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In the interest of improving the resilience of cyber-physical control systems to 
better operate in the presence of various cyber-attacks and/or faults, this dissertation 
presents a novel controller design based on deep-learning networks. This research lays out 
a controller design that does not rely on fault or cyber-attack detection. Being passive, the 
controller’s routine operating process is to take in data from the various components of the 
physical system, holistically assess the state of the physical system using deep-learning 
networks and decide the subsequent round of commands from the controller. This use of 
deep-learning methods in passive fault tolerant control (FTC) is unique in the research 
literature. The proposed controller is applied to both linear and nonlinear systems. 
Additionally, the application and testing are accomplished with both actuators and sensors 
being affected by attacks and /or faults.  
The effects of various attacks and faults are identified, and composed into a 
taxonomy for use in training and testing FTCs. By training the controller on the wide range 
of cyber-attack and fault effects, the type(s) of attack or fault affecting the system do not 
need to be known in advance. This research effort challenges the assertion made by some 
researchers that passive FTC is limited in utility or application because fault information 
must be known a priori. 
Two variants of the proposed controller design are presented and tested; one using 
a single large deep-learning network and the other using an ensemble of smaller networks. 
The proposed controller design is compared to an active fault tolerant controller. Both are 
v 
applied to simulations of a benchmark non-linear quadruple-tank system. Test results show 
both versions of the proposed controller design perform monotonically better than the 
active FTC in keeping or regaining control of the system during a simulated cyber-attack 
or fault. The proposed controller is also more responsive to changes in the system, not 
suffering from the delays inherent to active FTCs. 
The differences in performance are especially pronounced when the system under 
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DEEP LEARNING-BASED, PASSIVE FAULT TOLE RANT CONTROL 




This chapter provides the context for the research described in this dissertation. 
Events that exemplify the challenges faced by cyber-physical systems are described and 
the specific research questions to be explored are presented. The methodology and the 
scope of the proposed solution are introduced.  
1.1. Motivation 
In 2014, a German steel mill was attacked by hackers who accessed the operational 
control system via the company’s IT network [1]. The hackers were able to put the mill 
into an “undefined state” [2] from which a blast furnace could not be shut down properly, 
resulting in extensive, though unspecified physical damage to furnace systems at the mill. 
This confirmed case of a cyber-attack causing physical destruction of equipment followed 
the Stuxnet attack that damaged Iranian centrifuges at a uranium enrichment plant [2]. That 
attack was discovered in 2010; since then, experts have warned that it would only be a 
matter of time before other more destructive attacks would occur. 
In Maroochy, Australia, a former employee of the shire’s water services used radio 
signals to remotely switch valves in the water treatment plant [3]. He caused extensive 
environmental damage by routing 800,000 liters of untreated sewage into nearby 
waterways and parks, contaminating fresh water sources and killing marine life. 
More recently, the Ukrainian power grid was taken down in a cyber-attack that 
required “extensive reconnaissance” [4] and preparation to complete. This is, or should be, 
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of particular concern to the US Department of Defense (DOD). There are over 2,600 
electrical, water, wastewater, and natural gas utility systems on DOD installations [5]. In 
1997, the DOD decided that utility privatization was the preferred method for improving 
utility systems and services; Congress subsequently approved legislative authority for 
privatizing utility systems at military installations. Since these privatization efforts are 
currently under way, a closer look at the technology controlling these systems is warranted. 
1.2. General Issue 
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are systems of collaborating computational elements 
controlling physical entities such as: power and water, industrial systems, transportation 
systems, medical devices, security systems, building automation, emergency management, 
and many other systems vital to our well-being. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are a 
subset of these cyber-physical systems that comprise a diverse group of sensor and control 
systems used to monitor and control critical infrastructure. These include Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs).  
When any CPS malfunctions, or fails, the operation of the corresponding system(s) 
in the real world can endanger physical safety or even cause loss of life, as well as property 
damage or harm to the environment [6]. The priorities for traditional IT systems are usually 
focused, in order, on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the data. These 
priorities are generally reversed for ICS. Keeping the system up and running (data 
availability) is the top priority for ICS. Data integrity and confidentiality usually fall in 
behind availability. 
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As applied to ICS, industry recommended solutions include security policies, 
procedures, tools and products to prevent unauthorized access of the system [7] [8]. These 
solutions, when used together are commonly referred to as a “Defense in Depth” [9] 
approach. The elements of Defense in Depth are all useful and should be employed. 
Unfortunately, focusing too much on “preventing access” results in a cyber “Maginot Line” 
to protect ICS.  
France’s WWII defensive line did prevent the German army from simply rolling 
straight across the border. Instead, the Germans got around it by way of Belgium and easily 
conquered France. Likewise, Defense in Depth makes a head-on attack of an ICS much 
more difficult, but ICS are ill equipped to deal with malicious actors if, and when, they do 
gain access to the system. 
There has been (and continues to be) interest in the control theory community in 
developing controllers that can operate in the presence of a component failure, i.e. fault 
tolerant controls (FTC). Practitioners in this community have made the logical step of 
applying the benefits of FTC in developing controllers that can respond to a cyber-attack 
on any physical component of a system.  
Unlike active (reactive) controllers which depend on attack or fault detection to 
trigger their activity, passive (proactive) controllers are designed to properly control the 
system whether faults and/or attacks are present or not. Proactive controls are disregarded 
by many researchers because of the belief that proactive controllers are only effective if 
detailed information about the fault or attacks the system may face is known a priori [10] 
[11].  
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1.3. Research Questions  
This research will address the following questions relating to the use of fault 
tolerant controls to improve the resilience of cyber physical systems.  
Question 1. What are the physical layer effects in Cyber Physical System that could 
result from a component fault or cyber-attack?  
Question 2. How could a passive Fault tolerant Controller use deep learning to 
maintain operations, and how could it be realized?  
Question 3. Will the approach work for both linear and nonlinear systems?  
Question 4. What benefit(s) does passive FTC with deep learning provide 
compared to an active FTC?  
1.4. Methodology 
To answer the research questions stated above, this dissertation proposes an ICS 
control design that is broadly applicable to multiple input – multiple output (MIMO) and 
multiple input – single output (MISO) systems.  
 
Figure 1.1. Notional MISO and MIMO Systems Diagram. 
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For systems portrayed in Figure 1.1, the control signals going to the actuators in the 
system (plant) are labeled (ui) and the output signals from the system sensors are labelled 
(yi). Both systems have more than one actuator to be controlled, thus categorizing them as 
multiple input systems.  
In an effort to represent system faults and cyber-attacks, their possible effects are 
explored at the fundamental physical component (sensor or actuator) layer. By considering 
the possible behaviors of a sensor or actuator when being affected by faults or cyber-
attacks, we develop and present a taxonomy of effects. This taxonomy is useful in the 
design and testing of any FTC, but is foundational to the design, training and testing of a 
proposed controller design. 
The proposed controller holistically considers the entire state of the system under 
control and uses deep-learning networks (either stand-alone or in an ensemble) to 
determine the next appropriate commands for each actuator in the system under control. It 
does so without relying on a fault or attack detection mechanism. The proposed design is 
tested in simulations, on both linear and nonlinear systems, with multiple combinations of 
fault/attack effects on the sensors and actuators introduced to the system under test. The 
proposed controller performance is compared to a published active FTC controller design 
and the test results are analyzed. 
Finally, the proposed controller and comparison controller are tested on a system 
that is experiencing Stuxnet-like attacks. Those test results are also discussed. 
6 
1.5 Assumptions/Limitations 
The application of this research effort will only be demonstrated on MIMO and 
MISO systems. While this controller design could be applied to systems with a single input 
(single actuator), these are of limited interest, because the direct and/or indirect interaction 
within a system of multiple inputs make the control problem much more challenging and 
interesting. 
Any solution that would require altering the system to be controlled (e.g., adding 
redundant components or limiting the system’s intended operational capabilities) is not 
considered in this work. The solution controller needs to work with the system as designed. 
As described in Chapter 3, there are some fault and attack effects that can render 
an actuator in the cyber physical system “uncontrollable”. Since there is no fault tolerant 
or adaptive controller that can control an uncontrollable component, such fault and cyber-
attack effects will not be addressed in this work unless the system under control is designed 
with redundant actuators. 
1.6. Organization 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a 
review of the pertinent literature in the areas of fault tolerant control, reactive control, 
system modeling and faults and attacks on control systems. Chapter 3 shows the 
development of the taxonomy of effects and lays out the proposed controller design in 
detail. Chapter 4 describes a proof-of-concept, linear test subject and specifies how the 
proposed controller is applied to that test subject system. The method and results of testing 
the proposed controller design on the linear system are also discussed. Chapter 5 describes 
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a benchmark nonlinear test subject system and specifies how the proposed controller is 
applied to that test subject system. The design and training of the deep learning-based 
controller are presented in detail. The method and results of testing the proposed controller 
design on the nonlinear system are also discussed. In Chapter 6, a published comparison 
controller [12] is reviewed and the method and results of testing the comparison controller 
design on the same nonlinear system are presented and analyzed. This chapter also 
compares and addresses the results of testing the proposed and comparison controllers on 
the nonlinear test system. In addition, it also provides a discussion on the results of testing 
the comparison controller and the proposed controller(s) against Stuxnet-like attacks on the 
non-linear test system. Concluding remarks and comments are found in Chapter 7. 
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 Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview  
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant existing literature for the 
proposed research problem. First, is a review of work done in traditional fault tolerant 
controls, followed by data driven fault tolerant controls. A review of the fault tolerant 
controls using artificial intelligence is then presented and the section is rounded out with a 
review of the application of deep-learning methods applied to active fault tolerant controls. 
The final section reviews how faults and attacks are represented in the various publications. 
2.2 Relevant Research  
The literature reviewed in this chapter comes from two related areas of controls 
research: Fault Tolerant Controls (FTC) and controls designed to respond to attacks. The 
former focuses on designing controllers that can handle one or more faults/malfunctions in 
the system under control. The latter focuses on designing controllers that can respond to 
one or more deliberate attacks on the system under control. Both areas offer research 
worthy of discussion. 
The literature can be divided along a few different lines; active vs. passive FTC, 
model-based vs. data-driven, or those designed to work with linear vs. nonlinear systems. 
Active vs. passive FTC is a sorting used in much of the literature, and this section will 
begin there since the controller proposed in this work is passive and the controller against 
which it will be compared is active.  
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2.2.1 Fault Tolerant Controls 
Before beginning a review of the pertinent literature, it is useful to define the terms 
that are commonly used in the field of fault tolerant controls. The following definitions 
come from [13]. 
• Fault-tolerance: the ability of a controlled system to maintain control objectives, 
despite the occurrence of a fault. A degradation of control performance may be accepted. 
Fault-tolerance can be obtained through fault accommodation or through system and/or 
controller reconfiguration.  
• Fault-accommodation: change in controller parameters or structure to avoid the 
consequences of a fault. The input-output between controller and plant is unchanged. The 
original control objective is achieved although performance may degrade.  
• Reconfiguration: change in input-output between the controller and plant through 
change of controller structure and parameters. The original control objective is achieved 
although performance may degrade.  
• Supervision: the ability to monitor whether control objectives are met. If not, 
calculate a revised control objective and a new control structure and parameters that make 
a faulty closed loop system meet the new modified objective. Supervision should take 
effect if faults occur and it is not possible to meet the original control objective within the 
fault tolerant scheme. 
Figure 2.1 provides a taxonomy of FTC approaches in each category. The subjects 
highlighted in bold face are discussed in this section. The others are listed for context, and 
references to research in those areas are provided in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2.1. Taxonomy of Fault Tolerant Control Methods. 
Current efforts on FTC design can be classified as either passive (proactive), or 
active. The passive approach focuses on making the system insensitive to faults by 
designing a more robust controller. Passive Fault Tolerant Controllers (PFTC) are 
attractive for their comparative design simplicity. The advantage of the PFTC approach 
can be explained as follows. When a fault occurs, it takes some time for the Fault Detection 
and Diagnosis (FDD) module of an active FTC to detect the fault and then isolate and 
identify the fault. There may also be some delay due to the controller reconfiguration. 
During this period, the system is working with the nominal controller. Performance of the 
system in this period is mainly dependent on the severity of the fault and the robustness of 
the nominal controller. It is clear that the controlled system may become unstable during 
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this period [14]. For safety-critical systems, such as aircraft flight controls or nuclear power 
plants, the time window may be too short to perform accurate fault isolation and estimation. 
In such cases, a PFTC system is preferable because it does not need an FDD scheme [15]. 
2.2.1.1 Passive Fault Tolerant Control 
Passive controllers can employ robust control methods such as Linear Quadratic 
Gaussian (LQG) control like that used in [16] and [17]. The problem concerns linear 
systems driven by additive white Gaussian noise. The challenge is to determine an output 
feedback law that is optimal in the sense of minimizing the expected value of a quadratic 
cost criterion. The LQG controller is simply a combination of a Kalman filter (linear 
quadratic state estimator (LQE)) as part of a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) as shown in 
Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2. Linear Quadratic Gaussian Controller and System. 
The output measurements are assumed to be corrupted by Gaussian noise (v) and 
the initial state (w) is assumed to be a random Gaussian vector. The LQG controller 
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provides reliable linear quadratic state feedback control such that it can tolerate actuator 
outages. The work in [18] combines LQC and H∞ optimization to control flight tracking in 
the Advanced Tactical Fighter when actuator faults or flight surface impairments occur. 
H∞ optimization methods are used to synthesize controllers to achieve stabilization 
with guaranteed performance [19] [20] [21] [22]. To use H∞ methods, the control problem 
is expressed as a mathematical optimization problem, and the challenge is to find the 
controller that solves this optimization. H∞ techniques have the advantage over classical 
control techniques in that they are readily applicable to problems involving multivariate 
systems with cross-coupling between channels. The disadvantages of H∞ techniques 
include the level of mathematical understanding needed to apply them successfully and the 
need for a reasonably accurate model of the system to be controlled. The general form of 
an H∞ controller with plant is shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3. General Form of H-infinity Control. 
The plant (P) takes as input a reference signal and disturbances (w) as well as the 
manipulated signal (u). The outputs from the plant are an error signal (z) and the measured 
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variables (v) used to control the system. The controller (K) uses v to manipulate u. The 
signals w, u, z and v are usually vectors while P and K are matrices. The mathematical 
















The dependency of z on w is expressed as:  
𝑧 = 𝐹ℓ(𝐏, 𝐊)𝑤 
𝐹ℓ is called the lower linear fractional transformation and is defined as  
𝐹ℓ(𝐏, 𝐊) = 𝑃11 + 𝑃12𝐊(𝐼 − 𝑃22𝐊)
−1𝑃21 
Thus, the objective of H∞ control is to find K such that 𝐹ℓ(𝐏, 𝐊) is minimized 
according to the H∞ norm. 
It is important to keep in mind that the resulting controller is only optimal with 
respect to the prescribed cost function and does not necessarily represent the best controller 
in terms of the usual performance measures used to evaluate controllers such as settling 
time, energy expended, etc. As an example, the method used in [18], guarantees the H∞ 
performance of the normal systems, as well as the faulty system to be less than a 
predetermined bound.  
In the cases of [23] and [24] faults are modeled as uncertainties and a robust control 
is designed such that it can tolerate uncertainties. Robust control of uncertain piecewise 
linear systems using state feedback and continuous piecewise Lyapunov functions helps 
achieve the desired H∞ performance. 
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Another approach is to use simple redundancy as described in [25]. In this example, 
the presence of multiple redundant (identical) controllers to ensure H∞ performance is 
achieved even in the presence of sensor and/or actuator faults. 
Sliding Mode control (SMC) is a nonlinear control method that alters the dynamics 
of a nonlinear system by application of a discontinuous control signal that forces the system 
to "slide" along a cross-section of the system's normal behavior as depicted in Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4. Sliding Mode Control and System. 
The example in Figure 2.4 depicts a generic sliding mode control circuit. The 
discontinuous signal that forces the system to slide is usw and the signal being acted upon 
is ueq. 
The feedback control law is not a continuous function of time. Instead, it can switch 
from one continuous structure to another based on the current position in the state space. 
Thus, sliding mode control is a variable structure control method. The multiple control 
structures are designed so that trajectories always move toward an adjacent region with a 
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different control structure, and so the ultimate trajectory will not exist entirely within one 
control structure. Instead, it will slide along the boundaries of the control structures [26], 
[27] [28] as shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5. Phase Portrait of Sliding Mode Control [29]. 
One advantage of this method is that the dynamic behavior of the system may be 
directly tailored by the choice of switching function; essentially the switching function is 
a measure of desired performance [30]. The sliding mode approach is also used in [31] 
with application to aircraft control. 
Attack preventive approaches (also called proactive) seek to make the controller 
more robust by identifying the system vulnerabilities and changing the physical structure, 
changing parameters of the system, or by designing new control methodologies. They are 
not dependent on an attack detection system. The primary criticism of preventive 
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approaches is that designers are required to have prior knowledge of the types of attacks 
[11]. Work in preventive action controllers has focused on modifying the system structure 
(e.g., adding redundancy), or by designing more robust controllers. 
In [32] the authors use observability and controllability Gramian matrices as a 
means of measuring and minimizing network vulnerability. The vulnerabilities of a power 
system state estimator are explored in [33] where modifications of routing and data 
authentication are used to mitigate data integrity attacks. Authors in [34] find the optimal 
estimator that minimizes estimation error based on multiple sensor measures. 
The work in [35] investigates the problems of robust passive fault-tolerant control 
for systems with time-delays and uncertain parameters or unmodeled dynamics. The 
authors design a state feedback controller, which ensures robust stability of the closed loop 
system for all “admissible uncertainties”. The challenge is to design a controller that meets 
desired performance metrics and maintains stability despite the uncertainties in the system. 
The authors develop a linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach to solve these problems. 
This work considers only actuator faults and/or unknown parameters. 
2.2.1.2 Active Fault Tolerant Control 
In contrast to passive control, active FTC approaches focus on responding to an 
identified, or diagnosed fault. In order to respond to a fault, active controllers require a 
mechanism for detecting and isolating faults. Typically, an active FTC will have a Fault 
Detection and Identification (FDI) scheme and a controller reconfiguration mechanism 
paired with a reconfigurable controller [36]. The structure of an FTC system is depicted in 
Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6. Traditional Control Loop with Fault Detection & Diagnosis Block. 
In Figure 2.6 yref is the desired output of the system under control (i.e., condition 
the controller is trying to reach). The output of the controller is designated by u while the 
output of the system under control (the plant) is designated as y. Under normal operations, 
the controller compares yref to y and adjusts the next value of u to compensate for any error 
in the last value of y. 
The fault diagnosis block receives the input (u) and output (y) from the system, and 
checks its consistency with the behavior of the system. If the I/O sequence is consistent 
with the normal behavior of the system, then the system is considered to be working in the 
normal condition by the FDD block and will continue working with the nominal controller. 
If the I/O sequence is not consistent with the nominal behavior of the system, then the FDD 
block detects occurrence of a fault. Specifically, the measured difference between normal 
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and abnormal behavior is tracked and accumulates as a residual. Once the residual crosses 
a predetermined threshold, the fault is “detected”. 
Next, the FDD block tries to find out which fault has occurred by checking the 
consistency of the I/O sequence with the faulty behaviors of the system. The result is a 
fault candidate fc; the controller is then informed by the FDD block that fault fc has 
occurred. A new control scheme, should be designed online, or be selected among pre-
designed controllers such that the faulty system can achieve the control objective. 
If such a controller exists, then the system is considered to be fault-tolerant with 
respect to the fault fc and the control objective. But if the controller objective cannot be 
achieved, the system is not fault tolerant. In this case, a possible solution is to change the 
control objective, e.g. by allowing some degradation in system performance. 
Set-membership based detection and isolation approaches have been proposed for 
the detection of specific faults. These methods generally operate by discarding models of 
a system or subsystem that are not compatible with observed data rather than selecting the 
most likely model. 
There is a multiplicity of methods to perform active Fault Tolerant Control. 
Although each method has its own advantages (speed, accuracy, ease of implementation, 
etc.) and weaknesses (need for closed-form mathematical models, inability to detect 
multiple sensor faults, inability to distinguish between sensor and system faults, and the 
need to integrate different approaches together to accomplish different tasks such as 
modeling, fault detection, fault isolation, etc.). As shown in Figure 2.1, the approaches used 
can be divided into a few broad categories.  
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2.2.1.2.1 Observer Based Controllers 
An observer is a system that provides an estimate of the internal state of a given 
real system, from measurements of the input and output of the real system. A typical 
configuration of a system with an internal observer is shown in Figure 2.7.  
 
Figure 2.7. Control System with Internal Observer. 
Observers are a popular tool employed in the active FTC area for fault detection. 
The work in [37] introduces an observer-based approach to estimate the actuator fault in a 
system and design an FTC strategy that compensates for the effects of the fault. The authors 
use a quadratic boundedness approach to design the observer so that the state and fault 
estimation errors converge to the origin. 
In [38] the authors estimate simultaneous sensor and actuator faults using an 
adaptive observer based on the quadratic Lyapunov approach. The solution is described as 
an optimization problem formulated in terms of linear matrix inequalities. The proposed 
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controller is applied to a VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) aircraft system. The work 
in [39] also uses an adaptive observer but it is applied to aircraft engines in this case.   
2.2.1.2.2 Model Predictive Control  
Model Predictive Control (MPC) relies explicit model of the system to predict a 
future output chain (ŷ). The basic structure of MPC is shown in Figure 2.8.  
 
Figure 2.8. Basic Structure of Model Predictive Control. 
Based on predicted system output (ŷ) and current system output (y), the error (e) is 
calculated. The error is fed into the optimizer which calculates the future optimal control 
sequence (Δu) using the cost function and constraints. The sampling instant is represented 
by k. 
As an example, the work in [40] develops multiple models off-line then uses 
multiple MPC on-line to switch between models as faults are detected. The approach is 
demonstrated on a simulated DC servo from the MATLAB® controls toolbox. 
The work in [41] takes on a more challenging effort in using a discrete controller 
with an analog continuous system (these combinations are known as hybrid systems). 
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Intended to control an aircraft conducting air-to-air refueling, this work uses Hybrid Bond 
Graphs to capture the interactions in the physical system and temporal causal graphs to 
derive state-space equations for fault isolation and to estimate fault magnitudes.  
2.2.1.2.3 Adaptive Control 
Adaptive control changes the control law with parameters that may be uncertain or 
at least variable over time. A generic adaptive control diagram is shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9 Generic Adaptive Control Diagram. 
Unlike robust control, adaptive control requires no a priori knowledge of the bounds 
of the parameters or variables in question. Adaptive controls can be direct or indirect. 
Indirect adaptive control estimates the parameters of the controller using a model of the 
process. Direct adaptive control uses the I/O data to calculate the controller parameters. 
Reactive responses only take effect once the attack has been detected. They then 
reconfigure the control action to mitigate the impact of the attack on the system.  
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Many reactive controllers require switching between models or modes to maintain 
control. Upon detection of a fault, the switching methodologies in [42] and [43] generate a 
model or vector for the controller to compensate for the detected abnormality. 
Model-based responses use models of the system under normal conditions (i.e., not 
under attack) and compares them to the values received from the system under control to 
determine the best response to keep the system in a desirable state.  
There are two general types of model-based adaptive control: 
Model reference adaptive controllers (MRACs) which incorporate a reference model 
defining desired closed loop performance [44] as shown in Figure 2.10.  
 
 
Figure 2.10. Model Reference Adaptive Control Diagram. 
Examples of this approach are found in [45] and [46] in which the authors present 
a method for handling “locked in place” actuator faults by using a model of the system 
with known actuator faults as a reference to design a control structure to dealing with 
unknown actuator faults. 
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The other method is Model identification adaptive controllers (MIACs). This 
approach builds a mathematical model of the system while the system is running as 
shown in Figure 2.11. 
 
Figure 2.11. Model Identification Adaptive Control Diagram. 
An example of this approach is found in [47]. Here the authors use online model 
and control derivative identification to control the X-33 reusable launch vehicle in ascent 
mode. 
For both approaches, different types of models are used such as finite state 
machines [48] or linear models that can be used to represent nonlinear systems [49]. Others 
use redundant back-up controllers [50] or models of the process controller itself [51] [52] 
[53]. For further related work in the field of active FTC, the reader is referred to references 
[A1-A82] in Appendix A. 
In summary, the examples of published work in the area fault tolerant controls can 
be grouped as either active or passive as shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Passive and Active Fault Tolerant Control References. 
Passive FTC Active FTC 
[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 
[28] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] 
 
 
[37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] 
[43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] 
[49] [50] [51] [52] [53] 
A: [A1-A82] 
 
2.2.2 Data-Driven Control vs. Model-Based Control 
Up to this point, the control literature reviewed has been model-based. There is 
another separation in control approaches that cuts across both active and passive FTC; that 
is Model-Based Control (MBC) vs. Data Driven Control (DDC) [54]. Since at least one 
application of the proposed controller in this dissertation uses a data-driven design, it is 
appropriate to review the fundamentals of DDC.  
Data-driven controls are the control theories and methods in which the controller is 
designed directly using on-line or off-line I/O data of the controlled system or knowledge 
from the data processing without using explicit or implicit information of the mathematical 
model of the controlled process, and whose stability, convergence, and robustness can be 
guaranteed by rigorous mathematical analysis under certain reasonable assumptions [55]. 
The reason to make the division between MBC and DDC is that MBC theory can 
only solve control problems when reliable mathematical models are available and the 
uncertainties are constrained within a known moderate bound. DDC methods are the better 
choice for control problems in which the mathematical model is difficult to establish or 
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unavailable or if the mathematical model is complicated with too high of an order or too 
much nonlinearity [54]. 
Data direct controls generally fall into one of two structure types. The first is those 
with a fixed controller structure. This kind of DDC method involves controller design that 
depends only on plant I/O measurements with a pre-specified fixed controller structure. 
Controller parameters are obtained from some optimization procedures, such as batched or 
recursive algorithms. Here the controller design problem is transformed into the controller 
parameter identification with the help of the assumption that the controller structure is 
known prior and linear in controller parameters. No information regarding the plant model 
or dynamics is involved. The main issue in this kind of methods is how to determine 
controller structure for a given controlled plant. 
Obtaining a good controller structure with unknown parameters, especially for 
general nonlinear systems, is quite difficultAnother issue with this kind of DDC method is 
the lack of the stability and analysis methodologies. 
The second (and more interesting) type of DDC is made up of those systems with 
an unknown controller structure. These can further be divided into 2 subsets; Apparent 
DDC methods and Model-free DDC methods. 
Apparent DDC methods. In this DDC method the controller design is dependent 
only on measured plant I/O data and the plant model structure and the dynamics are 
implicitly involved in controller design. The controller design and methods of theoretical 
analysis are similar to those of MBC designs. However, they are also more robust when 
they are used in practice. The direct adaptive control and predictive control methods 
(described previously) are typical of this [56]. 
26 
Model-free DDC methods. This kind of DDC method implies that the controller is 
designed directly simply using the measured plant I/O data, without explicitly or implicitly 
using model information. This is the ideal type of DDC method. The outstanding feature 
of this kind of DDC methods is that it has a systematic controller design framework and 
systematic means of analyzing stability. The main difference between this kind of DDC 
method and others is that the effectiveness or rationality of the controller structure or 
controller designing is theoretically guaranteed using rigorous mathematics. This strategy 
can deal with the system control problems using a uniform way both for linear and 
nonlinear systems.  
2.2.2.1 Passive DDC 
A passive, model-free FTC method is presented in [57]. In this work several 
candidate controllers are designed without any knowledge of the plant model or fault 
model(s). Using an approach called unfalsified Control (UC) the controllers that do not 
achieve the required performance set by the designer are discarded (falsified) and switched 
out of the loop. That controller is then replaced by an unfalsified controller. This process 
continues until a controller is placed in the loop that can maintain proper performance. No 
fault detection or fault identification steps are involved. The decision to switch controllers 
is driven by poor performance of the system, not in response to a fault or attack. This 
controller in [57] was demonstrated on a MIMO system. 
2.2.2.2 Active DDC 
The work in [58] used active model predictive control (described previously) 
combined with a data-driven approach to determining the post-fault actions for system 
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recovery. The authors applied the control approach to a 4-motor drone experiencing partial, 
single and multiple faults. 
In [59] the authors present a data driven compensation controller to make a 
traditional PID controller more fault tolerant. This is an active FTC system that is 
demonstrated on a DC motor controller experiencing a single fault. 
In [60] an integrated data-driven adaptive FTC system design scheme is proposed 
for MIMO systems with unknown plant model dynamics. The nominal feedback controller 
is first designed with a data-driven observer-based residual generator, which produces a 
residual signal when a fault occurs. Then, the data-driven adaptive FTC compensator is 
developed using only the online system data. This Model Free Adaptive Control (MFAC) 
system is compared to an iterative feedback controller (IFC) on a stirred, heated tank 
system. 
In an unusual application of active fault detection [61] proposes an unsupervised 
model-free approach to detect insulin pump malfunctioning in an artificial pancreas, 
relying on data-driven techniques for anomaly detection. It is model-free, thus avoiding the 
complex subtask of identifying a model of patient physiology and it is also unsupervised, 
thus not requiring labeled data for training, which is difficult to obtain in actual practice. 
The authors extract a feature set capable of accounting for the dynamics in type-1 diabetic 
physiology and designed to highlight anomalous behaviors associated with pump faults. 
They then applied established anomaly detection methods to the data set. 
The work in [62] reviews a residual generator-based (active) data-driven fault-
tolerant control framework. The two data driven methods for deriving the optimal 
compensator control design are based on gradient decent or machine learning. By analyzing 
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the differences between the cost function of the two methods, it is confirmed that the 
solution obtained by the gradient descent method is locally optimal while the reinforcement 
learning method’s solution is globally optimal. Both methods are demonstrated on a DC 
motor benchmark case study. These systems are nonlinear. The fault used in this work is a 
single step disturbance. No discussion about multiple faults. 
For more examples of published work in the area of active Data-Driven FTC, the 
reader is referred to references [A84-A90] in Appendix A. 
In review, the published work in the area of Data-Driven Control can be grouped 
in to active and passive DDC as shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Active and Passive Data Driven Control References. 
Passive  Active   
[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[22]  [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 





[37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] 
[43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] 
[49] [50] [51] [52] [53] 
A: [A1-A82]  


















This last example brings up another area of research applicable to fault tolerant 
controls. That is the application of artificial intelligence methods in FTC. 
2.2.3 Artificial Intelligence in FTC  
The use of artificial intelligence techniques in fault tolerant control has been 
researched since 1988. Part of the reason for the interest is AI methods can be readily 
29 
applied to nonlinear systems which can be a challenge with crisp mathematical methods. 
Like conventional FTC methods, AI related FTC can be grouped as either passive or active. 
2.2.3.1 Passive FTC using Artificial Intelligence 
The first published work on using AI with passive FTC or adaptive controls was 
the application of Fuzzy Control theory to the flight controls of an F-16 experiencing 
actuator faults [63] also found in [64]. In this work, the authors use fuzzy model learning 
to teach the controller normal aircraft responses to various pilot inputs. With the “normal” 
model in memory, the controller used fuzzy control principles to adapt the controller 
outputs when the aircraft behavior varied from the normal model. The approach is effective 
to a point. The authors found that trying to model all possible fault conditions resulted in 
degraded performance of the controller under normal conditions as well as being very 
computationally demanding. 
Like all fuzzy controllers, this approach is well suited to non-linear systems. While 
this work could theoretically handle more than one simultaneous actuator faults, the 
possibility of co-occurring sensor faults is not addressed in this work. 
In 2001, the authors of [65] published work on a fuzzy logic-based damage-
mitigation controller. The system uses a dual level control scheme. In addition to the 
normal (lower level) control functions the controller also employs a structural model of the 
system and a damage prediction model. Using data from the system during operation, the 
damage prediction model informs the fuzzy damage controller (higher level control) when 
conditions indicate a higher likelihood of damage to a critical component. The fuzzy 
damage controller then adjusts the control signals to the system to lessen the likelihood of 
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damage to a component This early work added to the body of research, but is not actually 
FTC. 
In [66], which was published in 2011, the authors investigate the position and 
velocity tracking control problem with high-speed trains with multiple vehicles connected 
through couplers. A dynamic model reflecting nonlinear and elastic impacts between 
adjacent vehicles as well as traction/braking nonlinearities and actuation faults is derived. 
They developed neuro-adaptive fault-tolerant control algorithms to account for various 
factors such as input nonlinearities, actuator failures, and uncertain impacts of in-train 
forces in the system simultaneously. The resulting control scheme is essentially 
independent of any system model and is primarily data-driven because with the appropriate 
input–output data, the proposed control algorithms are capable of automatically generating 
the intermediate control parameters, neuro-weights, and the compensation signals, literally 
producing the traction/braking force based upon input and response data only. The process 
does not require precise information on system models or system parameters. 
Finally, in [67] the authors propose a passive fault-tolerant tracking controller for 
use with a class of uncertain, non-linear systems with intermittent faults and time delays. 
The proposed controller uses a fuzzy control system combined with a PID controller on a 
two-tank system experiencing intermittent actuator faults. 
2.2.3.2 Active FTC Using Artificial Intelligence 
Research in using artificial intelligence in active FTC was first published in 1988 
when the authors of [68] proposed adding a learning portion to a rule-based FTC system 
so that new rules for controlling the system can be generated to respond to an unanticipated 
fault in the system. The controller used redundant software and hardware to ensure accurate 
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data (at varying levels of fidelity) was available when required. The rules and normal 
operating data were stored in a lattice structure. Rules for all anticipated faults were 
included in the original controller design. When an unanticipated fault was detected, the 
controller would search by depth and by breadth across the lattice for the existing data and 
rules that best match the conditions of the unanticipated fault and generate control actions. 
The authors of [69] use a multi-layer perceptron network as the process model and 
adapt it on-line using extended Kalman filters to learn changes in process dynamics. In this 
way, the adaptive model learns the post-fault dynamics caused by actuator or component 
faults. Then, the inversion of the neural model is used as a controller to maintain the system 
stability and control performance after fault occurrence. The convergence of the model 
inversion control is verified using the Lyapunov method. 
In [70] the authors provide an overview of applying a neural network to the control 
of a nonlinear system for the purpose of detecting, identifying and accommodating a fault 
in the system. The fault(s) are unspecified but categorized as either “incipient” or “abrupt” 
and are, therefore, only described their time profile matrix. A learning algorithm is used to 
approximate the function of the fault thus acting as detector and identifier all in one. No 
mention is made of detecting more than one fault at a time. 
The authors of [71] integrated model-based adaptive control and reconfiguration 
based on fault detection and diagnosis. The adaptive controller and the fault detection 
scheme are based on a fuzzy model process. In this case it is applied to a heat exchanger 
which is a non-linear system. The topic of addressing multiple simultaneous faults is not 
addressed. 
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The authors of [72] show that a dynamic fuzzy logic controller (DFLC) could be 
shown to be equivalent to a sliding mode controller, but without the chattering they 
experience during disturbances. Sliding mode controllers have a “dead zone” in which the 
control equations converge to zero for second order (and lower) systems. This work applies 
the DFLC to higher order nonlinear systems. 
Similarly, in [73] the authors apply fuzzy logic techniques to affect the gain on a 
sliding mode controller to design a discontinuous controller for nonlinear multivariable 
systems to eliminate the chattering they experience during disturbances.  
In [74] a genetic algorithm is used to design a fault tolerant controller for the active 
magnetic bearings used by the Rolls Royce turbomachine’s rotor. This is a nonlinear 
system. The controller has a fault compensator which responds by shifting the workload to 
neighboring coils when the controller detects that one has failed (which is the anticipated 
fault). The authors do discuss the application of this approach to multiple coil failures but 
do not implement in under those conditions. 
A genetic algorithm is also used in [75] to train a multi-layer neural network. The 
controller relies on redundancy to ensure there is a fault-free data path and the neural 
network selects which data path to use when a fault is detected by the active detection 
circuit. The genetic algorithm retrains the network weights. The controller is implemented 
on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). 
The authors of [76] use a genetic algorithm to redesign the sliding mode controller 
after a fault is detected. This approach preserves much of the dynamics of the system 
unaffected by the failure. 
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For more published work in the area of active FTC using artificial intelligence 
techniques, the reader is referred to references [A91-A117] in Appendix A. 
In summary, the examples of published work in Artificial Intelligence in fault 
tolerant and adaptive controls can be grouped as either active or passive as shown in Table 
2.3. 
Table 2.3. Passive and Active References on Artificial Intelligence in FTC. 
Passive  Active   
[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[22]  [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 
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[49] [50] [51] [52] [53] 
A: [A1-A82]  
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2.2.4 Deep Learning in Fault Tolerant Controls 
Deep learning is a comparatively recent development in Artificial Intelligence. 
While deep-learning networks are a type of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) they differ 
from the traditional neural networks referenced previously. Deep-learning networks are 
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capable of effectively working with much larger data sets than traditional neural networks. 
Additionally, deep-learning networks do not require any type of a priori feature extraction.  
2.2.4.1 Active Fault Tolerant Control Using Deep Learning 
There are a few examples of deep-learning methods being used in active FTC 
systems. The earliest is from 2016 in which the authors used a stacked sparse auto encoder 
to learn the deep architectures of fault data to minimize the loss of information in the event 
of a fault. Their proposed method was used to improve the divisibility between faults and 
normal process, and classify faults in the chemical benchmark, Tennessee Eastman Process 
(TEP) data [77]. 
In 2018 the authors of [78] used a hybrid recurrent/convolutional neural network 
model to estimate adaptation parameters for F-16 aircraft dynamics experiencing 
actuator/engine faults. The model is trained offline from a database of different failure 
scenarios. When a fault occurs, the model identifies adaptation parameters and feeds this 
information to an adaptive controller, which changes its configuration to better handle the 
fault. This controller works especially well in the case of significant actuator faults/failures.  
Another active FTC application of deep learning is found in [79] published in 2019. 
Here the authors proposed a real-time fault diagnostic model for air-handling units 
(AHUs); the model used deep learning to improve the operational efficiency of AHUs. 
EnergyPlus® simulation software was used to establish different types of fault operation 
behavior data to serve as reference for the deep-learning network, thus improving the 
reliability of the diagnostic model. The proposed deep neural network features five hidden 
layers, each comprised of 200 neurons. 
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The authors of [80] propose using deep-learning tools, specifically auto-encoders, 
to actively identify faults in in the assemblies of automobile instrument clusters. 
In [81] the authors propose a fault diagnosis method based on convolutional neural 
network (CNN) for aero-engine sensors. Convolutional layers and pooling layers in a CNN 
are used to extract correlation features among sensed signals, based on which fully 
connected layers are used to actively diagnose sensor faults. The inception module method 
is used to extract features on different data sizes among sensors, making the method 
capable of detecting multi-sensor faults.  
More recently, a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network was used to actively 
diagnose sensor bias in an air-cooled chiller system [82]. 
In [83], a mapless movement policy for robots is presented. Deep reinforcement 
learning is used to create a policy which is capable of handling a robot even when some of 
its sensors are broken. The policy is based on three neural models capable not only of 
moving the robot, but also learning the best movement behavior to adapt it to its perception 
needs.  
The other FTC-related deep learning work is based around bearing fault detection 
and fault identification [84]. The publications in this survey use, autoencoder networks, 
restricted Boltzman machines and convolutional neural networks to detect and/or identify 
failing bearings. 
2.2.4.2 Passive Fault Tolerant Control Using Deep Learning 
We are not aware of any passive FTC systems that employ deep-learning methods. 
Thus, passive FTC using deep-learning methods appears to be a research area of potential 
interest. 
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The examples of published work in deep learning in active fault tolerant and 
adaptive controls are added to the active FTC group as shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Passive and Active FTC Methods with Deep Learning Included. 
Passive  Active   
[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 








[63] [64] [65] [66] [67] 
[37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] 
[43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] 
[49] [50] [51] [52] [53] 
A: [A1-A82]  





[68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] 
[74] [75] [76] 
A: [A91-A117] 
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The control approach proposed in this dissertation is a passive controller that uses 
deep-learning methods. 
All of the works discussed thus far have some form of limitation. Active FTC 
controllers must rely on detecting and identifying a fault. To prevent the poor performance 
that would result from a high rate of false positives or false negatives in the detection 
mechanism, some form of cumulative residual is calculated thus forcing a delay between 
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the onset of the attack or fault and the detection of it. Once detected, the active FTC system 
must select the appropriate corrective action. Combined, these steps result in a delay that 
could allow the system under control to experience a critical failure before control is 
regained. 
Among the passive FTC works cited, the limitations are primarily system-based 
(linear or piece-wise linear only) [16] [17] [19] [23] [24] or component-based (sensor faults 
only [26] [34] or actuator faults only [22] [18] [27] [31] [35] [63] [64] [67]). The other 
limitations are the requirement to add redundant components [25] [32] or limiting the types 
of attacks or faults that can occur [20] [21] [28]. Table 2.5 summarizes the limitations as 
described. 
Table 2.5. References Sorted by Limitations. 
Limitation Referenced Work 
Response Delay from Fault/Attack Onset All Active FTC 
Linear (Piecewise Linear) Systems Only [16] [17] [19] [23] [24] 
Sensor Faults Only [26] [34] 
Actuator Faults Only [22] [18] [27] [31] [35] [63] [64] [67] 
Redundancy Required [25] [32] 
Specific Attack/Fault Types Only [20] [21] [28] 
 
The ideal controller would adapt to the effects of faults and attacks as a matter of 
routine operations, not relying on a detection mechanism. This controller would be able to 
deal with attacks and faults on both sensors and actuators. It would be able to work on 
linear and nonlinear systems alike and would not require adding additional redundant 
components to function properly. In this work, we propose such a controller. 
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2.2.5 Faults and Cyber-Attacks on FTC as Represented in Literature 
In the body of FTC work, the faults that can affect the system under control are 
represented in different ways. In [70] the speed at which the faults occur was addressed by 
categorizing them as either abrupt or incipient. Abrupt faults occur quickly and are 
generally easier for active FTCs to detect and identify, while the effects of incipient faults 
come on gradually over time and can be more difficult for active FTCs to detect or identify. 
In identifying the faults that could affect a wind turbine [85], the authors separate 
out the faults as sensor faults and actuator faults. The sensor faults are labeled as Fixed 
Value or Gain Factor. A Fixed Value fault occurs when the sensor repeatedly reports the 
same value when that value should be changing. A Gain Factor fault is one in which the 
sensor reports a higher value than is correct, but the reported value does change over time.  
For actuators, the faults are labelled as either Offset or Changed Dynamics. An Offset fault 
is said to have occurred when an actuator consistently misses the intended end state by the 
error size. A Changed Dynamic fault occurs when the actuator responds differently to a 
given command. 
A popular approach in much of the research is to assume the fault is manifested as 
a fading component. For example, the work in [86] represents the faulty actuator as 
responding to the control command at some level below that which is intended.  
Mathematically, faults are often treated as additive or multiplicative terms [87] 
appended to the in the model of the system.  
Taken together, these articles provide useful examples of different ways that 
component faults can be represented, but none provide a comprehensive picture of the 
effects of faults on industrial control systems. 
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Three studies were conducted in 2017. The authors of [88] present a model-based 
software development framework integrated with a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for 
rapidly deploying CPS attack experiments. The framework provides the ability to emulate 
low level attacks and obtain platform specific performance measurements that could be 
difficult to obtain in a traditional simulation environment. This work focused on the attack 
vectors and types of attacks (DDoS, packet sniffing, side-channel attacks, etc.) rather than 
looking at the effects of the attacks on control components. 
In [89] the authors capture and systematize existing research on CPS security under 
a unified framework. The framework consists of three orthogonal coordinates: (1) from the 
security perspective, they follow the well-known taxonomy of threats, vulnerabilities, 
attacks and controls; (2) from the CPS components perspective, they focus on cyber, 
physical, and cyber-physical components; and (3) from the CPS systems perspective, they 
explore general CPS features as well as representative systems (e.g., smart grids, medical 
CPS and smart cars). Here again the research does not drill down to the physical component 
level. 
In [90] the authors present an analysis method (STPA-SafeSec) to consider both 
system safety and security. This work references the physical layer components as part of 
the process analysis, but does not address specific effects at that layer. 
In work leading up to this dissertation [91] industrial control systems were modeled 
along with inputs from an attacker and the system response was tested using formal 
verification. That research highlighted the necessity of knowing all the effects a fault or 
cyber-attack can have on a CPS. 
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There is no published work that addresses the full range of effects that cyber-attacks 
and faults can have at the physical layer of a cyber-physical system. We address this in 
Chapter 3. 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the relevant research in the area of fault tolerant controls 
(both active and passive), data driven fault tolerant controls, the use of artificial intelligence 
in FTC and, specifically, the application of deep-learning methods. The limitations of 
previously published works were identified and the area of passive FTC using deep 
learning was identified as an open area of research. There was also a review of the research 
addressing the types of faults and attacks and how they are represented in the TC research. 
41 
 Background and Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
As stated in Chapter 1, this dissertation presents a novel, passive controller for 
industrial control systems designed to operate properly in the presence of multiple cyber-
attacks and/or component faults. This chapter initially presents background information on 
the network structure and protocols used by industrial control systems. This is followed by 
the development and introduction of a taxonomy of the effects faults and cyber-attacks can 
have on the physical components of the system. The chapter also introduces the design of 
a deep learning-based, passive controller design for ICS networks. The application of the 
taxonomy of effects to training and testing this controller is discussed. Finally, a version 
of the controller that uses an ensemble of smaller networks instead of a single large network 
is described. 
3.2 ICS Networks 
Industrial Control Systems can be very complex with multiple layers of activity, as 
shown in Figure 3.1 (originally from the DoD Committee on National Security Systems 
Instruction (CNSSI) No. 1253, “Security Categorization and Control Selection for National 
Security Systems”). In this layered representation, the highest layer represents the interface 
between the ICS and the outside world while the lowest layer represents the physical 
components that interface the controller to the system under control. Layers 2 through 5 
use well known Internet Protocols (IPs). 
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Figure 3.1. CNSSI 1235 ICS Overlay Enclave Authorization Boundary & Layers [92]. 
Less well known are the non-IP connections appearing in layers 0 through 2, as 
shown in Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2. Notional ICS Network. 
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Depending on the size and complexity of the ICS network, it may or may not 
include Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) or Remote terminal Units (RTUs). A 
small control system may have the controller tied directly to the individual components 
(actuators and sensors) that interact with the physical system (or plant) under control.  
The connections from layer 2 down to layer 0 can be radio, cellular or wired 
(telephone, coaxial or Ethernet). These connections are referred to as a “fieldbus”. Fieldbus 
was the original protocol used for these communications. According to the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), there are 16 different Communication Profile 
Families (CPFs) or protocols used in process controls [93]. Fieldbus is the generic term for 
any of them. The most common are Foundation Fieldbus, Profibus, Modbus, and the 
Control and Information Protocol (CIP). For the purposes of this research effort no 
distinction is made between various fieldbus protocols. All of them carry data to and from 
the controller. The particular format of the data and the protocol(s) used are irrelevant to 
this research effort. 
3.3 Effects of Cyber-Attacks and Faults  
The survey [89] cited in Chapter 2 provides a taxonomy of cyber threats (Criminal, 
Espionage, Insider, etc.) and identifies the various types of cyber-attacks that can affect 
cyber-physical systems. However, the effects discussed are limited to the system level and 
the proposed “controls” are all focused on limiting network access to the system. Nowhere 
in the literature is there discussion of the component-level effects that cyber-attacks can 
have on an industrial control system. The remainder of this section uses the ICS enclave 
layers described in Figure 3.1 and the list of ICS attacks listed in [89] as the starting point 
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to develop a taxonomy of cyber-attack effects on ICS. The effects of faults are also rolled 
in so the resulting taxonomy can be used in the training and/or testing of a control system 
meant to address the faults and cyber-attacks that can impact an ICS. 
The cyber-attack examples include the attack on the Maroochy Water Services in 
Queensland Australia. In that case, the attacker accessed the system via a wireless 
communications link (layer 2) and used his system knowledge to send false commands to 
the system pumps (actuators) at layer 0. 
In the Stuxnet example, the malware was written to exploit the lack of encryption 
on the Siemens motor controllers and the fieldbus that connected them to infect the system. 
This resulted in harmful control commands being injected into the system and false sensor 
signals being sent to the controllers so the human monitors were not aware of the 
misbehaving systems. With Stuxnete, the attack entered the system at layer 5 and 
propagated through the ICS until it found its way to the motor controllers (layer 1). 
The German steel mill attack [1] was an example of hackers accessing the corporate 
IT network (layer 5) and pivoting via layer 4 to the operational network (layer 3). In that 
case the hackers used the controllers in layers 2 and 1 to eventually manipulate multiple 
actuators (layer 0) and put the system into a state from which the blast furnace could not 
easily be shut down.  
The Modbus worm [94] exploits the lack of authentication in the Modbus protocol. 
The worm has been demonstrated to cause DoS attacks by causing servers to repeatedly 
reset and injecting false command signals to the system actuators. 
A research effort using the Shodan program [95] found over 14,000 ICS directly 
connected to the internet. Web-based attacks have been used to leave devices in an open 
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connection state thus allowing an illegitimate user to access the field devices remotely and 
execute malicious commands or cause a denial of service to the legitimate users. 
Looking across these examples, there is no single means of access or type of attack 
that was common to all. The only common factor in each was that the field devices (sensors 
and/or actuators) of the system were affected. In the case of the Denial of Service attacks, 
the field devices never received the command signals and therefore did not respond. In 
those attacks where malicious control signals were introduced to the system. The actuators 
responded to those modified signals. The Stuxnet attack was a good example of falsified 
sensor data being introduced into the system thus preventing any notification that the 
system was behaving abnormally. 
3.4 Taxonomy of Effects on Physical Components 
At layer 0, sensors and actuators are the components which interface between the 
cyber side and the physical side in cyber physical systems as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Basic Control System 
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From the perspective of the controller, the information of interest is the last control 
signal sent to the actuator(s) of the plant 𝑢𝑡 and the output reported by the sensor(s) of the 
plant 𝑦𝑡. A “dumb” controller assumes the actuators are behaving as commanded and that 
the sensor readings it is receiving are accurate. Therefore, minimizing any difference (or 
error) between the reported output 𝑦𝑡 and the desired output 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑓 is addressed by adjusting 
the commands to the plant actuators 𝑢𝑡. Other than the sensor readings 𝑦𝑡, the plant is a 
black box operation to the controller. 
In reality the output error could be caused by an attack or a fault of the actuator 
(shown as  ?̂?𝑡 in Figure 3.4) or the error may be incorrectly perceived by the controller 
because of an attack or a fault of the sensor (shown as  ?̂?𝑡  in Figure 3.4). Even more 
challenging still, is a combination of both. 
 
Figure 3.4. Basic Control System with Attacks/Faults 
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A control system, like that shown in Figure 3.4. can be modeled using simple 
differential equations 
?̇? = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵𝑢 
𝑦 = 𝐶𝑥 + 𝐷𝑢 
Where 𝑥 is the system state, 𝑢 is the input to the system actuator(s) and 𝑦 is the 
output from the system sensor(s). A common way of representing a fault in the system is 
to add the fault term to the equations. So, an actuator fault would be represented in the 
differential equations as  
?̇? = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵?̂? 
𝑦 = 𝐶𝑥 + 𝐷?̂? 
Where ?̂? is the resulting faulty actuator signal resulting from some function of 𝑢 
and an erroneous or malicious input 𝑣.  
?̂? = 𝑓(𝑢, 𝑣) 
Similarly, a sensor fault would be a function of the output equation and a faulty or 
malicious input s. 
?̂? = 𝑓(𝐶𝑥 + 𝐷𝑢, 𝑠) 
This ?̂? and ?̂? nomenclature will be used through this section and we will return to these 
control system equations shortly. 
By focusing on the effects of faults and/or attacks, rather than how the attack or 
fault occurred, we can enumerate and describe the effects of cyber-attacks and faults in 
terms of how the system sensors and actuators behave. We present the development of a 




The term sensor refers to a device that measures something from the physical 
system under control and reports that measurement to the controller. All modern ICS 
sensors operate on common principles; a physical change in the system produces a 
corresponding electrical (voltage, current, capacitance, etc.) change in the sensor. Figure 
3.5 shows an example of a water level measurement sensor. 
 
Figure 3.5. Example Water Level Sensor [96] 
In the case of this example sensor, changing water level causes a change in the 
capacitance of the sensor. That capacitance measurement is converted (via Capacitance-to-
Digital Converters) to a digital signal which is then sent to the controller via the fieldbus.  
From one time increment (𝑡) to the next (𝑡 + 1), the value of the measurement sent 
(reported) from a properly functioning sensor can only change in one of three ways as 
shown in Table 3.1, where y is the value of the reported signal from the sensor. 
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Table 3.1. Possible Changes of Sensor Measurement Values 
Value Change 
Increase yt < yt+1 
Decrease yt > yt+1 
No change yt = yt+1 
 
Any fault in the sensor can cause the value of the reported measurement (y) to be 
different than the actual value. Similarly, a cyber-attack on the system can alter or replace 
the value being reported via the fieldbus from the sensor. In either case, if the reported 
value is incorrect, there are only four comparative ways in which the measured value can 
differ from the actual value over a single time step as shown in Table 3.2, where ?̂? is the 
corrupt reported value, and 𝑦 is the correct value of the measurement (i.e., the value that 
should have been reported). 
Table 3.2. Possible Changes in Reported Sensor Measurement Values 
Reported Value Differs from Actual Value 
High ŷt = yt  AND  ŷt+1 > yt+1 
Low ŷt = yt  AND  ŷt+1 < yt+1 
No change ŷt = yt  AND ŷt = ŷt+1 AND  yt ≠ yt+1 
No value ŷt = yt  AND ŷt+1 = { } 
 
These four comparative variations between the reported and actual values can be 
considered the building blocks for creating the effects of a fault or cyber-attack on the 
sensor. By expanding the time frame to cover several consecutive time steps, we begin to 
see more possible effects. If the same type of effect persists over time, the resulting effect 
remains the same. If different basic effects are combinations of these effects can be added 
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to those already identified. If there is a pattern to the combination the effect is cyclical, 
otherwise it is stochastic. Thus, the effects on the reported value, as compared to the actual 
value, can be represented by the six different effects described in Table 3.3. These six 
representative effects can be set to start abruptly or gradually (incipient faults) and, of 
course, the specific values of the variables should be set to match the system to be tested. 
Table 3.3. Fundamental Effects on Sensors 


















Where μ is mean and σ is the 





?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑦𝑡+𝑧 + 𝛾 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝜋𝑧) 
Where γ determines the 
magnitude of an additive cyclical 





 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 =    Where ε is the fixed value 
6 No Value ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = { }    
 
Returning to the control theory equation for the sensor output 
?̂? = 𝑓(𝐶𝑥 + 𝐷𝑢, 𝑠) 
The variable s is drawn from the third column of Table 3.3. If, for example, the 
control designer wants to represent an additive effect (# 1 through #4) to their system 
model, the output equation would take the form  ?̂? = 𝐶𝑥 + 𝐷𝑢 + 𝑠. For multiplicative 
effects (#1 or #2) the output equation would take the form  ?̂? = 𝑠(𝐶𝑥 + 𝐷𝑢). Effects #5 
and #6 are simple replacement functions (i.e., ?̂? = 𝑠). 
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3.4.1.2 Actuators 
An actuator is a device that effects a change in the physical system under control. 
The actuator receives an electronic command signal from the controller via the fieldbus 
and converts that signal into physical action. 
The process to develop the effects of cyber-attacks and faults on actuators is very 
similar to that done for sensors. From one time increment (t) to the next (t+1), the value of 
the command signal sent to a properly functioning actuator can only change in one of three 
ways as shown in Table 3.4, where u is the value of the command signal. 
Table 3.4. Possible Changes in Actuator Command Values 
Value Change 
Increase ut < ut+1 
Decrease ut > ut+1 
No change ut = ut+1 
 
A cyber-attack on the system can alter or replace the command signal value to the 
actuator. Similarly, a mechanical or electrical fault in the actuator can cause the actuator to 
respond to the command signal as if the value of the signal were something different than 
the actual value u. In either case, if the actuator does not respond as desired, there are only 
four ways in which the action value can differ from the commanded value over a single 
time step as depicted in Table 3.5, where û is the altered or misinterpreted command signal. 
These four comparative variations between the received and actual values are the building 
blocks for creating the effects of a fault or cyber-attack on the actuator. By expanding the 
time frame to cover several consecutive time steps, we begin to see more possible effects.  
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Table 3.5. Possible Variations from Actuator Value 
Reported Value Differs from Actual Value 
High ût = ut  AND  ut+1 < ût+1 
Low ût = ut  AND  ut+1 > ût+1 
No change ût = ut  AND ut ≠ ut+1 AND  ût = ût+1 
No Value ût = ut  AND ût+1 = { } 
 
If the same type of effect persists over time, the resulting effect remains the same. 
Combinations of these effects can be added to those already identified. If there is a pattern 
to the combination, the effect can be considered cyclical, otherwise it is stochastic. Thus, 
the effects on the received command signal value, as compared to the actual value, can be 
represented by the six different effects described in Table 3.6. These six representative 
effects can be set to start abruptly or gradually (incipient faults) and, of course, the specific 
values of the variables should be set to match the system to be tested. 
Table 3.6. Fundamental Effects on Actuators 
 


















Where μ is mean and σ is the 





?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑢𝑡+𝑧 + 𝛾 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝜋𝑧) 
Where γ sets the magnitude of a 





?̂?𝑡+𝑧 =    Where ε is the fixed value 
6 No Value ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = { }   
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Returning to the control theory equations for the system, the variable v is drawn 
from the third column of Table 3.6. For all of the actuator effects, the system equations 
would take the form  
?̇? = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵?̂? 
𝑦 = 𝐶𝑥 + 𝐷?̂? 
If, for example, the control designer wants to represent an additive effect (#1 
through #4) to their system model, then ?̂? = 𝑣 + 𝑢. For multiplicative effects (#1 or #2) 
the altered input signal is derived from ?̂? = 𝑣(𝑢). Effects #5 and #6 are simple replacement 
functions (i.e., ?̂? = 𝑣). 
The 12 representative effects (from Table 3.3 and Table 3.6) constitute a taxonomy 
of effects that cyber-attacks and faults can have on the sensors and actuators of an ICS. 
Using this taxonomy, the control designer can represent the effects as abrupt or incipient, 
as intermittent or continuous, as a single effect or in combination with other effects.  
This taxonomy is a basis upon which any fault tolerant or adaptive control can be 
tested. Because the effects can be applied to any Industrial Control System or any Cyber-
physical system, they can be used to test both active and passive FTC. The flexibility of 
setting variable values associated with each effect also means they can be readily applied 
to the training of control systems that employ any kind of learning in their design. This 
taxonomy is foundational to the controllers designed and presented in later chapters of this 
dissertation. 
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3.5 Proposed Controller Considerations 
To be generally applicable to ICS, the controller must work with both linear and 
non-linear systems. The controller must also be capable of handling faults or cyber-attacks 
that affect both the sensors and the actuators of the system. The controller must also be 
capable of handling any type of cyber-attack or fault effect. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the goal of active FTC is ensuring the stability and 
performance, possibly degraded, of a system experiencing one or more faults, by 
reconfiguring the controller on-line, using a fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) 
component that detects, isolates and estimates the current fault. Contrary to this active 
approach, the passive solution uses a unique robust controller that, will deal with all the 
expected faults.  The passive approach has the advantage of avoiding the time delay 
required in active FTC for on-line fault diagnosis and control reconfiguration. In addition, 
passive controller designs are generally more simple in their design. 
A primary criticism of passive (proactive) controllers is that a knowledge of the 
types of attacks or faults the controller may face is required a priori. As seen in Chapter 2, 
the existing literature regarding passive FTC always places some sort of limitation on the 
type of fault, or type of component or type of system to which the controller can be applied. 
Since almost any conceivable type of component effect can be represented using the 
taxonomy described previously, these limitations can be set aside and a truly universal 
passive FTC can be considered. 
Because it would be used with complex systems, such a controller must necessarily 
be capable of considering multiple simultaneous inputs. Which specific inputs are the most 
important will vary from system to system, so the controller should be able to select the 
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inputs used to determine the correct control command. Because the effects of cyber-attacks 
and faults are characterized in part by how they change over a segment of continuous time, 
the controller must also be able to leverage the change in inputs over a segment in time. 
These considerations drove the decision to design the proposed controller around a Long 
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network [97].  
3.5.1 Long Short-Term Memory Networks 
LSTM networks are a type of deep-learning, recurrent neural network (RNN) 
designed to classify activities over time. LSTMs are a favored tool in applications such as 
natural language recognition or activity classification from video inputs. Their ability to 
use time series inputs makes LSTMs a good candidate for use with industrial control 
systems. ICS are commonly continuous-time (analogue) plants controlled by discrete-time 
(digital) controllers.  
Intended for use with time series inputs, RNNs not only process an input vector but 
they also include previous hidden layer values as well. This allows the network to use 
previous iterations as part of its calculations for selecting the best output. Because RNNs 
use back-propagation to update the network weights during training, they are prone to 
phenomena known as “vanishing gradient” and “exploding gradient” [98]. 
The relationship between layers in a RNN is multiplicative. As a result, in deep 
networks (those with many hidden layers), the values being passed back through the 
network to update the weights can quickly become so small that they have little or no effect 
on the front layers (vanishing gradient). It also easy for the opposite to occur where some 
values grow exponentially causing some weights to be grossly over-emphasized (exploding 
gradient). 
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LSTM networks address these problems by including a “forget gate” which allows 
the individual nodes (called cells) of the network to either carry useful information through 
to the next layer to update the weights or dismiss information that will overly affect the 
weights. Figure 3.6 shows a notional LSTM cell, also called a block. As shown, an 
individual cell takes as input the output of a previous cell ht-1, the previous cell state ct-1, 
and the new system input xt, also called a feature. The output from a given cell is denoted 
as ht and the state of that cell is ct. The internal gates are the forget gate 𝑓, the input gate 𝑖, 
the input modulation gate 𝑔 and the output gate 𝑜.  
 
 
Figure 3.6. Typical LSTM Block [99]. 
The equations for the individual cell are given below, in which the subscript t 
denotes time.  
𝑓𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑤𝑓[ℎ𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑡] + 𝑏𝑓) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑤𝑖[ℎ𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑡] + 𝑏𝑖) 
𝑜𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑤𝑜[ℎ𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑡] + 𝑏𝑜) 
where 
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𝑓𝑡 represents the forget gate 
𝑖𝑡 represents the input gate 
𝑜𝑡 represents the output gate 
𝜎 represents the sigmoid function 
𝑤𝑥 represents the weights for the respective gate (𝑥) neurons 
ℎ𝑡−1 represents the output of the previous LSTM block (at time 𝑡 − 1) 
𝑥𝑡 represents the input at the current time stamp 
𝑏𝑥 represents the biases for the respective gates 𝑥 
Since the LSTM network works with time series input data, multiple cells (blocks) 
are connected to create the network as shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7. LSTM Network Logic Structure [100]. 
The input to the LSTM network is a 2-dimensional array. One dimension is the 
number of features (designated as x in Figure 3.7) and the other is the number of time steps 
(designated as 𝑐 in Figure 3.7). The number of features is driven by the input data to the 
network and is set when the network is designed. The number of prior time steps can vary 
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from feature to feature, but large variations in the number of time steps from one feature to 
another can adversely affect the performance of the network [101].  
The number of hidden layers and nodes in the network is also determined when the 
network is designed. Increasing the number of hidden units can improve the performance 
of the network, but comes at a cost of longer training times and increased time to calculate 
a solution. Increasing the number of hidden layers in the network can significantly increase 
the time required for the network to calculate a solution. 
3.5.2 Proposed Controller Design 
An overview of the proposed controller is shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8. Overview of Proposed Controller with Plant. 
It takes as input the desired output value of the plant (𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑓), the previous output 
value of the plant (𝑦𝑡−1) and the previous input to the plant (𝑢𝑡−1) that resulted in 𝑦𝑡−1. 
The output from the controller is the new input to the plant, 𝑢𝑡. 
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From the perspective of the controller, there may be no way to tell if a change in 
behavior and associated sensor readings is the result of a faulty sensor, a system fault, or if 
it is an accurate measure of a system being affected by an actuator that is in fact under 
attack. The normal functioning of the controller must therefore keep the plant performance 
within established bounds of “acceptable behavior” regardless of how or why the system 
is affected. The proposed controller uses deep learning to learn a policy, or mapping, of 
various inputs to the appropriate output. The mapping is a function of the controller inputs 
which results in a single desired controller output (𝑢𝑡) to the actuator to which it is assigned. 
𝑢𝑡  =  𝑓(𝑦𝑡−1, 𝑢𝑡−1) 
The specific stages of the proposed controller are shown in Figure 3.9 and described below. 
 
Figure 3.9. Stages of Controller Using LSTM Network. 
3.5.3 Input to the LSTM 
The input to the controller includes the values reported by the system sensors and 
the control value(s) previously sent to the actuators. These values, along with others 
derived from these values are internally calculated. These inputs (called features) are 
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tracked, normalized and presented to the LSTM network as shown in Figure 3.8. The 
number of features, their composition and their length (time steps) are all determined by 
the designer and are based on the specific system to be controlled. 
3.5.4 Data Driven and Model-Based Control 
Depending on the system to be controlled, the LSTM-based controller can be purely 
data-driven (as with the test subject in Chapter 4) or may be a synthesis of model-based 
and data-driven control (as with the test subject in Chapter 5). If the latter is the case, then 
along with the input features, the control program also generates values from multiple 
internal models of the system under control. The classification decision made by the LSTM 
is which model’s output to select based on the input features provided. Because the LSTM 
is selecting the model, not the model’s output value, there is only one correct solution, even 
if more than one of the models happens to be calculating the same value. 
3.5.5 Converting LSTM Output to a Usable Control Signal 
The raw output of the LSTM needs to be converted into a signal that is useable by 
the system under control. The exact conversion mechanism varies based on the system. In 
the case of a simple linear system (such as the test subject in Chapter 4) a set of if-then-
else logic statements may be sufficient. In the case of the test subject in Chapter 5, the 
output of the internal models from which the LSTM is selecting are possible values for a 
sensor 𝑦𝑖. Once the LSTM network decides which model to select, the output value of the 
selected model is fed into a classical controller such as a Proportional-Integral-Derivative 
(PID) controller. That PID controller then determines the control signal value 𝑢𝑡 to the 
actuator to which it is assigned. 
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The block diagram in Figure 3.10 shows the principles of how these terms are 
generated and applied. The figure shows a classical PID controller that continuously 
receives an error value as the difference between a desired reference 𝑟(𝑡) and a measured 
process variable 𝑦(𝑡) , and applies a correction based on proportional, integral, and 
derivative terms. The controller attempts to minimize the error 𝑒(𝑡)  over time by 
adjustment of a control variable 𝑢(𝑡), such as the speed of a pump motor, to a new value 
determined by a weighted sum of the control terms. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Traditional PID Controller Block Diagram [102]. 
The overall control function is  








where 𝐾𝑝 , 𝐾𝑖 and 𝐾𝑑  are all non-negative and represent the coefficients for the 
proportional, integral, and derivative terms respectively (sometimes denoted P, I, and D).  
In the standard form of the equation, 𝐾𝑖 and 𝐾𝑑 are replaced by 𝐾𝑝/𝑇𝑖 and 𝐾𝑝𝑇𝑑, 
respectively. This is useful because 𝑇𝑖 and 𝑇𝑑have some understandable physical meaning, 
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since they represent the integration time and the derivative time. Factoring out 𝐾𝑝 results 
in the standard form equation: 
𝑢(𝑡) = 𝐾𝑝  (𝑒(𝑡) + 
1
𝑇𝑖






In the proposed controller design, the LSTM network provides the value of the current, or 
corrected, sensor reading 𝑦(𝑡) to the PID as shown in Figure 3.9. 
In this application the PID controller is employed to allow fine tuning of the overall 
controller. The primary goal of fine tuning is to ensure the controller precisely controls the 
system when no fault or attack is present. It also simplifies the controller calculations in 
cases where the reference level 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑓 may change during the course of normal operations. 
Instead of the LSTM having to learn the proper output to the actuator for all possible 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑓  
levels, the error 𝑒𝑡 is simply calculated and used as a matter of course. 
It should be noted that the use of a PID controller was influenced by the specific 
test case systems being controlled in this dissertation. A different type of system using this 
LSTM-based controller may be able to use a Proportional, Proportional-Integral, 
Proportional-Derivative, or other type of controller.  
3.6 Training the LSTM Network 
Regardless of the number, composition or length of the features, training the LSTM 
network(s) requires samples of the features as generated when the system is operating. 
Specifically, the samples need to be representative of the system under normal operating 
conditions as well as while being affected by faults and/or cyber-attacks that cause the 
various behaviors in the sensors and actuators described previously.  
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The data used to train the proposed controller was generated by building a computer 
simulation of the test subject systems in MATLAB®. The test subject system in this data 
generation step is controlled by a traditional controller that meets the control requirements 
when no faults or attacks are affecting the system. This controller has access to true system 
values, not just the sensor readings or control signals provided to the system previously. 
With the benefit of access to ground truth, the simulated control program can select the 
best output for any situation it faces. A combination of correct and incorrect control outputs 
are saved and used for training the LSTM network.  
The simulation is run, iteratively introducing representative values of each of the 
effects of faults and cyber-attacks on each component. Table 3.7 shows how the number 
and combinations of data generating simulations runs are determined. 
Table 3.7. Numbers and Combinations of Data Generation Runs. 
 Components   
















 X - A A(X) 
- Y B B(Y) 
X Y C C(XY) 
 Total ∑ 
 
The example in Table 3.7 is for a controller with two components that will be 
affected for testing and training. For some component effects, additional runs are made to 
better balance out the number of data samples between single and multiple components 
being tested (i.e., 𝐴(𝑋) + 𝐵(𝑌) ≈ 𝐶(𝑋𝑌)). 
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After each component (sensors and actuators) has been run with each of the 
different effects, the process is repeated with two components being simultaneously 
affected. This repeated increasing the number of components affected until the desired 
number of components have been affected. The information saved from each data 
generation run are the input variables that will be provided to the LSTM during testing. 
Before the data from the simulation runs can be used to train the LSTM networks 
there are several preprocessing steps it must go through. 
Since the training data is generated sequentially, each training data sample is an      
m by n matrix where m is the number of features and n is the length of each input sample. 
The input length n is determined when the controller is designed. The length should be 
selected as the shortest that provides good results. Inputs longer than this may result in 
degraded network performance.  
The data must also be normalized to a range of (-1,1). This is done by subtracting 
the mean value for each element and dividing by the maximum value for each element. 
With the data normalized, 20% of the data is randomly selected and set aside for interim 
testing and validation.  
A key step in data preprocessing for LSTMs is data balancing. If, for example, a 
significant portion of the data has a correct classification of “1” and only a comparative 
few with correct classification of 2 or 3, the LSTM will learn it can get good results by 
simply classifying all inputs as “1”. Therefore, the data is balanced by identifying which 
classification group is most represented in the data set and duplicating the inputs from the 
less represented classes until all classes have the same number of samples in the training 
data. This step is repeated on the sequestered testing inputs as well. 
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3.6.1 Ensemble or Single LSTM 
There are circumstances in which an ensemble of smaller LSTM networks may be 
preferable to a single larger network. Examples of such cases could include, limited 
memory on processing hardware which precludes the possibility of training or executing a 
very large network, inputs to the network that are too difficult for a single network to 
separate, or a requirement for the classifier to operate under tight time constraints, (i.e., the 
controller must be capable of a higher sampling rate).  
Each of the LSTM networks within the ensemble is trained using a separate but 
equal portion of the training data. Individually, each of these networks is a reasonably 
accurate classifier. However, when aggregated together in an ensemble, their combined 
performance is improved. 
The decision of how many classifiers to use in an ensemble depends on the number 
of class labels (different possible outputs) used for that specific ensemble.  
Research indicates, for example, using more than two classifiers to make a binary 
classification decision offered no improvement in performance and in many cases 
decreased the accuracy of the ensemble. This “law of diminishing returns in ensemble 
construction” was first identified and applied by Bonab and Can. Their work in [103] 
demonstrates that using the same number of classifiers as class labels provides the highest 
accuracy. 
3.6.2 Many Classifiers - Single Solution 
There are several possible methods for resolving the results of the networks within 
an ensemble to a single output. The following approaches were investigated for this 
research: majority vote scheme, multiple linear regression (MLR), k Nearest Neighbor 
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(kNN) classifier, and Boosting and Bootstrap Aggregation Algorithms (Bagging). Each is 
described below and the results of testing with each are described in Chapter 5. 
Majority Vote Method. As the name implies, this method takes the output from 
each classifier (𝑢𝑧) in the stacked ensemble and counts it as a vote for that particular output 
to be the output of the entire ensemble (𝑢𝑡). Whichever output receives the most votes is 
selected as the overall output of the ensemble. In the case of a tie, a tie-breaking policy is 
required. 
Multiple Linear Regressions (AKA multiple regression). Multiple Linear 
Regression (MLR) is an extension of ordinary least squares regression. It seeks to predict 
the value of a dependent variable using the values of more than one explanatory variables 
by calculating a weighting for each explanatory variable. In this application, the 
explanatory variables are the outputs from the individual LSTM networks in the ensemble 
(𝑢𝑖). The weightings are represented as 𝑏𝑖 and the dependent variable is the single overall 
output of the entire ensemble (𝑢𝑡). The equation for MLR is  
𝑢𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑢1 + 𝑏2𝑢2 + 𝑏3𝑢3 + ⋯ . .+𝑏𝑧𝑢𝑧 
k Nearest Neighbor. The k Nearest Neighbor (kNN) is an instance-based classifier. 
Classifying an input using the kNN classifier can be as simple as locating the nearest known 
neighbor in the instance space and labeling the unknown instance with the same class label 
as that of the located (known) neighbor(s). 
One kNN classifier is used for each LSTM ensemble. The classifier takes the output 
of each LSTM network in the ensemble (𝑢1, 𝑢2, … 𝑢𝑧) and provides the single output 𝑢𝑡. 
During training, the kNN classifier builds a multi-dimensional space and places each 
training point 𝑞𝑖 in that space. When the kNN classifier is used, the outputs of the LSTMs 
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in the ensemble (𝑢1, 𝑢2, … 𝑢𝑧) are used as a measure of their respective dimension in that 
space. 
In this application “nearest” is defined using the Euclidean distance 𝐷 between 
each training point 𝑞𝑖  and the new point to be classified which is described by the 
dimensions (𝑢1, 𝑢2, … 𝑢𝑧); refer to the equation shown below: 





The training point 𝑝 that is closest to the new point described by those dimensions is used 
to classify the new point 𝑢𝑡. To maximize the performance of the classifier, the number of 
neighbors chosen 𝑘 is set to 1. 
Boosting and Bootstrap Aggregation Algorithms. Boosting and Bootstrap 
Aggregation (commonly called Bagging) both strengthen the performance of an ensemble 
of weaker learners by minimizing bias and variance in the learning algorithms. Bagging 
randomly selects training samples for each learner and develops them in parallel. Boosting 
develops the learners in sequence, weighting training data that was not learned well in in 
one learner so that it can be used again in subsequent learners. 
By using the ensemble algorithms built into MATLAB®, the outputs of the LSTMs 
are not treated as an ensemble, but rather as separate, parallel inputs to an ensemble of 
decision trees which the fitcensemble function in MATLAB® generates. By choosing to 
let MATLAB® automatically optimize the hyperparameters of the fitcensemble function, 
the algorithm tries both Boosting and Bagging algorithms and selects the one that provides 
the best results. 
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Each of these methods for determining the single output 𝑢𝑡 of the LSTM stack is 
tested and the results of testing with each are described in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 3.11. Information Flow through an Ensemble to Control a Single Actuator. 
Figure 3.11 depicts the logic flow through the controller to generate output signals 
for a single system actuator. This is duplicated for each system actuator, with each having 
its own LSTM stack, stack solver and output.  
3.7 Test Methodology 
The method for testing the controller is very similar to the method for generating 
the training data. For all testing, the system under test (SUT) and the associated control 
algorithm are realized as MATLAB® scripts. The tests are performed on an Intel® Core i7 
CPU platform with 32 GB of RAM running Windows 10. Each test run is conducted by 
running the script for a predetermined number of iterations. Prior to each run the 
attack/fault effects(s) (described previously) is/are set to be activated at an iteration after 
the system has reached a normal steady state level. Each of the sensor effects are applied 
on individual runs, then each of the actuator effects were applied on individual runs. 
69 
Finally, the sensor and actuator effects are applied simultaneously on the last several test 
runs, with each run using a different combination of the different effects. In all of the test 
runs the value of the variable(s) were randomly selected, from the uniform range described 
previously, prior to the beginning of the test run. The test metrics of interest are: 
 Did a catastrophic failure occur? This is defined differently for each system 
under test. 
 Did the controller maintain proper control? – Proper control is defined as 
keeping the system output values within ±1% of the set reference value. 
 If proper control was lost, how long did it take to regain proper control? – This 
is measured in iterations of the controller algorithm. 
 From the onset of the attack/fault effect(s), how long did it take for the 
controller to respond appropriately? – Definitions for this will vary from system 
to system and controller to controller. 
 Percentage of total iterations in which the controller responded appropriately - 
Definitions for this will vary from system to system and controller to controller. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter provided the development of a taxonomy of the effects that faults and 
cyber-attacks can have on the physical components of a system. The proposed controller 
design was explained in detail and an alternate ensemble version was also discussed. 
Considerations for training and testing the proposed controller based on the taxonomy were 
discussed and the methodology for testing the proposed controller(s) was described. 
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 Proof of Concept - Test Subject: Steam Boiler System 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the use of the linear steam boiler test subject system to 
demonstrate the utility of the proposed control approach. The specifics of how the proposed 
controller is applied to the system are described in detail. The taxonomy described in 
Chapter 3 is used to develop training data a test methodology for the proposed controller 
design. Finally, the results of the testing on the steam boiler with the proposed controller 
are discussed.  
4.2 The Steam Boiler System 
The steam boiler is a linear system with requirements that specify several safety 
measures and multiple operating modes (separate from the controller). The steam boiler 
uses binary actuators for which a single classifier type LSTM controller will suffice.  
The Steam-boiler Control Specification Problem [104] [105] was initially 
published by Jean-Raymond Abrial and was provided to participants of the Dagstuhl 
meeting, “Methods for Semantics and Specification”, in June 1995. 
The specification describes a control program serving to control the water level in 
a steam boiler like those used in nuclear power plants. Based on a specification by the 
“Institute for Risk Research” and the “Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute” (Institut de 
Protection et de Sureté Nucléaire) the requirements for the controller emphasize safety and 
are very formal. Figure 4.1 depicts the steam boiler system. 
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Figure 4.1. Steam Boiler System Diagram. 
The controller is responsible for keeping the water level in the tank between preset 
maximum and minimum levels, while ensuring that the boiler generates a sufficient volume 
of steam not exceeding a preset maximum. The controller takes as inputs values from 
sensors that measure the water level in the 1200 liter tank. The output from the controller 
is control signals sent to the 4 water pumps which are simply On/Off devices.  
4.2.1 Operational Modes/Safety Features 
Since this steam boiler is intended for use in a nuclear power plant, allowing the 
system to enter a state that could damage the steam boiler, or connected equipment, is 
unacceptable. In order to ensure the safety of the system, the specifications for the 
controller call for it to switch between five different modes [104]. Four are operational 
72 
modes (Initialization, Normal, Degraded and Rescue); the fifth operational mode is 
Emergency Stop. The operation of these modes is summarized below. 
Initialization mode: In this mode, the controller waits for the physical units to 
become ready and then ensures the starting water level in the tank is between the preset 
maximum and minimum required for normal operations. 
Normal mode: In this mode, the controller’s task is to maintain the water level in 
the boiler between the two "normal" levels. The controller communicates with physical 
units to obtain information about the states of the units (water level, etc.) and uses this 
information to react. The program stays in normal mode until a failure is detected, or an 
emergency stop signal is received.  
Degraded mode: In this mode, the program tries to maintain a satisfactory water 
level, despite of the failure of one or more physical components. 
Rescue mode: This is the mode in wherein the program attempts to maintain 
satisfactory water levels in the boiler, despite failure of the water level measuring unit. This 
indicates that it has to computationally estimate the water level taking into account boiler 
dynamics. 
Emergency stop mode: The control program has to engage the emergency stop 
mode either when the vital units experience a failure, or when water levels fail to reach 
either of its two-limit values. This mode may also be reached upon detection of a 
transmission error between the program and physical units. In this mode, the control will 
just send a command to the physical units, to cease operation, and then terminate itself. 
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4.2.2 System Parameters and Variables 
The value of primary concern in this system is the water level in the boiler tank (q). 
The various capacities and flow rates for the physical system components are shown on 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Parameters and Variables used in the Steam Boiler System. 
Parameters Unit Description 
C = 1200 liters Physical capacity of steam boiler 
M2 = 900 liters Maximum allowable water level 
M1 = 100 liters Minimum allowable water level 
N2 = 600 liters Maximum normal water level 
N1 = 400 liters Minimum normal water level 
W = 10 liters/sec Maximum quantity of steam at output 
U1 = 10 liters/sec/sec Maximum gradient increase of steam at output 
U2 = 10 liters/sec/sec Maximum gradient decrease of steam at output 
P = 5 liters/sec Nominal pump capacity 
Variable Unit Description 
q liters Current quantity of water in steam boiler 
p liters/sec Current throughput of pumps 
v liters/sec Current quantity of steam at output 
 
The calculation for the water level change when the system is operating normally 
is defined by the following time-variant linear equation: 




There is also an internal model for estimating the water level in the boiler using estimated 
flow of the pumps. 





4.3 Proposed Controller Design 
As applied to this test system, the proposed controller design uses a single LSTM 
network for all four pumps. For each iteration of the control program, the LSTM is used to 
determine how many pumps should be turned on. The basic configuration of the system 
with the proposed controller is shown in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2. Proposed Controller with System. 
For the steam boiler controller a few trial runs were conducted to identify the input 
sequence length that resulted in the best overall performance of the controller. In the trial 
runs the only parameter that was changed was the sequence length. The results are shown 
in Table 4.2. 







As the sequence length was increased, the results of each trial run decreased from 
the maximum results that were achieved with a sequence length of ten.  
Using the sequence length of ten identified in the trial runs, the next stage was to 
find the combination of hidden layers and nodes per layer that would maximize 
performance of the LSTM on the Steam Boiler system data. The results of those 
experiments are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Comparison of Network Performance Correlated with Network Size 
Nodes Hidden Layers 
 2 3 4 5 
768 98.42 98.22 97.44 98.46 
512 98.56 98.28 98.34 98.68 
256 97.78 98.42 98.26 98.06 
128 97.60 97.80 98.58 95.80 
64 97.08 96.34 98.22 96.32 
 
The best performance was derived from the network with five hidden layers and 
512 nodes per layer. The second best was the network with four hidden layers and 128 
nodes per layer. The network size selected was the third best with two hidden layer and 
512 nodes per layer. This network size was chosen because additional hidden layers 
significantly increase the time required to train and test the network. Since the performance 
difference between the top three was minimal, the smaller network was chosen.  
The full LSTM used for the steam boiler controller is a six-layer network with an 
input layer, two hidden layers (with 512 nodes each), a fully connected 4-node layer, a 
dense layer (softmax layer) and an output layer with 4 nodes. 
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4.3.1 Inputs to the LSTM 
The LSTM for the steam boiler uses a 16x10 element input matrix. Table 4.4 
describes the variable values used to generate the input matrix. 





1 Difference between the reported water level and the reference level (ref-qr) 
2 Difference between the modelled water level and the reference level (ref- qm) 
3-6 Last estimated flow rate through each of the four pumps [pe] 
7-10 Last reported flow rate from each of the four pumps  [pr] 
11-14 Available pump register [1,0,1,1] 
15 System Mode (Normal, Degraded, Rescue, Emergency Stop) (11-14) 
16 The sum of the estimated flow rate through each of the 4 pumps (sum(pe)) 
 
The output of the LSTM is a single value (1 through 4) indicating how many motors 
should be on. Based on this decision, a switching routine in the controller then sends the 
appropriate signal (on or off) to each pump. 
4.4 Effects of Faults and Cyber-Attacks 
Before discussing how the LSTMs were trained and tested, it is necessary to show 
how the effects of cyber-attacks and faults on the steam boiler system components are 
addressed. 
Recall the taxonomy of representative sensor effects described in Chapter 3, Table 
3.3. Applied to the sensor of the steam boiler system, these effects are applied as described 
below and summarized in Table 4.5. 
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1. Increased Value effect - This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative   
function with ?̆? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (1.10, 2.10).  
2. Decreased Value effect - This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative 
function with ?̆? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.10, 0.80).  
3. Stochastic Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝜇 set to zero and 𝜎 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.05, 0.55).  
4. Cyclical Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝛾 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval  
(0.10, 1.10) and 𝛿 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.015, 1.015).  
5. Fixed Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with ε being 
randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval (0.00, 20.00).  
6. No Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with the value of 
𝑦𝑡+𝑧  being set as Not-a-Number (NaN). 
In addition to these six effects, it is also prudent to examine the performance of the 
controller if the quadruple tank system sensors are subjected to incipient effects. Therefore, 
two more effects are modeled: 
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7. Increased Value effect - This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive function 
with 𝛼 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval 
(0.00, 1.00) and the effect being applied using the equation   
 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑦𝑡 + .025𝛼𝑦𝑡+𝑧 
8. Decreased Value effect - This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive function 
with 𝛽 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval 
(0.00, 1.00) and the effect being applied using the equation   
 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑦𝑡 − .05𝛽𝑦𝑡+𝑧 
These eight sensor effect representations are summarized in Table 4.5. The Effect 
Number and Effect Value fields will be used when discussing test results. 









Increased 1 (1.10, 2.10) Mult Abrupt 
Decreased 2 (0.10, 0.80) Mult Abrupt 
Stochastic 3 (0.05, 0.55) Add Abrupt 
Cyclical 4 (0.10, 1.10) (0.015, 1.015) Add Abrupt 
Fixed 5 (100, 900) Replace Abrupt 
No Value 6 (NaN) Replace Abrupt 
Increased 7 (0, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient 
Decreased 8 (0, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient 
 
There are no set rules for selecting the ranges of the effect values. In general, the 
low end of the range should make the effect strong enough to cause a change in the sensor. 
At the high end the value should not cause the effect to exceed the physical limitations of 
the sensor. Applied to the actuators of the quadruple-tank system, the effects are applied as 
described below and summarized in Table 4.6. 
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1. Increased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative   
function with  ?̂? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (1.05, 1.50). This effect leaves the actuator controllable.  
2. Decreased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative 
function with  ?̂? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.15, 0.90). This effect leaves the actuator controllable. 
3. Stochastic Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝜇 set to zero and 𝜎 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.05, 0.55). This effect leaves the actuator controllable. 
4. Cyclical Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝛾 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval    
(0.50, 3.50) and 𝛿 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.05, 0.55). This effect leaves the actuator controllable. 
5. Fixed Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with  being 
randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval (1.00, 4.00). 
This effect leaves the actuator uncontrollable. 
6. No Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with the value of 
𝑦𝑡+𝑧  being set as Not-a-Number (NaN). This effect leaves the actuator uncontrollable. 
Two additional effects are modeled to examine the performance of the controller if 
the quadruple tank system sensors are subjected to incipient effects:  
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7. Increased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive function 
with 𝐴 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval 
(0.00, 1.00) and the effect being applied using the equation   
 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = (𝑢𝑡 + .0025𝛼𝑢𝑡+𝑧)𝑢𝑡+𝑧 
8. Decreased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive function 
with 𝛽 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval 
(0.00, 1.00) and the effect being applied using the equation   
 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = (𝑢𝑡 − .0019𝛽𝑢𝑡+𝑧)𝑢𝑡+𝑧 
These eight actuator effect representations are summarized in Table 4.6. The Effect 
Number and Effect Value fields will be used when discussing test results. 










Increased 1 (1.05, 1.50) Mult Abrupt Yes 
Decreased 2 (0.10, 0.80) Mult Abrupt Yes 
Stochastic 3 (0.05, 0.55) Add Abrupt Yes 
Cyclical 4 (0.50, 3.50) 
(0.05, 0.55) 
Add Abrupt Yes 
Fixed 5 (1.00, 4.00) Replace Abrupt No 
No Value 6 (NaN) Replace Abrupt No 
Increased 7 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient Yes 
Decreased 8 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient Yes 
 
Fixed Value (#5) and the No Value (#6) effects leave the actuator uncontrollable 
but the steam boiler system design does include redundant actuators, so these two effects 
will be included in the training or testing of the controller for the steam boiler system. 
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As with the sensor effects, the variable range values for the actuator effects should 
be large enough to produce the desired effect, but so large that the actuator is driven beyond 
its physical capabilities. 
4.5 Training the LSTM Networks 
The following parameters were used to train the LSTM for this controller in 
MATLAB®: 
Solver: ADAptive Moment estimation (ADAM) 
Execution Environment: auto (defaults to GPU if one is present) 
Initial Learning Rate: 0.0002 
Learn Rate Schedule: piecewise 
Learn Rate Drop Factor: 0.5 
Learn Drop Rate: 2 (epochs) 
Maximum Epochs: 10 
In order to expedite the training process of the LSTM, the training inputs are 
compiled into “minibatches”. The larger the minibatch, the quicker the training is 
accomplished. If the minibatch size is too large, the network will overfit to the training data 
and not perform well in testing or actual use. Based on the size of the training data set, the 
minibatch size for this application is 256 inputs.  
Another important parameter in training the LSTM is the learning rate. Larger 
learning rates help the values of the LSTM weights to converge more quickly, but risk 
possibly settling in local minimum rather than the global minimum. Lower learning rates 
are more likely to find the global minimum but can take a very long time to get there. 
MATLAB® allows the designer to vary the learning rate during training. In this application, 
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the initial learning rate is set at 0.002 and is cut by 50% every 2 epochs. Thus, after 20 
training epochs the training rate is dropped to 0.000125. 
4.5.1 Generating Training Data 
The data used to train the proposed controller was generated by building a computer 
simulation of the quadruple-tank system in MATLAB®. This test subject system was 
controlled by a logic statement controller that meets the control requirements when no 
faults or attacks are affecting the system. This controller was fed the output from the correct 
model so it always controlled the system correctly. 
The simulation was run, iteratively introducing representative values of each of the 
effects of faults and cyber-attacks on each component as shown in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7. Numbers and Combinations of Data Generation Runs for Steam Boiler. 
 Components   
 










8 0 0 8 64 
0 8 0 8 64 
0 0 8 8 64 
8 8 0 1 64 
8 0 8 1 64 
0 8 8 1 64 
    Total 384 
 
After each component has been run with each of the different effects (8 for the 
sensor and 8 for each pump), the process is repeated with two components being 
simultaneously affected (the sensor and each pump, then 2 pumps) which totals 196 effects 
combinations. 
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Eight times as many data generation simulations were run with single component 
effects compared to those with two components affected. This was done to provide an 
approximately equal number of samples for each. 
Each data generation simulation ran for 500 iterations with the component effect 
starting at iteration number 250. This was done to ensure the system was operating in a 
normal steady state the effect begins. 
A total of 192,000 inputs were generated using them method described above. Each 
input was a 16x10 matrix. 
4.5.2 Data Preprocessing 
Before the data from the simulation runs can be used to train the LSTM networks 
there are several preprocessing steps it must go through. 
The data was first be normalized to a range of (−1,1). With the data normalized, 
20% of the data was randomly selected and set aside for future testing. This left 153,600 
data samples in the training set. Data balancing increased the training set to 162,560 
samples evenly distributed across the four classification groups. The LSTMs were then 
trained with this data using the training parameters identified at the beginning of this 
section 
4.6 Testing the Controller with Steam Boiler System 
The linear steam boiler system was tested as a proof of concept; that a passive, data 
driven controller based on a deep-learning network could properly control a simple linear 
system in the presence of various and sometimes simultaneous cyber-attacks and faults. 
This system has redundant actuators and several built-in safety checks to prevent 
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catastrophic failure. The actuators are binary (off/on) making the control requirements 
comparatively simple. The testing on this system is intended to determine if a version of 
the proposed controller can maintain proper control of the system and if faults or attacks 
that would normally trigger the built-in EMERGENCY STOP mode can be countered to 
keep the system running rather than shutting down. 
The method for testing the controller is very similar to the method for generating 
the training data. For all testing, the system under test (SUT) and the associated control 
algorithm are realized as MATLAB® scripts. Each test run is conducted by running the 
script for 500 iterations. Prior to each run the attack/fault effects(s) (described previously) 
is/are set to be activated at iteration number 250. Each of the eight sensor effects were 
applied on individual runs, then each of the actuator effects were applied on individual runs 
to two of the four pumps. This totaled 24 individual effect runs. Finally, the sensor and 
actuator effects were applied simultaneously on the last 192 test runs, with each run using 
a different combination of the different effects. In all of the test runs the value of the 
variable(s) were randomly selected, from the uniform range described previously, prior to 
the beginning of the test run.  
With each test run, the performance of the steam boiler with the proposed controller 







Table 4.8. Measured Items for Steam Boiler Testing 
Components 
Affected 




Did the water level ever fall below 100 liters or exceed 900 
liters? 
Mode 14  
Triggered 
Was mode 14 (Emergency Stop mode) triggered? 
Proper Control 
Maintained 
Was the liquid level in the tank maintained between 495 and 
505 liters (reference level ± 1%)? 
Iterations to Regain 
Proper Control 
If proper control was not maintained, how many iterations 




How many iterations occurred from the onset of the effect until 
the controller selected the correct solution? 
Iterations with 
Correct Solution % 
What percentage of the iterations in the test were run with the 
correct solution selected? 
For this system, a failed test (catastrophic failure) is defined as one wherein the 
water level in the tank is allowed to rise above 900 liters, or drop below 100 liters. The 
performance of the proposed controller is also judged by its ability to keep the water level 
in the tank within 1% of the desired level. If the controller allows the system to go outside 
the ±1% range then it is also measured on how long it takes to return it to that level if it 
does.  
The system was tested with each component being affected by one of the 
fault/attack effects as described previously. After a run with each component being tested 
with each effect, the effects were applied to two components simultaneously until all 
combinations of components were tested with all combinations of effects. 
The results of the testing are shown in Table 4.9 below. Due to size constraints of 
the dissertation format, only a portion of the chart is displayed in Table 4.9. The entire 
chart is found in Appendix B. 
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1       0 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
2 1 206.17     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
3 2 0.71     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
4 3 0.24     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
5 4 0.50     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
6 5 340.08     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
7 6 *     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
8 7 0.28     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
9 8 0.50     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
10   1 2.68   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
11   2 0.74   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
12   3 0.45   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
13   4 0.40   1 0 0 1 * 0 99.33% 
14   5 1.88   1 0 0 1 * 105 77.00% 
15   6 *   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
16   7 0.74   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
17   8 0.10   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
18     1 2.81 1 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
19     2 0.49 1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 































198   6 * 5 1.25 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
199   6 * 6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
200   6 * 7 0.21 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
201   6 * 8 0.12 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
202   7 0.46 1 1.93 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
203   7 0.22 2 0.51 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
204   7 0.36 3 0.35 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
205   7 0.39 4 0.26 2 0 0 1 * 0 92.67% 
206   7 0.88 5 1.03 2 0 0 1 * 168 85.67% 
207   7 0.64 6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
208   7 0.08 7 0.30 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
209   7 0.86 8 0.66 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
210   8 0.78 1 2.95 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
211   8 0.72 2 0.16 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
212   8 0.74 3 0.27 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
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213   8 0.93 4 0.24 2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
214   8 0.73 5 1.33 2 0 0 1 * 153 83.67% 
215   8 0.70 6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
216   8 0.67 7 0.37 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
217   8 0.99 8 0.64 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
 
Of the 217 total test runs there were no catastrophic failures. In 198 cases the 
controller kept proper control throughout the test run. In the others, the controller regained 
proper control in an average of 124 iterations (median of 86). The Mode 14 (Emergency 
Shut Down) conditions were met in only 2 of the test runs. On average, the controller 
selected the correct solution in 20.95 iterations (median of zero). In total, 94.46% of all 
iterations were completed with the correct solution selected by the controller. The results 
of the test are summarized in Table 4.10. 




















# A/S/Both % % % Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean 
16 Actuator 0 0.00 93.75 250.00 250.00 0.00 10.06 99.67 94.64 
8 Sensor 0 0.00 100.00 * * 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
192 Both 0 1.02 88.78 78.50 114.50 0.00 50.11 100.00 94.19 
Total - 0 0.92 91.24 86.00 124.05 0.00 20.95 100.00 94.46 
 
Statistically speaking, this controller performed perfectly on the eight tests using 
sensor effects. The performance on the 16 tests using actuator effects was good, but the 
results for the metric of how quickly it regained proper control was skewed by the fact that 
there was only one of the 16 tests in which proper control was maintained, and in that case 
the controller did not regain proper control before he test ended, hence the recorded value 
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of 250 iterations. With a larger pool of test results the 192 tests conducted when 2 
components were being affected provides more useful results.  
Using the same data summarized in the last two columns of Table 4.10., a confusion 
matrix of the classification results of the LSTM is shown in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11. Confusion Matrix of LSTM Classifications for Steam Boiler 











 5046 169 0 0 1 
3817 79904 243 0 2 
0 0 5103 0 3 
0 0 0 18468 4 
 1 2 3 4  
By way of review, model 1 is the correct choice when no component is being 
affected. Model 2 is the correct choice when the actuator is being affected. Model 3 is the 
correct choice when the sensor is being affected and model 4 is the correct choice when 
both are being affected. 
The benefit of this testing was two-fold. First, it confirmed that a passive, data-
driven, LSTM-based controller could be used to make the system under test resilient to the 
effects of cyber-attacks and faults. This was demonstrated by leveraging the taxonomy of 
effects developed in Chapter 3. 
Second, this testing showed the utility of the proposed controller on a simple, linear 
system with redundant actuators and built in safety modes. This is a stark contrast to the 
test subject introduced in Chapter 5.  
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4.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a linear system used as a proof-of-concept test subject. The 
proposed controller design was applied to this system. The method for generating training 
data using the taxonomy of effects was described. The training process was discussed and 
the system was tested using the various effects of faults and attacks described previously. 
The testing demonstrates this controller works well with the test system even in the 
presence of multiple simultaneous faults/attacks. Since good results were achieved on this 
linear system with redundant actuators, application to a more complex and challenging 
system is in order. 
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 Test Subject: Quadruple-Tank System  
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter presents a detailed description of the benchmark quadruple-tank 
system. The application of the proposed controller to this nonlinear system is detailed. 
Specifics of how the taxonomy of effects is applied to the quadruple-tank system are 
presented. Two versions of the proposed controller are presented; single LSTM and 
ensemble-based). The steps for training and testing the controllers are described and the 
results of that testing are discussed. 
5.2 Quadruple-Tank System Design 
The quadruple-tank system was first introduced in 1999 as a problem for the study 
of multivariable control [106]. The system consists of four cylindrical tanks connected to 
each other through pipes as shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1. Diagram of Quadruple-Tank System [106]. 
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The system is fed by two pumps. Specifically, tanks 1 and 4 are fed by pump 1 
while tanks 2 and 3 are fed pump 2. Additionally, tank 1 is fed by the output of tank 3 and 
tank 2 is fed by the output of tank 4. The ratio of how much fluid flows to the upper tank 
or lower tank from each pump is set manually by a proportional valve at the outlet of each 
pump. 
The function of the controller is to set the control voltage to each pump (and thereby 
the speed of each pump) such that the fluid level in both lower tanks is as close as possible 
to the preset reference level. The physical parameters of the quad-tank system [107] are 
shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1. System Parameters used in the Quadruple-Tank System. 
Parameter Description Value 
A1, A3 Cross-sectional area of tanks 1 and 3 28 cm2 
A2, A4 Cross-sectional area of tanks 2 and 4 32 cm2 
a1, a3 Cross-sectional area of outlet pipes 1 and 3 0.071 cm2 
a2, a4 Cross-sectional area of outlet pipes 2 and 4 0.057 cm2 
kc Voltage constant 0.5 V/cm 
g Gravitational constant 981 cm/s2 
 
The values for these parameters were not specified in the original publication of the 
system. These are the values used in subsequent publications [107] and [108] which built 
upon the original work. The same is true for the operational parameters given in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2. Operational Parameters for the Quadruple-Tank System [107] [108]. 
Parameter Description Value 
ℎ1
0 Initial height of liquid in tank 1 12.6 cm 
ℎ2
0 Initial height of liquid in tank 2 13.0 cm 
ℎ3
0 Initial height of liquid in tank 3 4.8 cm 
ℎ4
0 Initial height of liquid in tank 4 4.9 cm 
𝑣1
0 Initial input to pump 1 3.15 V 
𝑣2
0 Initial input to pump2 3.15 V 
𝑘1 Gain constant for pump 1 voltage 3.14 cm
3/Vs 
𝑘2 Gain constant for pump 2 voltage 3.29 cm
3/Vs 
𝛾1 Ratio to lower tank from pump 1 0.70 
𝛾2 Ratio to lower tank from pump 2 0.60 
 
The valve settings (𝛾1, 𝛾2) determine if the majority of the water from each pump 
is directed to the associated lower tank or associated upper tank. The valves are set before 
the system runs. When the valves are set so that (𝛾1 + 𝛾2) < 1 the system is said to be in 
a minimum phase, meaning the majority of the liquid from the pumps is going to the upper 
tanks. When the valves are set such that 1 ≤ (𝛾1 + 𝛾2) ≤ 2 the system is said to be in a 
non-minimum phase, meaning the majority of the liquid is going to the lower tanks. 
5.2.1 Internal System Equations 
Using these parameters, the following nonlinear equations for the rate of change in 













































𝑣1    (4) 
The value on the right-hand side of each equation is used to update the height of 
fluid in each respective tank and the output from the system (𝑦𝑖) is calculated as  
𝑦𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑘𝑐 
There is no water level sensor in tank 3 or 4, therefore the water height in those tanks must 
be calculated if that information is required by the controller. The input to the system 𝑢𝑖 is 
referenced as 𝑣𝑖 in the equations above.  
5.3 Proposed Controller for Quadruple-Tank Test Case 
As applied to the quadruple-tank test system, the proposed controller design uses 
one LSTM classifier network for each of the pumps as shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2. Proposed Controller with System. 
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5.3.1 Designing the LSTMs 
In this application, the control designer determines the sequence length (time steps) 
of the input features. Longer sequence lengths provide more information for the network 
to use, but for any application there is an optimal sequence length. For the quad-tank 
controller a few trial runs were conducted to identify the input sequence length that resulted 
in the best overall performance of the controller. In the trial runs the only parameter that 
was changed was the sequence length. The results are shown in Table 5.3. 










As the sequence length was increased, the results of each trial run also increased 
until the maximum results were achieved with a sequence length of 30. From there the 
results began to drop off again. 
Using the sequence length of 30 identified in the trial runs, the next stage was to 
find the combination of hidden layers and nodes per layer that would maximize 
performance of the LSTM on the Quadruple-tank system data. The results of those 
experiments are shown in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4. Comparison of Network Performance Correlated with Network Size 
Nodes Hidden Layers 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
768 94.71 93.26 93.52 95.36 96.17 91.81 94.82 91.11 88.08 
512 93.90 95.81 96.48 96.85 96.73 96.87 98.29 96.79 93.35 
256 93.81 93.96 93.70 93.88 93.71 93.83 93.99 94.15 94.07 
128 92.53 93.08 93.30 93.70 93.86 93.58 93.89 94.15 93.76 
64 89.21 89.16 91.94 93.33 93.81 93.95 94.21 93.23 92.50 
 
The best performance was derived from the network with eight hidden layers and 
512 nodes per layer. Therefore the LSTM network is comprised of the input layer, eight 
hidden layers, each with 512 nodes, a fully connected 4-node layer, a softmax (dense) layer 
and an output layer with four output nodes – a total of 12 layers.  
5.3.2 Internally Generated Models 
When applied to the quadruple tank system, the proposed controller uses the LSTM 
to select one of several different models of the quadruple-tank system. These models are 
generated using the nonlinear equations described previously. Specifically, these models 
provide a value of the water level in each of the lower tanks. In order to better understand 
how the models are developed, two additional variables are introduced: 𝑦𝑖𝑟 and 𝑣𝑖𝑒. 
The variable 𝑦𝑖𝑟 is the reported value from the water level senor in tank 𝑖. The true 
value is 𝑦𝑖. Under normal operating conditions, 𝑦𝑖𝑟 = 𝑦𝑖, but the controller only receives 
𝑦𝑖𝑟 and has no access to 𝑦𝑖. The variable 𝑣𝑖𝑒 is the estimated value of the voltage to pump 
𝑖. The actual voltage to that pump is 𝑣𝑖  in prior equations, but the controller can only 
estimate the pump voltage based on the last command given. 
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Through the remainder of this section, the discussion will refer to tank 1 and pump 
1 and its associated LSTM. This done for clarity. The principles and analogous calculations 
also apply to tank 2 and pump 2 with its associated LSTM. 
At every iteration of the control program the tank 1 sensor and pump 1 (actuator) 
of the quadruple-tank system could be operating normally, or the tank sensor could be 
affected by a fault/cyber-attack, or the pump could be affected by a fault/cyber-attack or 
both could be affected. For each of these four conditions a different internal model is 
generated. The role of the LSTM is to assess the state of the system and select one of the 
four models to use for the controller. The derivation of each model is described below. 
Model 1: Uses the reported value of the water level sensor and is the correct model 
to use only when the system is operating free of any attacks or faults. Therefore, the 
modeled value 𝑦1𝑚  =  𝑦1𝑟. 
Model 2: Generates a value 𝑦𝑖 under the assumption that the associated pump is 
experiencing an attack or fault. This means the estimated pump voltage 𝑣1𝑒 is assumed to 
be incorrect and a new value for the modelled pump voltage needs to be calculated. This is 


















The value for 𝑑ℎ4 can be calculated and a model value for the voltage to pump 1 (𝑣1𝑚) is 






















This newly derived value of 𝑑ℎ1 is used to calculate the modelled value of 𝑦1𝑚 .  
Model 3: Generates a value 𝑦𝑖 under the assumption that the water level sensor is 
experiencing an attack or fault. Since the reported value of 𝑦1𝑟 would be influenced by the 













which is then used to calculate h1m and 
𝑦1𝑚 = ℎ1𝑚𝑘𝑐 
Model 4: Generates a value 𝑦𝑖𝑚 under the assumption that both the pump and the 
water level sensor are experiencing an attack and/or fault. To generate a modeled value for 
tank sensor 1 (𝑦1𝑚) neither 𝑦1𝑟 nor 𝑣1𝑒 can be used. The model for tank 1 is then derived 

















The value for 𝑑ℎ4 can be calculated and a model value for 𝑣1 is calculated by solving 





















𝑦1𝑚 can be calculated  
y1m=h1m kc 
98 
The same steps are followed to generate models related to the tank 2 sensor and 
pump 2 for use by the associated LSTM network. 
5.3.3 Inputs to the LSTM 
Both LSTM classifiers in the controller use the same input matrix, consisting of 27 
rows and 30 columns. The 30 columns represent the consecutive time iterations while the 
27 rows contain the different feature values as listed in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5. Inputs to LSTM Networks. 
Input 
Rows 
Description Example Variables 
1-2 Reported values of each sensor y1r, y2r 
3-4 Estimated voltage to each pump v1e, v2e 
5-7 Error estimated by the output of 
models 
y2m-yref, y3m-yref, y4m-yref 
8-10 Difference in the estimated output 
between models 
y2m-y3m, y2m-y4m, y3m-y4m 
11-13 Absolute value of difference in 
change in the estimated output of 
models 
|Δy2m-Δy3m|, |Δy2m-Δy4m|, |Δy3m-Δy4m| 
14-16 Change in the estimated output of 
models 
Δy2m, Δy3m, Δy4m 
17-19 Value of the model outputs y2m, y3m, y4m 
20-27 Binary logic statements 
comparing the mean squared 
error between samples of the 
models 
MSE(y2m(t-19:t)-y4m(t-19:t))>0.000138 
AND MSE(y3m(t-19:t)- y4m(t-19:t)) > 
0.000125 
 
A comment on the last entry of Table 5.5. As the controller runs, the last 20 values 
of the output of each model (𝑦𝑖𝑚(𝑡 − 19: 𝑡)) are stored in an array variable. In the binary 
logic statements, the mean squared difference of comparing each array pairwise is taken 
compared to a set value. If both parts of this statement are true, this statement provides a 1 
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to the input matrix. While these statements alone cannot provide sufficient input to control 
the system, they do help in discriminating between two very similar conditions. 
5.4 Effects of Faults and Cyber-Attacks 
Before discussing how the LSTMs were trained and tested, it is necessary to show 
how the effects of cyber-attacks and faults on the quad-tank system components are 
addressed. Recall the taxonomy of representative sensor effects described in Chapter 3 
which is repeated here in Tables 5.6.  
Table 5.6. Fundamental Effects on Sensors 


















Where μ is mean and σ is the 





?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑦𝑡+𝑧 + 𝛾 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝜋𝑧) 
Where γ determines the 
magnitude of an additive cyclical 





 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 =    Where ε is the fixed value 
6 No Value ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = { }    
 
Applied to the sensors of the quadruple-tank system, these effects are applied as 
described below and summarized in Table 5.7. 
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1. Increased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative   
function with ?̂? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (1.00, 3.00).  
2. Decreased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative 
function with ?̂? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.15, 0.90).  
3. Stochastic Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝜇 set to zero and 𝜎 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.05, 0.55).  
4. Cyclical Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝛾 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval   
(0.10, 1.10) and 𝛿 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.015, 1.015).  
5. Fixed Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with ε being 
randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval (0.00, 20.00).  
6. No Value effect - This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with the value of 
𝑦𝑡+𝑧  being set as Not-a-Number (NaN). 
Two additional effects are modeled to examine the performance of the controller if 
the quadruple tank system sensors are subjected to incipient effects.  
7. Increased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive and 
multiplicative function with 𝛼 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution 
with values on the interval (0.00, 1.00) and the effect being applied using the equation   
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 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑦𝑡 + .005𝛼𝑦𝑡+𝑧 
8. Decreased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive and 
multiplicative function with 𝛽 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution 
with values on the interval (0.0, 1.0) and the effect being applied using the equation   
 ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑦𝑡 − .005𝛽𝑦𝑡+𝑧 
These eight sensor effect models are summarized in Table 5.7. The Effect Number and 
Effect Value fields will be used when discussing test results. The six representative actuator 
effects are described in Table 5.8. 









Increased 1 (1.00, 3.00) Mult Abrupt 
Decreased 2 (0.15, 0.90) Mult Abrupt 
Stochastic 3 (0.05, 0.55) Add Abrupt 
Cyclical 4 (0.10, 1.10) (0.015, 1.015) Add Abrupt 
Fixed 5 (0.00, 20.00) Replace Abrupt 
No Value 6 (NaN) Replace Abrupt 
Increased 7 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient 




Table 5.8. Fundamental Effects on Actuators 
 


















Where μ is mean and σ is the 





?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = 𝑢𝑡+𝑧 + 𝛾 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝜋𝑧) 
Where γ sets the magnitude of a 





?̂?𝑡+𝑧 =    Where ε is the fixed value 
6 No Value ?̂?𝑡+𝑧 = { }   
 
 
Applied to the actuators of the quadruple-tank system, these effects are applied as 
described below and summarized in Table 5.9. 
1. Increased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative   
function with ?̂? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (1.05, 1.50). This effect leaves the actuator controllable.  
2. Decreased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, multiplicative 
function with  ?̂? being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.15, 0.90). This effect leaves the actuator controllable. 
3. Stochastic Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝜇 set to zero and 𝜎 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.05, 0.55). This effect leaves the actuator controllable. 
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4. Cyclical Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, additive function with 
𝛾 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval   
(0.50, 3.50) and 𝛿 being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on 
the interval (0.05, 0.55). This effect leaves the actuator controllable. 
5. Fixed Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with ε being 
randomly selected from a uniform distribution with values on the interval (0.00, 10.00). 
This effect leaves the actuator uncontrollable. 
6. No Value effect – This effect is modeled as an abrupt, function with the value of 
𝑦𝑡+𝑧  being set as Not-a-Number (NaN). This effect leaves the actuator uncontrollable. 
As stated previously, two additional effects are also modelled. 
7. Increased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive and 
multiplicative function with α being randomly selected from a uniform distribution 
with values on the interval (0.00, 1.00) and the effect being applied using the equation   




8. Decreased Value effect – This effect is modeled as an incipient, additive and 
multiplicative function with β being randomly selected from a uniform distribution with 
values on the interval (0.00, 1.00) and the effect being applied using the equation   




These eight actuator effect models are summarized in Table 5.9. 
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Increased 1 (1.05, 1.50) Mult Abrupt Yes 
Decreased 2 (0.15, 0.90) Mult Abrupt Yes 
Stochastic 3 (0.05, 0.55) Add Abrupt Yes 
Cyclical 4 (0.50, 3.50) 
(0.05, 0.55) 
Add Abrupt Yes 
Fixed 5 (0.00, 10.00) Replace Abrupt No 
No Value 6 (NaN) Replace Abrupt No 
Increased 7 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient Yes 
Decreased 8 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient Yes 
 
The Effect Number and Effect Value fields will be used when discussing test results. 
Since the Fixed Value (#5) and the No Value (#6) effects leave the actuator uncontrollable 
and the quadruple-tank system design does not include redundant actuators, these two 
effects will not be included in the training or testing of the controller for the quadruple tank 
system. 
5.5 Training the LSTM Networks 
The following parameters were used to train the LSTM for this controller in 
MATLAB®: 
Solver: ADAptive Moment estimation (ADAM) 
Execution Environment: auto (defaults to GPU if one is present) 
Initial Learning Rate: 0.0002 
Learn Rate Schedule: piecewise 
Learn Rate Drop Factor: 0.5 
Learn Drop Rate: 2 (epochs) 
Maximum Epochs: 20 
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In order to expedite the training process of the LSTM, the training inputs are 
compiled into “minibatches”. The larger the minibatch, the quicker the training is 
accomplished. If the minibatch size is too large, the network will overfit to the training data 
and not perform well in testing or actual use. Based on the size of the training data set, the 
minibatch size for this application is 512 inputs.  
Another important parameter in training the LSTM is the learning rate. Larger 
learning rates help the values of the LSTM weights to converge more quickly, but risk 
possibly settling in local minimum rather than the global minimum. Lower learning rates 
are more likely to find the global minimum but can take a very long time to get there. 
MATLAB® allows the designer to vary the learning rate during training. In this application, 
the initial learning rate is set at 0.002 and is cut by 50% every 2 epochs. Thus, after 20 
training epochs the training rate is dropped to 0.000125. 
5.5.1 Generating Training Data 
The data used to train the proposed controller was generated by building a computer 
simulation of the quadruple-tank system in MATLAB®. This test subject system was 
controlled by a PID controller which was fed the output from the correct model so it always 
controlled the system correctly. 
Table 5.10. Numbers and Combinations of Data Generation for Quad-Tank System. 











 6 0 20 120 
0 8 15 120 
6 8 5 240 
 Total 480 
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The simulation was run, iteratively introducing representative values of each of the 
effects of faults and cyber-attacks on each component. After each component has been run 
with each of the different effects (8 for the sensor and 6 for the actuator), the process is 
repeated with both components being simultaneously affected (48 different combinations). 
Four times as many data generation simulations were run with actuator effects, and 
three times as many with sensor effects, compared to those with two components affected. 
This was done to provide an approximately equal number of samples for single component 
effects as multiple component effects. 
Each data generation simulation ran for 500 iterations with the component effect 
starting at iteration number 250. This was done to ensure the system was operating in a 
normal steady state the effect begins. 
A total of 240,000 inputs were generated using them method described above. Each 
input was a 27x30 matrix. 
5.5.2 Data Preprocessing 
Before the data from the simulation runs can be used to train the LSTM networks 
there are several preprocessing steps it must go through. 
The data must first be normalized to a range of (−1,1). With the data normalized, 
20% of the data was randomly selected and set aside for future testing. This left 198,000 
data samples in the training set. 
A key step in data preprocessing for LSTMs is data balancing. If a significant 
portion of the data has a correct classification of “1” and only a comparative few with 
correct classification of 2, 3 or 4, the LSTM will learn it can get good results by simply 
classifying all inputs as “1”. Therefore, the data is balanced by identifying which 
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classification group was most represented in the data set and duplicating data samples from 
each of the other classification groups until all four groups had the same number of data 
samples. This step increased the training set to 344,000 samples evenly distributed across 
the four classification groups. 
The LSTMs were then trained with this data using the training parameters identified 
at the beginning of this section 
5.6 Testing Methodology for Proposed Controller 
The quadruple-tank system poses some interesting and difficult control challenges. 
Testing with this non-linear system is intended to find the limits of both the proposed and 
the comparison controllers in the presence of the various cyber-attacks and component 
faults. Unlike the steam boiler, discussed in Chapter 4, this system has no redundant 
components nor built-in safety features. The actuators are variable speed pumps which 
make the control requirements much more complex. 
The method for testing the controller is very similar to the method for generating 
the training data. For all testing, the system under test (SUT) and the associated control 
algorithm are realized as MATLAB® scripts. The tests are performed on an Intel® Core i7 
CPU platform with 32 GB of RAM running Windows 10. Each test run is conducted by 
running the script for 500 iterations. Prior to each run the attack/fault effects(s) (described 
previously) is/are set to be activated at iteration number 250. Each of the eight sensor 
effects were applied on individual runs, then each of the six actuator effects were applied 
on individual runs. Finally, the sensor and actuator effects were applied simultaneously on 
the last 48 test runs, with each run using a different combination of the different effects. In 
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all of the test runs the value of the variable(s) were randomly selected, from the uniform 
range described previously, prior to the beginning of the test run.  
5.7 Test Results 
A total of 63 test runs were completed for the test; 1 with no effects applied, 8 with 
a sensor effect applied, 6 with an actuator effect applied and 48 with both a sensor and an 
actuator effect applied. For ease in understanding the complete results of the testing as 
presented in Table 5.11., the column headers are described below. 
Test Run Number – Sequential number of the specific test run 
Pump 1 Effect – Actuator effect applied in the test run. The effect numbers refer to the 
second column of Table 5.9. 
Effect Value – Refers to the randomly selected variable value for that effect on that test 
run. The range of possible actuator effect values are given in column 3 of Table 5.9. 
Sensor 1 Effect - Sensor effect applied in the test run. The effect numbers refer to the 
second column of Table 5.7. 
Effect Value – Refers to the randomly selected variable value for that effect on that test 
run. The range of possible sensor effect values are given in column 3 of Table 5.7. 
Components Affected – Total number of sensors and/or actuators affected in the test run. 
Catastrophic Failure - Boolean indicator is 1 if the actual water level in tank 1 dropped 
to 0 or exceeded 25 cm (maximum height of the tank). Otherwise it is 0. 
Maintain Proper Control – Boolean indicator is 1 if the actual water level in tank 1 did 
not vary by more than ±1% from the reference value after the effect was initiated. 
Otherwise it is 0. 
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Iterations to Regain Proper Control – If the previous column entry in the test run is a 0, 
this entry shows how many iterations occurred from the time the water level in tank 1 went 
outside the ±1% until it was brought back into that range. 
Iterations to Correct Model – Measure of how many controller program iterations 
occurred from the onset of the effect(s) until the controller selected the correct model.  
Iterations Using Correct Model (%) – Measure of the percentage of iterations during the 
test run in which the correct model was selected by the controller.  
Complete results of the test runs are shown in Table 5.11. 






























































































































































1   0  0 0 1  0 100.00% 
2   1 2.96  1 0 1  1 99.67% 
3   2 0.56  1 0 1  1 99.67% 
4   3 0.48  1 0 1  1 99.67% 
5   4 0.71  1 0 1  1 99.67% 
6   5 15.72  1 0 1  1 99.67% 
7   6 * 1 0 1  1 99.67% 
8   7 0.05  1 0 1  18 94.00% 
9   8 0.82  1 0 1  7 97.67% 
10 1 1.44    1 0 0 1 2 99.33% 
11 2 0.73    1 0 1  2 99.33% 
12 3 4.48    1 0 1  2 99.33% 
13 4 2.47    1 0 1  3 99.00% 
14 7 0.62    1 0 0 1 3 99.00% 
15 8 0.87    1 0 0 1 3 99.00% 
16 1 1.14  1 2.21  2 0 1  4 98.67% 
17 1 1.50  2 0.18  2 0 0 3 3 99.00% 
18 1 1.11  3 1.16  2 0 1  4 98.67% 
19 1 1.43  4 0.69  2 0 0 2 2 99.33% 
20 1 1.45  5 11.75  2 0 0 2 2 99.33% 
21 1 1.20  6 * 2 0 0 1 4 98.67% 
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22 1 1.50  7 0.21  2 0 0 2 2 99.33% 
23 1 1.18  8 0.83  2 0 1  3 99.00% 
24 2 0.30  1 2.53  2 0 0 30 3 99.00% 
25 2 0.61  2 0.87  2 0 0 10 2 99.33% 
26 2 0.53  3 2.44  2 0 0 15 2 99.33% 
27 2 0.52  4 0.35  2 0 0 15 2 99.33% 
28 2 0.23  5 3.07  2 0 0 36 3 99.00% 
29 2 0.80  6 * 2 0 0 2 4 98.67% 
30 2 0.69  7 0.01  2 0 0 4 2 99.33% 
31 2 0.76  8 0.25  2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
32 3 1.08  1 2.31  2 0 0 1 3 99.00% 
33 3 4.91  2 0.67  2 0 1  4 98.67% 
34 3 1.88  3 2.40  2 0 1  4 98.67% 
35 3 2.45 4 0.92  2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
36 3 1.23 5 15.41  2 0 1  5 98.33% 
37 3 1.86 6 * 2 0 0 1 4 98.67% 
38 3 4.36 7 0.13  2 0 1  4 98.67% 
39 3 4.50 8 0.73  2 0 0 1 3 99.00% 
40 4 1.77 1 2.21  2 0 0 1 4 98.67% 
41 4 2.79 2 0.89  2 0 1  4 98.67% 
42 4 0.10 3 2.57  2 0 0 3 5 98.33% 
43 4 2.96 4 0.96  2 0 1  10 96.67% 
44 4 0.84 5 13.72  2 0 1  250 16.33% 
45 4 2.48 6 * 2 0 1  17 94.33% 
46 4 0.99 7 0.70  2 0 1  6 98.00% 
47 4 1.84 8 0.97  2 0 1  4 98.67% 
48 7 0.62 1 2.15 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
49 7 0.65 2 0.25 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
50 7 0.08 3 2.12 2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
51 7 0.84 4 0.03 2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
52 7 0.54 5 6.75 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
53 7 0.80 6 * 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
54 7 0.76 7 0.44 2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
55 7 0.87 8 0.82 2 0 0 1 2 99.33% 
56 8 0.55 1 1.33 2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
57 8 0.63 2 0.83 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
58 8 0.34 3 1.82 2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
59 8 0.10 4 0.26 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
60 8 0.49 5 0.03 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
61 8 0.27 6 * 2 0 0 3 4 98.67% 
62 8 0.44 7 0.72 2 0 0 2 3 99.00% 
63 8 0.82 8 0.24 2 0 0 1 2 99.33% 
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Of the 63 test runs, there was only a single test (#44) in which the proposed 
controller did not maintain or regain proper control of the system after it was affected. The 
test results are summarized in Table 5.12. 

















# A/S/Both % % Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
6 Actuator 0 50.00 1.00 1.00 2.50 2.50 99.00 99.00 
8 Sensor 0 100.00 * * 3.88 1.00 98.67 98.67 
48 Both 0 27.08 4.29 2.00 7.80 3.00 97.37 98.50 
Total - 0 39.68 4.58 2.00 7.54 3.00 97.48 99.00 
 
Using the same data summarized in the last two columns of Table 5.12., a confusion 
matrix of the classification results of the LSTM is shown in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13. Confusion Matrix of LSTM Classifications in Proposed Controller 










 3338 0 0 0 1 
10 1491 3 2 2 
30 0 1977 1 3 
74 0 356 11618 4 
 1 2 3 4  
 
By way of review, model 1 is the correct choice when no component is being 
affected. Model 2 is the correct choice when the actuator is being affected. Model 3 is the 
correct choice when the sensor is being affected and model 4 is the correct choice when 
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both are being affected. These test results are discussed and analyzed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
5.8 Ensemble Variant of Network-Based Controller 
To this point the discussion of the design, training and testing of the proposed 
controller has considered a single LSTM network assigned to each actuator in the system 
under control. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are circumstances in which an ensemble of 
smaller LSTM networks may be preferable to a single larger network.  
For use as a controller for the quadruple-tank system, we found an ensemble of four 
smaller LSTM networks (2 hidden layers with 512 nodes each), operated slightly faster a 
single larger network. It is also possible to extract out a small increase in classification 
accuracy. 
 
Figure 5.3. Quadruple Tank System with Ensemble-Based Controller 
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From a design perspective, the differences between a controller with ensembles vs 
single networks are comparatively minor. Figure 5.3 depicts the quadruple-tank system 
(plant) with two ensembles of LSTM networks as opposed to the two single networks 
previously shown in Figure 5.1. 
Within the controller, the logic flow in an ensemble-based controller is very similar 
to that of single network-based controller.  
 
Figure 5.4. Logic Flow through a Single Network-Based Controller 
 
Comparing the flow shown in Figure 5.4 to that shown in Figure 5.5, the ensemble 
requires a resolver to take the output from the four networks in the ensemble and provide 




Figure 5.5. Logic Flow within an Ensemble-Based Controller. 
To train the LSTMs in the ensemble the training data was divided into fourths 
(86,000 samples each) so that each LSTM would be trained with different data than the 
others.  
After the LSTMs were each trained, the various options for resolving the LSTM 
outputs to a single solution were also trained and tested. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
options considered were a majority vote (and a unanimous vote variation), a kNN network, 
Multiple Linear Regression and MATLAB’s built-in ensemble Bagging/Boosting 
program. The results of testing each of these is summarized in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14. Test Results for Ensemble Resolution Options. 
Method Accuracy 
Majority Vote 93.82% 
Unanimous Vote 95.24% 
k Nearest Neighbor 94.93% 
Multiple Linear Regression 91.97% 
Bagging/Boosting 97.43% 
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It should be noted that the accuracy score of the Majority Vote and Unanimous 
Vote methods reflected above are based only on the number inputs for which there was a 
majority or unanimous input to select. For those inputs that did not have a majority or 
unanimous answer to select, no model was selected. This can be illustrated by the results 
shown in the confusion matrix for the Unanimous Vote method in Table 5.15. 
Table 5.15. Confusion Matrix of Unanimous Vote Ensemble Resolver. 










 0 2259 0 0 0 1 
11 8 986 0 0 2 
13 16 0 1177 0 3 
1447 124 265 7 4187 4 
 none 1 2 3 4  
 
In Table 5.15, the “none” column shows the times there was no unanimous input 
for the resolver to select. In these cases another means of deciding a single result is 
required. 
If all of the LSTMs in an ensemble select the same model, the output of that model 
is provided to the PID controller. If a unanimous decision is not reached, then a 
bagging/boosting classifier is activated to make the selection. The confusion matrix for the 




Table 5.16. Confusion Matrix of Bagging/Boosting Ensemble Resolver. 










 2259 0 0 0 1 
9 995 1 0 2 
18 0 1188 0 3 
40 123 0 5788 4 
 1 2 3 4  
 
Given that the Bagging/Boosting algorithms showed the best accuracy of the five 
methods considered, it would be reasonable to simply use it as the ensemble resolver. 
However, in this application, combining the Unanimous Vote and Bagging Boosting 
algorithms provided slightly improved accuracy over the Bagging/Boosting algorithm 
alone. The confusion matrix for two combined is shown in Table 5.17. 
 
Table 5.17. Confusion Matrix for Unanimous Vote with Bagging/Boosting Resolver. 










 2259 0 0 0 1 
11 993 1 0 2 
16 0 1190 0 3 
46 112 66 5806 4 
 1 2 3 4  
 
The two methods combined provide a classification accuracy of 97.60% which is 
slightly better than the 97.43% accuracy of the Bagging/Boosting algorithm alone. 
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5.8.1 Testing the Ensemble-Based Controller 
The testing for the ensemble-based controller was conducted exactly as the testing 
for the single network-based controller. Complete results of the test runs is shown in Table 
5.18, and a summary is provided in Table 5.19. 






























































































































































1     0 0 1  0 100.00% 
2   1 2.96  1 0 1  2 99.33% 
3   2 0.56  1 0 1  3 99.00% 
4   3 0.48  1 0 1  3 99.00% 
5   4 0.71  1 0 1  3 99.00% 
6   5 15.72  1 0 1  3 99.00% 
7   6 * 1 0 1  3 99.00% 
8   7 0.05  1 0 1  20 93.33% 
9   8 0.82  1 0 1  9 97.00% 
10 1 1.44    1 0  1 2 99.33% 
11 2 0.73    1 0 1  2 99.33% 
12 3 4.48    1 0 1  5 98.33% 
13 4 2.47    1 0 1  5 98.33% 
14 7 0.62    1 0  1 5 98.33% 
15 8 0.87    1 0  1 5 98.33% 
16 1 1.14  1 2.21  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
17 1 1.50  2 0.18  2 0  2 1 99.67% 
18 1 1.11  3 1.16  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
19 1 1.43  4 0.69  2 0  2 1 99.67% 
20 1 1.45  5 11.75  2 0  2 1 99.67% 
21 1 1.20  6 * 2 0 1  1 99.67% 
22 1 1.50  7 0.21  2 0  16 13 95.67% 
23 1 1.18  8 0.83  2 0  14 14 95.33% 
24 2 0.30  1 2.53  2 0  30 1 99.67% 
25 2 0.61  2 0.87  2 0  10 1 99.67% 
26 2 0.53  3 2.44  2 0  15 1 99.67% 
27 2 0.52  4 0.35  2 0  15 1 99.67% 
28 2 0.23  5 3.07  2 0  36 1 99.67% 
29 2 0.80  6 * 2 0 1  1 99.67% 
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30 2 0.69  7 0.01  2 0  23 23 92.33% 
31 2 0.76  8 0.25  2 0  23 24 92.00% 
32 3 1.08  1 2.31  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
33 3 4.91  2 0.67  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
34 3 1.88  3 2.40  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
35 3 2.45 4 0.92  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
36 3 1.23 5 15.41  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
37 3 1.86 6 * 2 0 1  1 99.67% 
38 3 4.36 7 0.13  2 0  13 15 95.00% 
39 3 4.50 8 0.73  2 0  14 14 95.33% 
40 4 1.77 1 2.21  2 0  2 1 99.67% 
41 4 2.79 2 0.89  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
42 4 0.10 3 2.57  2 0  3 2 99.33% 
43 4 2.96 4 0.96  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
44 4 0.84 5 13.72  2 0 1  1 99.67% 
45 4 2.48 6 * 2 0 1  1 99.67% 
46 4 0.99 7 0.70  2 0 1  6 98.00% 
47 4 1.84 8 0.97  2 0  3 14 95.33% 
48 7 0.62 1 2.15  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
49 7 0.65 2 0.25  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
50 7 0.08 3 2.12  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
51 7 0.84  4 0.03  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
52 7 0.54  5 6.75  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
53 7 0.80  6 * 2 0  1 1 99.67% 
54 7 0.76  7 0.44  2 0  15 15 95.00% 
55 7 0.87  8 0.82  2 0  1 2 99.33% 
56 8 0.55  1 1.33  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
57 8 0.63  2 0.83  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
58 8 0.34  3 1.82  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
59 8 0.10  4 0.26  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
60 8 0.49  5 0.03  2 0  1 1 99.67% 
61 8 0.27  6 * 2 0  1 1 99.67% 
62 8 0.44  7 0.72  2 0  14 15 95.00% 
63 8 0.82  8 0.24  2 0  1 2 99.33% 
 

















# A/S/Both % % Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
6 Actuators 0 50.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 98.67 98.33 
8 Sensors 0 100.00 * * 5.75 3.00 98.08 99.00 
48 Both 0 31.25 8.06 2.00 4.04 1.00 98.65 99.67 
Total - 0 56.25 7.47 2.00 4.19 1.00 98.60 99.67 
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Using the same data summarized in the last two columns of Table 5.19 a confusion 
matrix of the classification results of the LSTM ensemble is shown in Table 5.20. 
Table 5.20. Confusion Matrix of LSTM Ensemble Classifications. 










 3338 0 0 0 1 
12 1482 0 12 2 
30 0 1962 16 3 
71 123 0 11854 4 
 1 2 3 4  
 
Comparing the summarized test results in Table 5.12 to those in 5.19, we see the 
ensemble-based controller showed slightly improved performance over the single LSTM-
based controller. The ensemble base controller maintained proper control of the system 
during the tests in 56.25% of the runs where the single LSTM controller did so in only 
39.68% of the tests. Additionally, the single LSTM controller had a mean correct model 
selection rate of 97.48% while the ensemble-based controller’s mean selection rate was 
98.60%. These are just two highlights in the comparison of these two controllers. The 
performance of these controllers will be compared in more depth in Chapter 6. 
5.9 Computational Overhead 
Parameters 
The computational parameters of an LSTM network are weights (input and 
recurrent) at each hidden layer of the network as well as the biases at each cell. The number 
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of parameters is determined by the number inputs to the layer, the number of outputs from 
the layer as well as the hidden state (h) and cell state (c) described in section 3.5.1. There 
are four different sets of weights that are used in LSTM operations. Therefore, the number 
of parameters at a layer with m inputs and n outputs is calculated as  
4n(m+n+1)  
Consider the single large LSTM used to control the quadruple-tank system. The 
input to that network has 27 nodes (one for each input feature), each of the eight hidden 
layers contains 512 nodes, there is a softmax layer and 4 output nodes.  
This means the first hidden layer has 4×512(27+512+1)=1,105,920 parameters. 
The second through the eighth hidden layers each have 4×512(512+512+1)=2,099,200 
parameters. This makes a total of 15,800,320 parameters for the network. 
In comparison, the ensemble of smaller networks was made up of four LSTMs each 
with two hidden layers of 512 nodes each. Each of those networks had the same 1,105,920 
parameters for the first hidden layer, 2,099,200 parameters in the second layer. As a result, 
each of the smaller networks had 3,205,120 parameters for a total of 12,820,480 parameters 
in the ensemble. 
Memory Requirements 
Given the number of parameters for both the large LSTM and the LSTM ensemble, 
we can estimate the memory requirements for each. Assuming 64-bit processing and 
assuming each of the parameters in the LSTM networks is a double precision floating point 
number, each parameter will require 8 bytes of memory. From this, the large LSTM is 
estimated to be 128MB and the ensemble of LSTMs is estimated to be 103MB. Recall that 
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as applied to the quadruple-tank system, the controller would employ two LSTMs, one for 
each actuator. This doubles the estimated memory requirement for each.  
During operation, the controller program needs to capture and store past values of 
input features. With a segment length of 30 time steps and 27 features, this temporal data 
and the basic controller algorithm can bring the minimum memory requirement up to 
258MB for the large LSTM controller and 208MB for the LSTM ensemble controller. 
These estimates all assume the controller program runs on a CPU. If the controller 
computer is equipped with a GPU, the memory requirements could easily jump to over 1.5 
GB because of the wider vector paths used. 
The amount of RAM available on current industrial computers (process controllers) 
is discussed later in this section. 
Multiply and Accumulate Operations 
To better appreciate the computational capability required to operate a large LSTM 
network, it is useful to consider the Multiply and Accumulate (MAC) operations required 
in its use. In [109], the authors describe how the number of MAC operations in an LSTM 
are estimated. In short, matrix to vector multiplications dominate the number of 
computations made in an LSTM as well as the number of parameters. The number of MAC 
operations in a layer of an LSTM with m inputs and n outputs is given by 
sn[4(n+m)+3] 
where s is the segment length of the input features.  
Thus, the large LSTM network used in this dissertation performs 33,162,240 MAC 
operations in the first layer and 62,960,640 in the second through eighth layers. This is a 
total of 473,886,720 MAC operations at each iteration of the program. 
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Similarly, in the ensemble of smaller networks each LSTM would execute the 
32,486,400 MAC operations in the first layer and the 62,960,640 operations in the second 
layer. This makes a total of 96,122,880 operations per network or 384,491,520 operations 
in the entire ensemble. The computational complexity of the LSTM is then O(n2+n). 
As configured for the quadruple-tank system, each actuator requires its own LSTM 
in the proposed controller design. Therefore, the large LSTM controller for the quadruple-
tank system uses two networks and would execute approximately 950 million MAC 
operations per iteration of the control algorithm. In the case of the LSTM ensemble 
controller, two ensembles would be used and the control algorithm would execute over 760 
million MAC operations per iteration. 
This large number of MAC operations per iteration of the control program brings 
to mind the question of what the sampling rate of the controller can be in this application. 
Across the industrial controls community, the lower bound for sampling rates varies 
depending on the type of process under control. The general rules of thumb are; 1 second 
or faster for flow loops (processes) and 1-2 seconds for pressure processes. These processes 
react quickly to changes in controller output. Temperature control processes react more 
slowly to controller outputs so sampling every 2-5 seconds is the standard for those 
processes. 
Modern CPUs, implementing combinational logic, are capable completing a MAC 
operation every cycle. Clock speed and the number of cores of the control computer CPU 





A brief survey of industrial computers used for process control was conducted. 
Computers from three different sources were considered, using four different models from 
each source as samples. The survey revealed that the industrial computers currently 
available all use modern, Intel® multi-core processors with clock speeds ranging from just 
under 2 GHz to just under 4 GHz. The available RAM amounts range from 4 GB to 64 GB. 
Table 5.21 summarizes these findings. 
Table 5.21. Industrial Computer Processor Cores, Clock Speeds and RAM. 
Brand Allen-Bradley by Rockwell Automation 
Model VersaView 5400 6181P 6181P Advanced 6177R 
Processor Atom E3845 Core i3 - 4102E Core i7 - 4700EQ Core i5 - 2500 
Cores 4 2 4 4 
Speed 1.91 GHz 1.6 GHz 2.4 GHz 3.1 GHz 
Max RAM 4 GB 16 GB 16 GB 32 GB 
 
Brand Industrial Computers Limited 
Model IPPC 1602 IPPC 1501 IPPC 1503 IPPC 2107 
Processor Celeron - J1900 Core i3 - 3120ME Core i7 - 3540M Core i5 - 6300U 
Cores 4 2 2 2 
Speed 2.42 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.9 GHz 2.40 GHz 
Max RAM 4 GB 8 GB 8 GB 16 GB 
 
Brand CONTEC 
Model VPC 1600 VPC 3000 VPC 3100-G VPC 5000-G 
Processor Celeron G1820TE Core i3 - 4570S Core i7 - 8700 Xeon E-2278GE 
Cores 2 4 6 8 
Speed 2.2 GHz 2.9 GHz 3.2 GHz 3.3 GHz 
Max RAM 4 GB 8 GB 32 GB 64 GB 
 
From the information shown in Table 5.21, it appears any of the industrial 
computers listed would have sufficient RAM to run the proposed controller algorithms. 
Using the CPU specifications identified in Table 5.21 the plots shown in Figure 5.6 were 
generated. 
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Figure 5.6 shows the relationship between processor clock speed and maximum 
sampling rate when running a control algorithm that executes 1 billion MAC operations 
per iteration. 
 
Figure 5.6. CPU Clock Speed vs. Sampling Rates. 
When considering the effect of multiple CPU cores on the possible sampling rate 
for the plots in Figure 5.6, Amdahl’s law was applied with the assumption that 75% of the 
controller code could be run in parallel.  
Any of the CPU core/clock speed combinations in Table 5.21 would allow a 
sampling rate of 1 second or less using a control algorithm similar to the proposed 
controller with the large LSTM networks. Of course, if a significantly faster sampling rate 
(e.g., 0.25 seconds) is required, a CPU with a higher clock speed and/or more cores would 
be required to reach the desired sampling rate. 
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5.10 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the benchmark, nonlinear quadruple-tank system was described and 
used as a test subject. The specific design of the proposed controller as applied to this 
system was also presented in detail. The utility of the effects taxonomy was demonstrated. 
The specifics of testing the system and controller were discussed and results presented. In 
addition, the design implementation and testing of an LSTM ensemble-based controller 
were also presented. Finally, the computational overhead requirements for using the 
proposed controller were discussed. 
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 Reference Controller, Comparative Test Results Analysis and Stuxnet-Like 
Attack Testing 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter describes a previously published, active fault tolerant controller [12] 
which was applied to the same quadruple-tank system described in Chapter 5. The 
controller is tested using the same tests applied to the proposed controller in the previous 
chapter and the results of that testing are described. This chapter presents a discussion on 
the results of testing the proposed controller and the comparison controller with 63 different 
effects on a sensor and/or a pump of the quadruple-tank system as described in Chapter 5. 
Both versions of the proposed controller and the comparison controller are tested while the 
system is subjected to simulated Stuxnet-like attacks. The results of that testing are 
compared and discussed as well. 
6.2 Comparison Controller Design 
In [12] the authors presented a reconfigurable control strategy for linear continuous 
time invariant systems. This controller was selected because it embodies the more common 
characteristics of current FTC; it is active, model-driven and incorporates an observer as 
part of the solution. In addition, it is intended to achieve some of the same control 
requirements as the controller proposed in this dissertation. Namely, to maintain proper 
control of the system in the presence of both sensor and actuator faults whether they occur 
one at a time or simultaneously.   
As described in section 2.2.1, a reconfigurable controller uses a fault detection and 
identification mechanism to trigger reaction in the controller. Figure 6.1 shows the generic 
function of a reconfigurable controller. 
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.  
Figure 6.1. Reconfigurable Control System Diagram. 
In general terms, when the fault detection and identification mechanism detects and 
identifies a particular fault, it generates a fault estimate (𝑓𝑒 ) for the reconfiguration 
mechanism. In response, the reconfiguration mechanism generates a correction function 
(𝑓𝑐) for the controller. Depending on the specific design, the correction function may cause 
a change in the controller itself so it can adapt to the fault, or it may modify one or more 
the signals into the controller (𝑦𝑡) or out of the controller (𝑢𝑡). This latter approach is 
sometimes referred to as “fault hiding” as the controller itself does not need to be aware of 
the fault to function normally. This is the approach used in the comparison reference 
controller [12]. 
The authors of [12] apply their active, reconfigurable controller to the benchmark 
quadruple-tank system described in Chapter 5. They utilize linearized state-space equations 
to model the system to be controlled. In control theory, such state space models represent 
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a system using a series of first-order differential equations and an algebraic output 
equation. In general form, the state equations are derived as 
?̇?𝑛 = 𝑓𝑛(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … 𝑥𝑛, 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … 𝑢𝑚) 
and the output equation is derived as 
𝑦𝑝 = ℎ𝑝(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … 𝑥𝑛, 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … 𝑢𝑚) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the state space, 𝑢𝑖 is the input from the controller and 𝑦𝑖 is the system output. 
If the system of equations are linear they can be rewritten in the general form 
?̇? = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵𝑢 
𝑦 = 𝐶𝑥 
Where 𝐴 , 𝐵 , and 𝐶  are the state, input, and output matrices, respectively. Using this 
nomenclature, the nominal system with feedback controller diagram shown in Figure 6.2 
is reconfigured to the new, but equivalent, diagram shown in Figure 6.3. This form will be 
used in the remainder of this system description. 
 
 




Figure 6.3. Equivalent System with Feedback Control. 
The reference system uses a classical proportional-integral (PI) controller for each 
of the two pumps in the quadruple-tank system. Recall the nonlinear equations for the rate 
of change in the level of fluid in each tank in the quadruple-tank system previously 










































𝑣1    (4) 
Using equations (1-4), the system can be represented by linearized the state equations 
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which has the form ?̇? = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵𝑢.  The output equation is given by 𝑦 = 𝐶𝑥: 
𝑦 =  [
𝐾𝑐 0 0 0
0 𝐾𝑐 0 0
] 𝑥 








, where i = 1,… ,4 
The fault hiding reconfigurable control approach is based on the idea of placing a 
reconfiguration block between the nominal controller and the faulty plant at 
reconfiguration time as shown in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4. Fault Hiding with Reconfiguration Block. 
In Figure 6.4 the output signal from a faulty sensor (𝑦𝑓) is reconfigured to a correct 
output signal (𝑦𝑐) for the nominal controller. The correct input from the nominal controller 
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(𝑢𝑐) is reconfigured to a signal (𝑢𝑓) that will compensate for the faulty actuator in the plant. 
The reconfiguration block hides the fault from the controller and helps the faulty plant to 
operate properly.  The reconfiguration block contains a virtual sensor and a virtual actuator. 
In the event of a sensor fault, the controller activates the virtual sensor as shown in Figure 
6.5. 
 
Figure 6.5. Faulty System with Virtual Sensor [12]. 
The derivation of the virtual sensor is similar to the design of a state observer (as 
described in section 2.2.1). The derivation is given by: 
?̇̂? = 𝐴?̂? + 𝐵𝑢𝑐 + 𝐿(𝑦𝑓 − 𝐶?̂?)  
The parameter L is chosen so that all poles are within the design set 𝐶𝑔: 
𝜎(𝐴 − 𝐿𝐶𝑓) ⊂ 𝐶𝑔 
This resulting block is the virtual sensor and is actually a Luenberger observer with output 
matrix 𝐶. In the event of an actuator fault, the virtual actuator uses the input signal meant 
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for the nominal process and transforms it into a signal useful for controlling the faulty plant 
as shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6. Faulty Plant with Virtual Actuator [12]. 
As defined by the state-space model, the virtual actuator is described as: 
?̇?Δ = (𝐴 − 𝐵𝑓𝑀)𝑥Δ + 𝐵𝑢𝑐 
𝑦𝑐 = 𝑦𝑓 + 𝐶𝑥Δ 
𝑢𝑓 = 𝑀𝑥Δ 
where M is chosen so that all poles are within the designated set Cg where  
𝜎(𝐴 − 𝐵𝑓𝑀) ⊂ 𝐶𝑔 
When a fault occurs in both a sensor and an actuator at the same time, the 
reconfiguration block is realized by the interconnection of a virtual sensor and a virtual 
actuator as shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7. Virtual Sensor and Actuator with Faulty Plant [12]. 
As described previously, the virtual sensor is an observer for the state of the faulty 
plant with an output error injection and the virtual actuator contains a reference model of 
the nominal plant with feedback of the difference between the reference state and the 
observed state, as well as feed through of the control input. In this configuration the state 
space model equations are: 
?̇? = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵𝑢𝑐 
𝑦𝑐 = 𝐶𝑥 
𝑢𝑓 = 𝑀(𝑥 − ?̂?𝑓) 
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The authors of [12] use a simple fault detection mechanism. In the case of the virtual 
sensor, a fault is indicated if 𝐶 ≠ 𝐶𝑓 .  For the virtual actuator, a fault is indicated if 𝐵 ≠ 𝐵𝑓.  
Both the virtual actuator and virtual sensor are engaged when 𝐶 ≠ 𝐶𝑓 and 𝐵 ≠ 𝐵𝑓. This 
simplistic approach works fine in a sterile simulation environment, but does not allow for 
the possibility of minor signal noise or minor fluctuation in these parameters that easily 
occur when any change occurs in the system. In order to avoid excessive false positives, 
we implement this comparison controller using a typical residual generator [11]. The 
residual generator is simply sliding windows which tracks the sum of the difference 
between 𝐶 and 𝐶𝑓 and between 𝐵 and 𝐵𝑓. The window sums the difference over the last 
twenty iterations. This type of  residual generator is commonly used in active FTC systems. 
6.3 Comparison Controller Testing 
For all testing, the system under test (SUT) and the associated control algorithm are 
realized as MATLAB® scripts. The tests are performed on an Intel® Core i7 CPU platform 
with 32 GB of RAM running Windows 10. Each test run is conducted by running the script 
for 500 iterations. Prior to each run the attack/fault effects(s) (described previously) is/are 
set to be activated at iteration number 250. The type of effect and magnitude of the effects 
were identical to those used in testing the proposed controller.  
The various effects are shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. The Effect Number and 
Effect Value fields will be used when discussing test results. Since the Fixed Value (#5) 
and the No Value (#6) effects leave the actuator uncontrollable and the quadruple-tank 
system design does not include redundant actuators, these two effects were not included in 
the training or testing of the controller for the quadruple tank system. 
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Increased 1 (1.00, 3.00) Mult Abrupt 
Decreased 2 (0.15, 0.90) Mult Abrupt 
Stochastic 3 (0.05, 0.55) Add Abrupt 
Cyclical 4 (0.10, 1.10) (0.015, 1.015) Add Abrupt 
Fixed 5 (0.00, 20.00) Replace Abrupt 
No Value 6 (NaN) Replace Abrupt 
Increased 7 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient 
Decreased 8 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient 
 










Increased 1 (1.05, 1.50) Mult Abrupt Yes 
Decreased 2 (0.15, 0.90) Mult Abrupt Yes 
Stochastic 3 (0.05, 0.55) Add Abrupt Yes 
Cyclical 4 (0.50, 3.50) 
(0.05, 0.55) 
Add Abrupt Yes 
Fixed 5 (0.00, 10.00) Replace Abrupt No 
No Value 6 (NaN) Replace Abrupt No 
Increased 7 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient Yes 
Decreased 8 (0.00, 1.00) Add & Mult Incipient Yes 
 
In each test run the onset of the effect is timed to begin after the system is in a 
steady state condition (iteration #250). This is done to ensure an “apples to apples” 
comparison of the different controllers and to allow clarity in identifying how the system 
is controlled by each controller and how long it takes for the controller to return the system 
to the steady state condition. The tests performed on this controller were identical to those 
performed on the proposed controller in Chapter 5, and each test run used the same effect 
variable values as were used to test the proposed controller and the ensemble variant of 
that controller.  
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6.3.1 Comparison Controller Test Results 
A total of 63 test runs were completed for the test; 1 with no effects applied, 8 with 
a sensor effect applied, 6 with an actuator effect applied and 48 with both a sensor and an 
actuator effect applied. The complete results of the testing are presented in Table 6.3. The 
column headers are identical to those used in the tests in Chapter 5. 































































































































































1     0 0 1  0 100.00% 
2   1 2.96  1 0 0 250 1 99.67% 
3   2 0.56  1 0 0 28 3 99.00% 
4   3 0.48  1 0 0 46 inf 16.33% 
5   4 0.71  1 0 0 18 inf 16.33% 
6   5 15.72  1 0 0 22 2 99.33% 
7   6 * 1 0 1  1 99.67% 
8   7 0.05  1 0 0 49 77 74.33% 
9   8 0.82  1 0 0 75 44 85.33% 
10 1 1.44    1 0 1  19 93.67% 
11 2 0.73    1 0 1  16 94.67% 
12 3 4.48    1 0 1  21 93.00% 
13 4 2.47    1 0 1  24 92.00% 
14 7 0.62    1 0 1  13 95.67% 
15 8 0.87    1 0 1  12 96.00% 
16 1 1.14  1 2.21  2 0 0 250 22 92.67% 
17 1 1.50  2 0.18  2 0 0 250 2 99.33% 
18 1 1.11  3 1.16  2 0 0 35 13 95.67% 
19 1 1.43  4 0.69  2 0 0 250 inf 16.33% 
20 1 1.45  5 11.75  2 0 0 13 11 96.33% 
21 1 1.20  6 * 2 0 0 222 24 92.00% 
22 1 1.50  7 0.21  2 0 0 40 42 86.00% 
23 1 1.18  8 0.83  2 0 0 250 26 91.33% 
24 2 0.30  1 2.53  2 0 0 221 7 97.67% 
25 2 0.61  2 0.87  2 0 0 23 8 97.33% 
26 2 0.53  3 2.44  2 0 0 119 15 95.00% 
27 2 0.52  4 0.35  2 0 0 1 25 91.67% 
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28 2 0.23  5 3.07  2 0 0 1 3 99.00% 
29 2 0.80  6 * 2 0 0 219 24 92.00% 
30 2 0.69  7 0.00  2 0 0 250 211 29.67% 
31 2 0.76  8 0.25  2 0 0 29 41 86.33% 
32 3 1.08  1 2.31  2 0 0 217 14 95.33% 
33 3 4.91  2 0.67  2 0 0 228 4 98.67% 
34 3 1.88  3 2.40  2 0 0 16 19 93.67% 
35 3 2.45 4 0.92  2 0 0 20 22 92.67% 
36 3 1.23 5 15.41  2 0 0 3 10 96.67% 
37 3 1.86 6 * 2 0 0 228 17 94.33% 
38 3 4.36 7 0.13  2 0 0 250 49 83.67% 
39 3 4.50 8 0.73  2 0 0 250 28 90.67% 
40 4 1.77 1 2.21  2 0 0 3 12 96.00% 
41 4 2.79 2 0.89 2 0 0 24 10 96.67% 
42 4 0.10 3 2.57  2 0 0 9 13 95.67% 
43 4 2.96 4 0.96  2 0 0 4 23 92.33% 
44 4 0.84 5 13.72  2 0 0 17 12 96.00% 
45 4 2.48 6 * 2 0 1  13 95.67% 
46 4 0.99 7 0.70  2 0 0 1 29 90.33% 
47 4 1.84 8 0.97  2 0 0 40 26 91.33% 
48 7 0.62 1 2.15 2 0 0 218 14 95.33% 
49 7 0.65 2 0.25 2 0 0 11 3 99.00% 
50 7 0.08 3 2.12 2 0 0 250 24 92.00% 
51 7 0.84  4 0.03 2 0 0 16 15 95.00% 
52 7 0.54  5 6.75 2 0 0 5 4 98.67% 
53 7 0.80  6 * 2 0 0 218 14 95.33% 
54 7 0.76  7 0.44 2 0 0 250 32 89.33% 
55 7 0.87  8 0.82 2 0 0 17 30 90.00% 
56 8 0.55  1 1.33 2 0 0 177 15 95.00% 
57 8 0.63  2 0.83 2 0 0 19 6 98.00% 
58 8 0.34  3 1.82 2 0 0 189 15 95.00% 
59 8 0.10  4 0.26 2 0 0 2 32 89.33% 
60 8 0.49  5 0.03 2 0 0 225 14 95.33% 
61 8 0.27  6 * 2 0 0 224 14 95.33% 
62 8 0.44  7 0.72 2 0 0 250 28 90.67% 
63 8 0.82  8 0.24 2 0 0 250 44 85.33% 
 
Reviewing the results of these tests, the value of the taxonomy of effects (from 
Chapter 3) becomes more apparent. The comparison controller performed well when the 
effects were presented as abrupt, multiplicative increases or decreases to the sensor and/or 
actuator. In the article presenting this active, fault tolerant controller [12], these were the 
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only type of tests performed. In this research, the broader range effects identified conditions 
that posed a challenge to the comparison controller as well as highlighting a weakness of 
the active FTC; the inherent delay in responding to a fault or cyber-attack that is the result 
of using a dedicated detection/identification mechanism. The test results are summarized 
in Table 6.4. 


















# A/S/Both % % Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
6 Actuators 0 100.00 * * 17.50 17.50 94.17 94.17 
8 Sensors 0 12.50 69.71 46.00 16.00  1.50 73.75 92.17 
48 Both 0   2.08 123.49 119.00 22.48 15.00 90.76 95.00 
Total  0 14.29 116.52 47.50 20.83 15.00 89.07 95.00 
Using the same data summarized in the last two columns of Table 6.4, a confusion 
matrix of the detection/identification results of the comparison controller is shown in Table 
6.5. By way of review, fault type 1 is the correct choice when no component is being 
affected. Fault type 2 is the correct choice when the actuator is being affected. Fault type 
3 is the correct choice when the sensor is being affected and fault type 4 is the correct 
choice when both are being affected. 
Table 6.5. Confusion Matrix of Fault Detection in Comparison Controller. 













e 3338 0 0 0 1 
105 1401 0 0 2 
624 4 1378 2 3 
1284 27 19 10718 4 
 1 2 3 4  
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6.4 Discussion of Test Results for All Three Controllers 
The quadruple-tank test subject was subjected to 63 different tests in which a 
system sensor and/or a system pump was subjected to the different effects of a cyber-attack 
or fault. The tests were conducted on the system with the comparison controller and with 
the proposed controller (both single LSTM and ensemble variants) separately, but 
concurrently, so that the exact same effects were applied to each. The summary results of 
these tests are provided for comparison across all three controllers in Table 6.6. 

















 % % Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Comparison 0 14.29 116.52 47.50 20.83 15.00 89.07 95.00 
Proposed 
(Ensemble) 




0 39.68   4.58   2.00   7.54   3.00 97.48 99.00 
 
In no test did any controller allow a catastrophic failure of the system. Failure is 
defined as allowing a tank to run dry or to overfill. Most of the results summarized in Table 
6.6 are based on the performance of the system under control, and allow a ready 
comparison of how well the three controllers perform their intended function. Whether the 
priority is maintaining proper control or regaining that control after it is lost, the single 
LSTM controller performed better on these tests than the comparative controller and the 
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ensemble based controller did somewhat better than the single LSTM controller, making it 
the best of the three from a controller performance perspective. 
6.4.1 Statistical Analysis of Test Results for All Three Controllers 
In the area of active fault tolerant controls, “fault detection” is an ubiquitous term 
and is usually paired with other terms like “identification”, “diagnosis” or “recognition”. 
These terms all refer to the act of determining what type of fault has been detected. In the 
case of the comparison controller described in this chapter, that determination identifies 
the fault as being associated with a sensor, with an actuator or with both. In other words. It 
is performing classification of the fault. Since the proposed controller is based on a 
classification tool (LSTM) it is appropriate to compare both controllers as classifiers. 
Precision and recall are both popular metrics for evaluating classifier performance. 
Precision is the percentage that the classifier correctly predicts positive when making a 
decision. More specifically, precision is the number of correctly identified positive 
examples divided by the total number of examples that are classified as positive.  
As presented in [110], given an 𝑛 × 𝑛 confusion matrix 𝑚, like the one shown in 







Recall is the percentage of positives correctly identified out of all the existing positives; it 
is the number of correctly classified positive examples divided by the total number of true 








Precision and recall are often achieved at the expense of the other, i.e., high precision is 
achieved at the expense of recall and vice versa. An ideal classifier would have both high 
recall and high precision.  
The F-measure, sometimes called the F-statistic or F1-score, is the harmonic 
measure of precision and recall in a single measurement. The F1-score ranges from 0 to 1, 
with a measure of 1 being a classifier perfectly capturing both precision and recall. The F1-






With these three scores, an overall F1-score for the entire classifier can be calculated.  
There are three such overall F1-scores; Macro F1, Weighted F1 and Micro F1. The 
Macro F1 (ℱ1) is simply the arithmetic mean of the individual class hormonic means: 









When averaging the Macro F1, equal weight is given to each class even if the distribution 
of data across those classes is unbalanced. Such is the case with the tests conducted on the 
various controllers for the quadruple-tank system. This can cause the Macro F1 to skewed 
by an over represented class on which the classifier performs poorly or exceptionally well. 
To counter this, a Weighted F1 (WF1) score includes the number of samples in each 












As with the Macro F1 there are also weighted averages for the Precision and Recall. 
The final overall F1-score is the Micro-F1. Rather than being an average of F1-
scores, the Micro-F1 provides an overall accuracy for the classifier. It is simply the 
proportion of correctly classified samples to all the samples. Looking back at the example 
confusion matrix, the Micro-F1 is calculated as 










The micro-precision and micro-recall scores are calculated in the exact same 
manner, so micro-F1 = micro-precision = micro-recall = accuracy. For reference, all of 
the scores discussed are presented in Table 6.7 through 6.9 for the comparison controller, 
ensemble controller and LSTM controller respectively. 
From the scores for the comparison controller (Table 6.7.) the impact of the 
unbalanced precision and recall scores for classes 1 and 3 can be observed in the respective 
F1-score for those two classes. Relying solely on the macro-F1 score as an overall 
assessment of the classification performance would underrate the performance with a score 
of 0.8682. Using the weighted-F1 improves the overall assessment, but the micro-F1 score 
appears to be the best overall measure of the comparative controller’s classification ability. 
The ensemble and single LSTM classifiers were more consistent across their overall 
scores. For both of these the micro-F1-score is the preferred score. With scores of 0.9860 
and 0.9748 respectively, the ensemble and LSTM controllers demonstrate they are more 
accurate classifiers than the comparison controller. With a slightly higher accuracy score, 
and the results discussed in section 6.3.1, the ensemble-based controller is shown to be the 
more accurate classifier as well as the better overall controller. 
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Table 6.7. Precision, Recall and F1-Score Analysis for Comparison Controller. 
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support 
1 0.6238 1.0000 0.7683 3338 
2 0.9784 0.9303 0.9537 1506 
3 0.9864 0.6863 0.8094 2008 
4 0.9998 0.8896 0.9415 12048 
Macro F1 0.8971 0.8765 0.8682  
Weighted F1 0.9303 0.8907 0.8979  
Micro F1 0.8907 0.8907 0.8907  
Table 6.8. Precision, Recall and F1-Score Analysis for Ensemble-Based Controller. 
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support 
1 0.9673 1.0000 0.9833 3338 
2 0.9234 0.9841 0.9527 1506 
3 1.0000 0.9771 0.9884 2008 
4 0.9976 0.9839 0.9907 12048 
Macro F1 0.9721 0.9863 0.9788  
Weighted F1 0.9866 0.9860 0.9862  
Micro F1 0.9860 0.9860 0.9860  
Table 6.9. Precision, Recall and F1-Score Analysis for LSTM-Based Controller. 
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support 
1 0.9670 1.0000 0.9832 3338 
2 1.0000 0.9900 0.9950 1506 
3 0.8463 0.9846 0.9102 2008 
4 0.9997 0.9643 0.9817 12048 
Macro F1 0.9533 0.9847 0.9675  
Weighted F1 0.9777 0.9748 0.9754  
Micro F1 0.9748 0.9748 0.9748  
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6.5 Testing with Stuxnet-Like Attacks 
In the introductory section of this dissertation there is a reference to the Stuxnet 
virus attack and the damage it caused. The Stuxnet virus was able to work undetected 
because it not only was able to change the speed of the Iranian centrifuge motors, it also 
caused the motor speed sensor to report to the human operators that the centrifuge was 
operating within normal parameters. 
6.5.1 Stuxnet-Like Test Design 
Using the effects of the actual Stuxnet attack as an example, the comparison 
controller, the ensemble controller and the proposed controller design were tested with five 
different Stuxnet-like attacks on the quad-tank system. In all five tests the sensor value was 
locked in at the reference amount of 10 cm. The pump was then affected to abruptly rise in 
the first test and abruptly drop in the second test. The third test applied an oscillation to the 
pump voltage which caused the pump speed to oscillate. The other two tests were 
conducted applying an incipient effect to the pump; gradually increasing it in the fourth 
test and gradually decreasing it in the fifth test.  
In all five cases the attack occurred after the system had reached steady-state 
operations and the response of the respective systems was monitored over a 1,000 iteration 
window to allow the controllers more time to recover from the effects of the attack. All 
five attack scenarios were run four times with changes to the randomly selected effect 
variable values in the actuator effects. All three controllers were subjected to the exact 
same tests.  
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6.5.2 Stuxnet-Like Test Results 
To better visualize the differences in how these controllers handled the Stuxnet-like 
attacks, the following figures are grouped by test. The first group of three figures are from 
each of the three controllers showing performance during the first test and so on with each 
subsequent test. Each figure has 2 panels. The panel on the left depicts the water level in 
the tank (solid blue line) and the reported level from the tank sensor (dashed red line). The 
panel on the right depicts the voltage to the pump. The Stuxnet-like attack affects the pump 
voltage while the controller attempts to counter that effect. The quality of control in each 
case is represented by how close the controller can keep the actual water level to the desired 
(reference) level. 
Figures 6.8 through 6.10 depict examples of the test #1 performance of the 
comparison controller, the ensemble controller and the single LSTM controller 
respectively. Comparing the plots of the first Stuxnet-like attack test, we see the 
comparison controller never did recognize this as an attack on the sensor and the actuator. 
As a result, it never responded to it. Both the Ensemble controller and the LSTM controller 




Figure 6.8. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #1 with Comparison Controller. 
 
 
Figure 6.9. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #1 with LSTM Ensemble Controller. 
 
Figures 6.11. through 6.13. depict examples of the test #2 performance of the 




Figure 6.10. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #1 with Proposed Controller. 
 
Figure 6.11. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #2 with Comparison Controller. 
 
Figure 6.12. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #2 with LSTM Ensemble Controller 
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Figure 6.13. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #2 with Proposed Controller. 
In the second attack, the comparison controller did detect and identify the attack 
correctly and was able to regain proper control of the system before the test ended. The 
ensemble controller caused a spike in pump voltage before bringing the system under 
control and the LSTM controller regained proper control very quickly. 
Figures 6.14 through 6.16 depict examples of the test #3 performance of the 
comparison controller, the ensemble controller and the single LSTM controller 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6.14. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #3 with Comparison Controller. 
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Figure 6.15. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #3 with LSTM Ensemble Controller. 
 
Figure 6.16. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #3 with Proposed Controller. 
The third Stuxnet-like attack is the most similar to the actual Stuxnet attack in 
which the Iranian centrifuges were subjected large swings in motor speed. In this test the 
comparison controller did eventually detect the attack at iteration 542. The ensemble 
controller regained control after a full cycle of the oscillation and the LSTM controller did 
so almost immediately. 
Figures 6.17 through 6.19 depict examples of the test #4 performance of the 




Figure 6.17. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #4 with Comparison Controller. 
 
Figure 6.18. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #4 with LSTM Ensemble Controller. 
 
Figure 6.19. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #4 with Proposed Controller. 
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In the fourth test, the comparison controller did eventually detect the attack. This 
case illustrates the challenge to active fault tolerant controllers posed be incipient effects 
of cyber-attacks and faults. Because the onset of the effect was gradual, it took the 
controller over 560 iterations to detect it. The other controllers handled the effect readily. 
Figures 6.20 through 6.22 depict examples of the test #5 performance of the comparison 
controller, the ensemble controller and the single LSTM controller respectively. 
 
Figure 6.20. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #5 with Comparison Controller 
 
Figure 6.21. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #5 with LSTM Ensemble Controller. 
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Figure 6.22. System Response to Stuxnet-like Attack #5  with Proposed Controller. 
Similar to the fourth test, the fifth attack was eventually detected by the comparison 
controller while the other controllers were able regain or maintain proper control 
throughout the test.  
The figures shown above allow us to visualize how the effects from the taxonomy 
influence the system and how the controller behaves in the presence of those effects. The 
numerical results of these tests allow us to better measure and analyze their performance.  
The results on the test metrics for the comparison controller are presented in Table 
6.10. In this test series there were no catastrophic failures. Of the 20 Stuxnet tests the 
comparison controller detected and identified the attack as applying to both the sensor and 
the actuator in 17. Those that were not detected are indicated by the term “inf” in that 
column of the chart. Of those it did detect, it took between 138 to 587 iterations of the 
control program to do so. Another indication that the comparison controller struggled to 
perform under these conditions is the time required for the controller to bring the system 
back into proper control which started at 623 iterations on the low end and there were 10 
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tests in which the controller did not regain proper control before the test ended (indicated 
by 750 iterations in that column). 
The same tests were run against the ensemble LSTM controller. The results are 
presented in Table 6.11. 
 































































































































































1 1 1.36 5 10 2 0 0 739 179 77.63% 
2 1 1.12 5 10 2 0 0 750 407 49.13% 
3 1 1.10 5 10 2 0 0 750 587 26.63% 
4 1 1.09 5 10 2 0 0 750 inf 6.13% 
5 2 0.71 5 10 2 0 0 696 194 75.75% 
6 2 0.77 5 10 2 0 0 701 223 72.13% 
7 2 0.87 5 10 2 0 0 750 366 54.25% 
8 2 0.45 5 10 2 0 0 706 138 82.75% 
9 4 0.28 5 10 2 0 0 750 inf 6.13% 
10 4 0.32 5 10 2 0 0 750 293 63.38% 
11 4 0.05 5 10 2 0 0 723 103 87.13% 
12 4 0.18 5 10 2 0 0 623 107 86.63% 
13 7 0.23 5 10 2 0 0 750 561 29.88% 
14 7 0.08 5 10 2 0 0 750 inf 6.13% 
15 7 0.82 5 10 2 0 0 750 314 60.75% 
16 7 0.43 5 10 2 0 0 750 411 48.63% 
17 8 0.91 5 10 2 0 0 721 159 80.13% 
18 8 0.44 5 10 2 0 0 710 166 79.25% 
19 8 0.87 5 10 2 0 0 719 159 80.13% 
20 8 0.91 5 10 2 0 0 720 159 80.13% 
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Table 6.11. Results of Stuxnet-like Attacks on the Quadruple-Tank System with the 




























































































































































1 1 1.36 5 10 2 0 0 15 13 98.38% 
2 1 1.12 5 10 2 0 0 12 16 98.00% 
3 1 1.10 5 10 2 0 0 10 16 98.00% 
4 1 1.09 5 10 2 0 0 9 16 98.00% 
5 2 0.71 5 10 2 0 0 23 23 97.13% 
6 2 0.77 5 10 2 0 0 23 24 97.00% 
7 2 0.87 5 10 2 0 0 21 24 97.00% 
8 2 0.45 5 10 2 0 0 28 24 97.00% 
9 4 0.28 5 10 2 0 0 11 16 98.00% 
10 4 0.32 5 10 2 0 0 141 24 97.00% 
11 4 0.05 5 10 2 0 0 34 13 98.38% 
12 4 0.18 5 10 2 0 0 28 23 97.13% 
13 7 0.23 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
13 7 0.08 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
15 7 0.82 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
16 7 0.43 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
17 8 0.91 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
18 8 0.44 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
19 8 0.87 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
20 8 0.91 5 10 2 0 0 15 14 98.25% 
 
The LSTM ensemble controller selected the correct model in each of the 20 tests. 
The speed at which it did so ranged from as few as 13 iterations and up to 24 iterations. 
The controller also regained proper control of the system in every test, requiring from 9 to 
141 iterations to do so. In all 20 test cases the disruption to the system was minimal as the 
LSTM ensemble controller using ensembles readily handled the Stuxnet-like attacks.  
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The same tests were also run against the proposed (single LSTM) controller as 
summarized in Table 6.12. The proposed controller was able to maintain control of the 
system during the simulated Stuxnet-like attacks. In five of the tests, the water level in the 
tank was maintained within the ±1% range during the entire test. In the other tests, it was 
quickly brought back into proper control with the worst case being test #8 in which 20 
iterations were required to do so. In all cases, the controller selected the correct model in 
only 2 to 4 iterations. 
Table 6.12. Results of Stuxnet-like Attacks on the Quadruple-Tank System with the 

























































































































































1 1 1.36 5 10 2 0 0 2 2 99.75% 
2 1 1.12 5 10 2 0 1 * 4 99.50% 
3 1 1.10 5 10 2 0 1 * 4 99.50% 
4 1 1.09 5 10 2 0 1 * 4 99.50% 
5 2 0.71 5 10 2 0 0 3 2 99.75% 
6 2 0.77 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
7 2 0.87 5 10 2 0 1 * 3 99.63% 
8 2 0.45 5 10 2 0 0 20 2 99.75% 
9 4 0.28 5 10 2 0 1 * 4 99.50% 
10 4 0.32 5 10 2 0 0 17 2 99.75% 
11 4 0.05 5 10 2 0 0 12 2 99.75% 
12 4 0.18 5 10 2 0 0 3 2 99.75% 
13 7 0.23 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
14 7 0.08 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
15 7 0.82 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
16 7 0.43 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
17 8 0.91 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
18 8 0.44 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
19 8 0.87 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
20 8 0.91 5 10 2 0 0 2 3 99.63% 
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The tests results for all three controllers are summarized in Table 6.13. Using the 
test data above, the confusion matrices for the three controllers are presented in Tables 
6.14 through 6.16. By design, the Stuxnet attack is difficult to detect because the sensor 
replay attack portion hides what the malware does to the actuators. The large number of 
false negatives shown in Table 6.14 are consistent with expectations. 
 



















 % % Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Comparison 0   0.00 727.90 744.50 266.24 194.00 57.63 67.75 
Proposed 
(Ensemble) 
0   0.00 23.75 15.00 17.20 15.00 97.85 98.13 
Proposed 
(Single LSTM) 
0 25.00 5.00 2.00 2.90 3.00 99.64 99.63 
 
Table 6.14. Confusion Matrix of Stuxnet Attack Detection in Comparison 
Controller. 













e 980 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 3 
6776 0 3 8241 4 
 1 2 3 4  
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Table 6.15. Confusion Matrix of Stuxnet Attack Classification of Ensemble 
Controller. 










 980 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 3 
58 268 0 14676 4 
 1 2 3 4  
 
The ensemble controller fared much better in correctly selecting the correct model 
to use during the Stuxnet-like attacks. The 268 cases where model 2 was mistakenly 
selected over model 4, indicate the effects of the attack on the system led the controller to 
make decisions as if only the actuator was being affected. 
 
Table 6.16. Confusion Matrix of Stuxnet Attack Classification of LSTM Controller. 










 980 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 3 
58 0 0 14962 4 
 1 2 3 4  
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The LSTM controller did not have the same problem as the ensemble controller. 
Based on the data in Table 6.12 the 58 misclassifications shown here are fully attributable 
to the 2 or 3 iterations that elapsed in every test between the onset of the attack and the 
controller selecting the correct model. Based on the information in these confusion 
matrices, we use the procedures described earlier in the chapter to calculate the micro-F1 
score for each controller. Those scores are shown in Table 6.17 
Table 6.17. Micro F1 Score for Controllers 
Controller Micro F1 Score 
Comparison  0.5763 
Ensemble 0.9785 
LSTM 0.9964 
Based on the Stuxnet test results discussed thus far, it is not surprising that the 
comparison controller has the lowest accuracy of the three when working with the Stuxnet-
like attack data. That controller’s reliance on detection of an attack specifically designed 
to avoid detection poses a significant challenge to this and other active fault tolerant 
controllers. 
In the general test section, the ensemble-based controller showed the best accuracy 
score for dealing with the array and combinations of effects on the system components. 
Clearly the ensemble-based approach works very well for general purpose classification of 
the various effects. The single larger LSTM-based controller showed remarkable accuracy 
in working with the system inputs and interactions specific to the Stuxnet-like effects. This 
would appear to support the idea that a large deep-learning network can learn the subtle 
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relationships and interactions between the various input provided to the controller when 
working with a complex, non-linear system like the quadruple tank system. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The active comparison controller performed reasonably well in these tests. It is a 
state-of-the-art, fault tolerant controller which encompasses some of the preferred methods 
of fault detection and model switching. While it did take a while to detect and respond to 
the Stuxnet-like attack, the fact that it did so at all is to the designers’ credit.  
In comparison, both versions of the proposed passive, deep learning-based 
controller did not suffer from the detection delays demonstrated in the active comparison 
controller. This confirms one of the touted benefits of passive over active FTC; namely not 
relying on a detection mechanism to initiate the fault tolerant behavior. Both variants of 
the proposed controller showed improved performance over the comparison controller as 
measured by every metric of the testing. This not only showed the efficacy of this controller 
design, but also the value of the taxonomy representing the various effects of faults and 
cyber-attacks in training and testing as was done in this research effort. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviewed the comparison controller and its application to the 
quadruple-tank system. The specific design of the comparison controller was presented and 
the testing approach for the system was described. Results of that testing were also 
discussed. 
The results of testing performed on the quadruple-tank system using the comparison 
controller and proposed controllers (as described in the previous chapters) has been 
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presented and discussed with analysis of their performance as controllers and as classifiers. 
In addition, all three controllers were tested against 20 Stuxnet-like attacks. The wide 
variety of variables and possible combinations of conditions demonstrated the value of the 
effects taxonomy as a basis for building useful training data as well as comprehensive test 
scenarios. The test results support the validity of the approach and show the efficacy of a 
passive controller design for dealing with multiple simultaneous cyber-attacks and/or faults 
in an ICS. 
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 Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarizes the research documented in this dissertation. The original 
research questions are revisited and the contributions of the research are presented along 
with avenues of future work as it relates to this research effort. 
7.2 Conclusions of Research 
This dissertation presents a deep learning-based, passive controller designed to 
keep the system under control operating properly, even when multiple components of the 
system are experiencing the effects of faults and/or attacks. The various effects of these 
faults and attacks are described and enumerated in a taxonomy so that they can be 
considered in controller design and used in the testing.  
7.2.1 Research Questions Revisited 
Question 1. What are the physical layer effects in Cyber Physical System that could 
result from a component fault or cyber-attack?  
Answer 1. In this work we have presented the development and implementation of 
a unique taxonomy of effects. This taxonomy addresses the possible effects a fault or cyber-
attack could have on the physical components (sensors and actuators) of an industrial 
control system. It provides the building blocks for representing the wide variety of physical 
layer effects when designing, training and/or testing control systems. By focusing on the 




Question 2. How could a passive Fault Tolerant Controller use deep learning to 
maintain operations, and how could it be realized?  
Answer 2. The controller proposed in this dissertation is a passive Fault Tolerant 
Controller. The heart of the controller is a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network. By 
using this deep-learning network, control decisions are made by holistically considering 
the entire state of the system under control and selecting the next command signal. The 
command signal is chosen from options generated by internal models of the system. Since 
no special action is required if an attack or fault is in effect, functioning in the presence of 
an attack, or fault, are all in the normal course of operations for the controller. 
There are two variants of this controller presented. One uses a single large LSTM 
to make the control decision, while the other uses an ensemble of smaller LSTMs to 
accomplish the same goal. 
The taxonomy of effects described in the answer to Question 1 is pivotal to the 
realization of this controller design. The LSTM requires large amounts of training data that 
is representative of the input data that will be available to the network during operations. 
With the development of the taxonomy, we can represent the various effects of cyber-
attacks and faults the system could experience and generate large amounts of data with 
good variation. This made it possible to realize the passive FTC with restricting it to 
particular types of faults or attack effects. 
Question 3. Will the approach work for both linear and nonlinear systems?  
Answer 3. As demonstrated in this research effort, the approach is equally adept at 
controlling both linear and non-linear systems. The deep-learning network can separate out 
the differences in the inputs (which are sometimes very subtle) and readily handle the 
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complexity of a non-linear system. In published literature, some designers have modelled 
the non-linear system under control as a piecewise linear system to allow their controller 
to work with it. Because the proposed controller in this dissertation is so capable, there was 
no need to represent the  non-linear system as piecewise linear. 
Question 4. What benefit(s) does passive FTC with deep learning provide 
compared to an active FTC?  
Answer 4. The primary benefits of passive FTC, in comparison to active, are: 
1. Simpler design. The passive FTC takes input from the system under control and 
sends a control command at every iteration of the control program regardless of 
any faults or cyber-attacks on the system. The active controller relies on a 
dedicated fault detection/identification mechanism to trigger it into 
reconfiguring the controller or to calculate alternative solutions. These 
mechanisms add complexity to the active controller design. 
2. Minimization of delays. Must take the extra steps described above, there is an 
inherent delay from the time a fault or attack occurs until the active controller 
can take corrective action. Depending on the severity of the effect of the fault 
or attack, this delay could result in serious negative impact to the system to the 
system. Passive controllers do not suffer from these delays. 
3. Resilience to a broad array of effects. One of the greatest perceived limitations 
of passive controllers is that some knowledge of the faults or attacks the 
controller will face must me known a priori and passive controllers are, 
therefore, limited in their utility. By basing this controller design on a deep-
learning network, the application of the controller is not limited to certain types 
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of faults or effects that fall within limited parameters. The deep-learning can be 
trained to handle any conceivable effect from a fault or cyber-attack. Again, the 
development of the taxonomy of effects was key to making this so.  
7.2.2 Contributions of Research 
The primary contribution of this research effort is the novel design of an ICS 
controller unlike others in current research as follows: 
1. The proposed controller is unique in that it uses one or more deep-learning 
networks and does not require a fault or attack detection/identification function to operate 
properly. It is a passive design that considers the entire state of the system and decides how 
to control it based on that information, regardless of either the presence or absence of faults 
and/or attacks. This deep learning-based approach to passive FTC is not found elsewhere 
in controls literature. 
2. This research challenges the notion that passive controllers cannot be broadly 
applied because some knowledge of the types of faults and attacks the system may face is 
required, a priori. This dissertation presents a unique taxonomy of effects that provides the 
building blocks to represent any effect of a fault or cyber-attack on an ICS. This is done by 
addressing those effects at how they are manifested at the physical component level of the 
system. 
3. The controller presented in this dissertation is not restricted in application to 
linear or piecewise linear systems. It is also not limited to the type of fault or to a particular 
component (sensor or actuator) fault. This makes the proposed controller exceptional 
among passive fault tolerant controllers. 
165 
4. The results of the testing demonstrate the deep-learning based passive controller 
can perform at least as well as its active FTC counterparts. The controller’s ability to handle 
a Stuxnet-like attack on the system shows one of the primary advantages of the proposed 
controller over the active FTC designs which must rely on the fault detection/identification 
function in order to operate. 
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
The research presented here can be further explored in a number of different 
directions.  
1. Both example controllers described and tested in this work use a classification 
type LSTM network to select from among the possible modeled commands to control the 
system. Using a regression-type deep-learning network to determine the output signal to 
the controller may allow this to be a purely data-drive (model-free) design. Early efforts to 
use such a network this in this work were unsuccessful, but do not eliminate the possibility 
of future success.  
2. The use of an ensemble of deep-learning networks requires significant 
computational overhead, as described in section 5.9. Further work focused on reducing the 
computational demand of the ensemble or refining a single deep-learning network to 
perform at the same (or higher) level as the ensemble presented here would be a marked 
improvement. 
3. The application and evaluation of this method to real world systems in a 
laboratory, or range environments constitutes a logical reason for further continuation of 
this effort. As pointed out in [111], there is a great need for facilities that incorporate real-
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world industrial control systems and processes to provide training on the effects cyber-
initiated actions have on physical systems.  
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has revisited the original research questions and summarized how they 
were addressed in the dissertation. The contributions of this research in passive fault 
tolerant control using deep-learning methods have been discussed. Along with the pivotal 
role played by the developed taxonomy of effects in making this controller design feasible. 
Additionally, areas for potential further research have also been identified. 
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A. Appendix: Additional References 
Active Fault Tolerant Controls 
Principle component analysis: the work in [A1] presents an approach to process 
and sensor fault detection, identification, and reconstruction via principal component 
analysis. The principal component analysis model partitions the measurement space into a 
principal component subspace where normal variation occurs, and a residual subspace that 
faults may occupy. Both process faults and sensor faults are characterized by a direction 
vector, which describes the behavior of the fault. Fault reconstruction is accomplished by 
sliding the sample vector as close as possible to the principal component subspace. When 
the actual fault is assumed, the maximum reduction in the squared prediction error is 
achieved. A fault-identification index is defined in terms of the reconstructed squared 
prediction error.  
State Space Subspace approach to fault detection is presented in [A2] where a 
method is proposed to detect, isolate, and compensate sensor degradation. A numerical 
algorithm for subspace state space system identification is used to track the changes of the 
time constants and gains of the sensor and the monitored system. Without requiring 
redundant sensors and measurement devices, this method utilizes the fact that sensor 
readings depict dynamic characteristics of the sensors as well as those of the monitored 
system. The method is verified in angular sensor degradation detection using high-fidelity 
simulations of an automotive electronic throttle system. This method is applied to linear 
systems only. This method is not model-based, but uses input and output data. The 
significance of this distinction is discussed in section 2.2.2. 
Control Allocation [A3], [A4], [A5], [A6] takes on the problem of generating a 
desired control effort and distributing it among multiple (usually redundant) actuators. This 
method is popular in the field of aircraft control design. Control allocation was used for 
multiple fault detection in [A7]. This work requires the addition of redundant smart 
actuators which are networked together.  
In systems based on game theory, the game between the attacker and defender can 
be simultaneous (e.g., minimax) [A8] in which each side chooses an action based on the 
assumed strategy of their adversary, or sequential (e.g., Stackelberg game) [A9] where one 
side responds with an action based on the adversaries last action. 
 
[A1] R. Dunia and S. J. Qin, “Joint diagnosis of process and sensor faults using principal 
component analysis,” Control Eng. Pract., vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 457–469, Apr. 1998. 
 
[A2] L. Jiang, D. Djurdjanovic, and J. Ni, “A new method for sensor degradation 
detection, isolation and compensation in linear systems,” in Proc.ASME IMECE, Nov. 
2007, vol. 9, pp. 1089–1101. 
 
[A3] Y. Luo, A. Serrani, S. Yurkovich, "Model predictive dynamic control allocation 
scheme for reentry vehicles", Journal of Guidance Control and Dynamics, vol. 30, no. 1, 
pp. 100-113, 2007. 
 
177 
[A4] Q. Wang, L. Qing, C. Wong, S. Tingyan, "Robust control allocation method in the 
presence of control effector failure", Proc. of IEEE Int. Conf. on Information Automation, 
pp. 660-664, 2014. 
 
[A5] Y. Zhang, C.A. Rabbath, C.Y. Su, "Reconfigurable control allocation applied to an 
aircraft benchmark model", Proc. of American Control Conference, pp. 1052-1057, 2008. 
 
[A6] D. Chen and G. Liu, "An adaptive control allocation algorithm for nonlinear 
vehicles with parameter uncertainty," 2017 11th Asian Control Conference (ASCC), Gold 
Coast, QLD, 2017, pp. 982-987. 
doi: 10.1109/ASCC.2017.8287304 
 
[A7] Inseok Yang and Dongik Lee, “Networked Fault-Tolerant Control Allocation for 
Multiple Actuator Failures”, Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Volume 2015, 
Article ID 249293, 14 pages  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/249293 
 
[A8] A. Farraj, E. Hammad, A. A. Daoud, D. Kundur, "A game-theoretic control 
approach to mitigate cyber switching attacks in smart grid systems", Proceedings of the 
IEEE Smart Grid Communications, pp. 958-963, 2014. 
 
[A9] Q. Zhu, T. Basar, "Game-theoretic methods for robustness security and resilience of 
cyberphysical control systems: Games-in-games principle for optimal cross-layer resilient 
control systems", IEEE Control Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 46-65, 2015. 
 
[A10] T. Baúar, P. Bernard, H∞ Optimal Control and Related Minimax Design Problems, 
Birkhäuser, 1995. 
 
[A11] Y. Yuan, F. Sun, H. Liu, "Resilient control of cyber-physical systems against 
intelligent attacker: a hierarchal stackelberg game approach", To appear on International 
Journal of Systems Science, 2015. 
 
[A12] A. Barth, B. Rubinstein, M. Sundararajan, J. Mitchell, D. Song, P. Bartlett, "A 
learning-based approach to reactive security", IEEE Transactions on Dependable and 
Secure Computing, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 482-493, July 2012. 
 
[A13] D. Shelar, S. Amin, "Analyzing vulnerability of electricity distribution networks to 
der disruptions", American Control Conference (ACC) 2015, pp. 2461-2468, 2015. 
 
[A14] P. Frank and X. Ding. Survey of robust residual generation and evaluation methods 




[A15] M.E. Romero, M.M. Seron, "Sensor fault tolerant control of doubly fed induction 
machines using multiple switching mechanisms", Proceedings of Australian Control 
Conference, pp. 191-197, 2011. 
 
[A16] S. Aberkane, J.C. Ponsart, D. Sauter, "Robust output feedback stochastic 
stabilization of active fault tolerant control systems", Proc. of IEEE Inter. Symposium on 
Intelligent Control, pp. 1561-1566, 2005. 
 
[A17] S. Aberkane, D. Sauter, J.C. Ponsart, D. Theilliol, "H∞ stochastic stabilization of 
active fault tolerant control systems: convex approach", Proc. of IEEE European Control 
Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 3783-3788, 2005. 
 
[A18] A. Fekih, S. Seelem, "A Fault Tolerant Control Design for Automatic Steering 
Control of Ground Vehicles", Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Control 
Applications, pp. 1491-1496, 2012. 
 
[A19] B.J. Bacon, A.J. Ostroff, S.M. Joshi, "Reconfigurable NDI controller using inertial 
sensor failure detection and isolation", IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electrical 
Systems, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1373-1383, 2001. 
 
[A20] Y. Bo, Y. Jun, "Parameter space approach for active fault tolerant control design", 
Proc. of Intl. Conference on Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation, vol. 1, 
pp. 409-412, 2008. 
 
[A21] J.D. Boskovic, R.K. Mehra, S.H. Yu, "A decentralized scheme for accommodation 
of multiple simultaneous actuator failures", Proc. of American Control Conference, pp. 
5098-5103, 2002. 
 
[A22] J. Chen, R.J. Patton, Z. Chen, "Active fault tolerant flight control systems design 
using the linear matrix inequality method", Trans. of Institute of the Measurement and 
Control, vol. 21, pp. 77-84, 1999. 
 
[A23] S. Chen, G. Tao, S.M. Joshi, "On matching conditions for adaptive state tracking 
control of systems with actuator failures", IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 
47, no. 3, pp. 473-478, 2002. 
 
[A24] D.R. Espinoza-Trejo, D.U. Campos-Delgado, "Active fault-tolerant scheme for 
variable speed drives under actuator and sensor faults", Proceedings of IEEE 
International Conference on Control Applications, pp. 474-479, 2008. 
 
[A25] S. Ganguly, A. Marcos, G. Balas, "Reconfigurable LPV control design for Boeing 




[A26] S. Kanev, M. Verhaegen, "A bank of reconfigurable LQG controllers for linear 
system subject to failures", Proc. of Conf. on Decision and Control, pp. 3684-3689, 2000. 
 
[A27] G. Liu, D. Wang, Y. Li, "Active fault-tolerant control with actuation 
reconfiguration", IEEE Trans. on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 40(3), pp. 1110-
1117, 2004. 
 
[A28] Y.W. Kim, G. Rizzoni, V.I. Utkin, "Developing a fault tolerant power train control 
system by integrating design of control and diagnostics", International. Journal of 
Guidance. Control and Dynamics, vol. 11, no. 11, pp. 1095-1114, 2001. 
 
[A29] M. Mahmoud, J. Jiang, Y.M. Zhang, "Stabilization of active fault tolerant control 
systems with imperfect fault detection and diagnosis", Journal of Stochastic Analysis and 
Applications, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 673-701, 2003. 
 
[A30] M. Maki, J. Jiang, K.A. Hagino, "Stability guaranteed active fault-tolerant control 
against actuator failures", International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control, vol. 
14, no. 2, pp. 1061-1077, 2004. 
 
[A31] H. Niemann, "Fault tolerant control based on active fault diagnosis", Proc. of 
American Control Conference, pp. 2224-2229, 2005. 
 
[A32] G. Tao, S.M. Joshi, X. Ma, "Adaptive state feedback and tracking control of 
systems with actuator failures", IEEE Trans. on Autom. Control, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 78-95, 
2001. 
 
[A33] Z. Weng, R.J. Patton, P. Cui, "Active fault tolerant control of a double inverted 
pendulum", Proc. of the Institution of Mech. Eng. Part I: J. of Sys. & Cont. Eng., vol. 
221, no. 6, pp. 895-904, 2007. 
 
[A34] W. Junsheng, W. Zhengxin, T. Zuohua, S. Songjiao, "An active fault tolerant 
controller design method for time delay systems", Proc. of Chinese Control Conference, 
pp. 422-425, 2007. 
 
[A35] A. Fekih, Ben J. Hmida, "A self tuning adaptive approach for actuator failure 
compensation in aircraft systems", IEEE Int. Conf. on Industrial Technology, pp. 10-14, 
March 14-17 2010. 
 
[A36] Y. Zhang, J. Jiang, "Integrated active fault-tolerant control using IMM approach", 
IEEE Trans. on Aerospace and Electronics Systems, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1221-1235, 2001. 
 
[A37] Y. Zhang, J. Jiang, "Issues on integration of fault diagnosis and reconfigurable 
control in active fault-tolerant control systems", Symposium on Fault Detection 
Supervision and Safety of Technical Processes, pp. 1437-1448, 2006. 
 
180 
[A38] A.L. Gehin, M. Assas, M. Staroswiecki, "Structural Analysis of system 
reconfigurability", Symposium on Fault Detection Supervision and Safety for Technical 
Processes, pp. 292-297, 2000. 
 
[A39] G. Bajpai, B.C. Chang, A. Lau, "Reconfiguration of Flight Control Systems for 
Actuator Failures", IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Mag., vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 29-
33, 2000. 
 
[A40] L-W. Ho, G.Y. Gary, "Reconfigurable control system Design for fault diagnosis 
and accommodation", Proc. of IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 1873-
1878, 2001. 
 
[A41] Wang Dan, Wu Zhiliang, Yao Yubin, Niu Xiaobing, "An FDI Approach for 
Aircraft Actuator Partial Failure", Proc. of Chinese Control Conference, pp. 440-444, 
2007. 
 
[A42] Y. Zhang, V. S. Suresh, B. Jiang, D. Theilliol, "Reconfigurable control allocation 
against aircraft control effector failures", Proc. of IEEE Int. Conference on Control 
Applications, pp. 1197-1202, 2007. 
 
[A43] H. Alawi, C. Edwards, "Fault tolerant sliding mode control design with piloted 
simulator evaluation", Journal of Guidance Control and Dynamics, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 
1186-1201, 2008. 
 
[A44] A. Fekih, "Integrated fault tolerant flight control design with application to an F-16 
aircraft" in Journal of Control Science and Engineering, ACTA Press, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 
159-167, 2011. 
 
[A45] J.D. Boskovic, N. Knoebel, R.K. Mehra, "An initial study of a combined robust 
and adaptive control approach to guaranteed performance flight control", Proc. of 
American Control Conference, pp. 5150-5155, 2008. 
 
[A46] D. Shin, G. Moon, Y. Kim, "Design of reconfigurable flight control system using 
adaptive sliding mode control: actuator fault", Proc. of the Institute of Mechanical 
Engineers Part G. Journal of Aerospace Engineering, vol. 219, pp. 321-328, 2005. 
 
[A47] A. Fekih, "Effective fault tolerant control design for a class of nonlinear systems: 
Application to a class of motor control", IET Control Theory & Applications, vol. 2(9), 
pp. 762-772, 2008. 
 
[A48] J. Shtessel, J. Buffington, S. Banda, "Tailless aircraft flight control using multiple 
time scale re-configurable sliding modes", IEEE Trans. on Contr. Syst. Technology, vol. 
10, pp. 288-296, 2002. 
 
181 
[A49] S.R. Wells, R. A. Hess, "Multi-input/multi-output sliding mode control for a 
tailless fighter aircraft", Journal of Guidance Control and Dynamics, vol. 26, pp. 463-
473, 2003. 
 
[A50] X. Yu, Y. Li, X. Wang, K. Zhao, "An autonomous robust fault tolerant control 
system", Proc. of IEEE Conf. on Information Acquisition, pp. 1191-1196, 2006. 
 
[A51] Hwang, Insoek, Sungwan, Kim, Kim, Youdan and Seah, Chze Eng, “A Survey of 
Fault Detection, Isolation, and Reconfiguration Methods”, IEEE Transactions on Control 
Systems Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, May 2010, pages 636-653. 
 
[A52] Beard, R., Failure accommodation in linear systems through self-recognition, PhD 
Thesis, MIT, 1971. 
 
[A53] R. Patton and J. Chen. Observer-based fault detection and isolation: robustness and 
applications. Control Eng. Prac., 5(5):671–682, 1997.  
 
[A54] S. Simani, C. Fantuzzi, and R. J Patton. Model-based fault diagnosis in dynamic 
systems using identification techniques. Springer Science & Business Media, 2003.  
 
[A55] P. Frank. Advances in observer-based fault diagnosis. In International Conference 
on Fault Diagnosis: TOOLDIAG, 1993.  
 
[A56] H. Sneider and P. M. Frank. Observer-based supervision and fault detection in 
robots using nonlinear and fuzzy logic residual evaluation. IEEE Trans. on Control 
Systems Technology, 4(3):274–282, 1996.  
 
[A57] H. Hammouri, M. Kinnaert, and E. H. El Yaagoubi. Observer-based approach to 
fault detection and isolation for nonlinear systems. IEEE Transactions on Automatic 
Control, 44(10):1879–1884, 1999. 
 
[A58] S. Paoletti, A. Garulli, J. Roll, and A. Vicino. A necessary and sufficient condition 
for input-output realization of switched affine state space models. In IEEE Conference on 
Decision and Control, pages 935–940, 2008.  
 
[A59] A. Abdo, S. X. Ding, J. Saijai, and W. Damlakhi. Fault detection for switched 
systems based on a deterministic method. In IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 
(CDC), pages 568–573, 2012.  
 
[A60] W. Pan, Y. Yuan, H. Sandberg, J. Goncalves, and G. Stan. Online fault diagnosis 
for nonlinear power systems. Automatica, 55:27–36, 2015.  
 
[A61] S. Campbell and R. Nikoukhah. Auxiliary signal design for failure detection. 
Princeton University Press, 2004.  
182 
[A62] J. K. Scott, R. Findeisen, R. D Braatz, and D. M. Raimondo. Input design for 
guaranteed fault diagnosis using zonotopes. Automatica, 50(6):1580–1589, 2014.  
[A63] P. Rosa, C. Silvestre, J. S. Shamma, and M. Athans. Fault detection and isolation 
of ltv systems using set-valued observers. In IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 
(CDC), pages 768–773, 2010.  
[A64] F. Harirchi and N. Ozay. Model invalidation for switched affine systems with 
applications to fault and anomaly detection. IFAC ADHS Conference, 48(27):260–266, 
2015.  
[A65] F. Harirchi, Z. Luo, and N. Ozay. Model (in)validation and fault detection for 
systems with polynomial state-space models. In American Control Conference (ACC), 
pages 1017–1023, July 2016.  
[A66] J. Anderson and A. Papachristodoulou. On validation and invalidation of 
biological models. BMC Bioinformatics, 10(1):1, 2009.  
[A67] N. Ozay, M. Sznaier, and C. Lagoa. Convex certificates for model (in)validation of 
switched affine systems with unknown switches. IEEE Transactions on Automatic 
Control, 59(11):2921–2932, 2014.  
[A68] H. Lou and P. Si. The distinguishability of linear control systems. Nonlinear 
Analysis: Hybrid Systems, 3(1):21–38, 2009.  
[A69] P. Rosa and C. Silvestre. On the distinguishability of discrete linear time-invariant 
dynamic systems. In IEEE CDC-ECC, pages 3356– 3361, 2011.  
[A70] M. Babaali and M. Egerstedt. Observability of switched linear systems. In 
International Workshop on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, pages 48–63. 
Springer, 2004. 
[A71] Harirchi, Farshad and Ozay, Necmiye, “Model Invalidation for Switched Affine 
Systems with Applications to Fault and Anomaly Detection”, International Federation of 
Automatic Control (IFAC) 48-27 (2015) p260-266. 
 
[A72] Harirchi, Farshad and Ozay, Necmiye, “Guaranteed Model-Based Fault Detection 
in Cyber-Physical Systems: A Model Invalidation Approach”, Cornell University Library 
archieve: 1609.05921v1, 19 Sep 2016, pp 1-34. 
 
183 
[A73] Farshad Harirchi and Sze Zheng Yong, Guaranteed Fault Detection and Isolation 
for Switched Affine Models, Cornell University Library archive: 1704.05947v1, 19 April 
2017, pp 1-8. 
 
[A74] Oudghiri, M.; Chadli, M. & El Hajjaji, A. (2008). Sensors Active Fault Tolerant 
Control For Vehicle Via Bank of Robust H∞ Observers. 17th International Federation of 
Automatic Control (IFAC) World Congress, July 2008, IFAC, Seoul, Korea. 
 
[A75] F-J. Hung, M-T. Tsai, "Fault-tolerant control for six-phase PMSM drive system 
via intelligent complementary sliding-mode control using TSKFNN-AMF", IEEE Trans. 
on Industrial Electronics, vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 5747-5762, 2013. 
 
[A76] B. Genge, I. Kiss, P. Haller, "A system dynamics approach for assessing the 
impact of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures", To appear on International Journal of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2015. 
 
[A77] E. K. Wang, Y. Ye, X. Xu, S. Yiu, L. Hui, K. Chow, "Security issues and 
challenges for cyber physical system", Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/ACM Int'l 
Conference on Green Computing and Communications & Int'l Conference on Cyber 
Physical and Social Computing, pp. 733-738, 2010. 
 
[A78] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dorfler, F. Bullo, "Attack detection and identification in cyber-
physical systems", IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control„, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 2715-
2729, 2013. 
 
[A79] R. Mitchell, I.-R. Chen, "A survey of intrusion detection techniques for cyber-
physical systems", ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 55:1-55:29, Mar. 2014. 
 
[A80] A. A. Cárdenas, S. Amin, Z.-S. Lin, Y.-L. Huang, C.-Y. Huang, S. Sastry, 
"Attacks against process control systems: Risk assessment detection and 
response", Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information Computer and 
Communications Security ser. ASIACCS '11, pp. 355-366, 2011. 
 
[A81] C. Barreto, A. A. Cárdenas, N. Quijano, "Controllability of dynamical systems: 
Threat models and reactive security" in Decision and Game Theory for Security, 
Springer, pp. 45-64, 2013. 
 
[A82] P. Hu, H. Li, H. Fu, D. Cansever, P. Mohapatra, Dynamic defense strategy against 
advanced persistent threat with insiders. IEEE Xplore Digital Library. 747-755. 
10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218444. 
Data Driven Control  
The work in [A88] is concerned with the problem of data-driven fault-tolerant 
control for multiple simultaneous sensor drift faults in variable-gain digital PID systems 
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with very large time constants and long dead time, which are common characteristics of 
process control systems. No existing data-driven residual generation method can allow 
building (with low computational costs) residual variables independent of the state of these 
systems, and meanwhile guarantee that each of the sensor faults is mapped uniquely and 
entirely onto the associated residual variable. To solve the aforementioned technical 
difficulty, a novel residual generation technique is devised via the dead time as well as the 
coefficients and state of the variable gain PID controller. On this basis, a methodology is 
developed for the purpose of the full-decoupling estimation of several sensor malfunctions 
from the residual variables. Finally, a resulting data-driven approach to compensate for the 
aforesaid faults is applied to a dual-chamber electric heating furnace (which is a typical 
process plant), so that the effectiveness and advantages of the proposed methods are 
verified by experiment. 
In [A89] the same authors present a data-driven output-feedback fault-tolerant 
tracking control design for unknown discrete-time linear systems with stochastic 
measurement and process noise. With the aid of a proposed input-output data-based online 
iterative identification algorithm, this study presents a fault detection strategy, an 
approximate dynamic programming approach to performance optimization, and a method 
for the achievement of tracking control via a pre-filter. The resulting fault-tolerant control 
(FTC) scheme is applied to a practical DC servo motor system with load fluctuations and 
nonlinearity. Finally, the experimental test demonstrates that the proposed FTC strategy 
(including a methodology for compensating load variations and nonlinearity) has better 
applicability and practicability than the one given by the previous work, where a load needs 
to be held constant and it is required that the motor run in a nearly linear small working 
region. 
In [A86] the authors focus on the data-driven model-free adaptive fault detection 
and estimation (FDE) and fault-tolerant control (FTC) problems for multi-input multi-
output (MIMO) discrete-time systems with unknown sensor faults. First, the initial systems 
are transformed into a novel data-based model with only one unknown parameter. Second, 
a fault estimator is established to detect the sensor faults. Noting that a time-varying 
residual threshold is developed to determine whether the sensor faults occur or not. Then, 
the unknown faults are approximated based on the approximation capability of a 
generalized fuzzy hyperbolic model and the FTC approaches are reconstructed by applying 
the optimality criterion. Given the use of a data-based model and the fuzzy hyperbolic 
model, it questionable if this is really a data-driven method. This method is restricted to 
single sensor faults. 
The same authors presented similar work in [A87] using but used artificial neural 
networks to apply the method to a Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) electromechanical 
system.  
The authors of [A85] propose a data driven fault tolerant strategy for nonlinear 
systems. The core of the proposed strategy is a just-in-time learning (JITL) based soft 
sensor. When a sensor fault is detected, the value of soft sensor is adopted as the 
redundancy instead of the real faulty sensor value. Due to the complexity of mechanism 
model for nonlinear system, a kind of just-in-time learning method is employed for the soft 
sensor. The indexes are predicted by the just-in-time learning method using only historical 
sample data. Instead of considering the system global model as normal the just-in-time 
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learning methods only consider the approximate system at the current time. Two nonlinear 
systems, a numerical one and a benchmark of a wastewater treatment system, are employed 
for experiments. Only single sensor faults are considered in this work. There was 
discussion of tackling multiple faults. 
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Artificial Intelligence in Active FTC 
The work in [A95] presents a comprehensive methodology based on a hybrid 
system of AI and statistical techniques. The methodology is designed for monitoring 
complex equipment systems, which validates the sensor data, associates a degree of 
validity with each measurement, isolates faulty sensors, estimates the actual values despite 
faulty measurements, and detects incipient sensor failures. The system consists of two 
Bayesian networks. The first is used to provide a list of potentially faulty sensors, while 
the second is used to isolate the fault. 
The methodology consists of four steps: redundancy creation, state prediction, 
sensor measurement validation and fusion, and fault detection through residue change 
detection. These steps use the information obtained by looking at a sensor individually, 
information from the sensor as part of a group of sensors, and the immediate history of the 
process that is being monitored. Using a Kalman Filter, the methodology can detect 
multiple sensor failures, both abrupt as well as incipient. It can also detect subtle sensor 
failures such as drift in calibration and degradation of the sensor. The methodology is 
applied to data from a gas turbine power plant. 
The authors of [A97] use adaptive fuzzy models to detect and identify a fault, thus 
providing fault tolerant control for a nonlinear system. The nonlinear fuzzy inference 
system is based on the Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy models. This approach is limited to detecting 
and identifying a single fault at a time. They later apply this method to a rail vehicle motor 
controller in [A98]. 
An unspecified nonlinear system is controlled by a neural network in [*90]. Using 
the residual signal generated by the fault detection module another neural network-based 
control loop is introduced to compensate for the fault(s) detected. 
Likewise, in [A96] genetic programming is used to increase the convergence rate 
of the fault detection and identification routine applied to an evaporation station at a sugar 
factory. This approach is specifically geared toward nonlinear systems. 
In [A94-A96] the authors propose using an artificial neural network to compensate 
for the unknown dynamics of the fault(s). The controller uses a sliding mode control signal 
to keep the system performance in an acceptable range until the ANN can determine the 
best response to the detected fault. A multiple-fault case is also addressed. 
A Fault Detection and Identification (FDI) routine based on a wavelet neural net is 
propose in [A102]. The network is trained using data from simulated fault scenarios. The 
approach is designed to detect and identify only a single fault at a time. 
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The authors of [A103] and [A104] use component level models to generate system 
data. Like [A97] a Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy model is used to capture the structure of the system 
under control. Finally fuzzy/neural control is used in conjunction with a learning algorithm 
to capture the dynamics caused by faults. This approach is applied to jet engine turbine 
control. 
In [A105] the authors use the flexibility of fuzzy logic to select from among several 
models for the best fit to the conditions of the system when one or more faults occur. 
In [A106-A108] the authors propose a neural network-based learning approach. 
The Controller references a Dynamic Model bank when a fault is detected. If the bank 
contains the appropriate model for the fault in question, that model is used. Otherwise the 
supervisor module changes the initial conditions of the algorithm to keep system 
performance within acceptable bounds. The controller is demonstrated on a nonlinear 
system. 
In [A109] the controller architecture uses a neural controller aiding an existing 
conventional controller. The neural controller uses a feedback error learning mechanism 
and employs a dynamic Radial Basis Function neural network called Extended Minimal 
Resource Allocating Network (EMRAN), which uses only on-line learning and does not 
need a priori training. The conventional controller is designed using a classical design 
approach to achieve the desired autonomous landing profile with tight touchdown 
dispersions. The system is demonstrated in cases with single and double faults. 
The authors of [A110] demonstrate an application of neural estimators for detection 
and identification of faults in sensors and actuators in flight controls. The actuator faults 
are addressed using nonlinear dynamic inversion. The sensor faults are addressed by 
replacing the sensor outputs with neural estimates computed during fault detection and 
identification. 
In [A111] a robust fault tolerant fuzzy control problem for continuous-time 
nonlinear systems with time delay and sensor faults is addressed. The Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy 
model is employed to represent a nonlinear system. Using a sensor fault model and fuzzy 
state observer, the authors develop a fuzzy output feedback controller. The fuzzy control 
system is reliable in the sense of that asymptotic stability is achieved not only when all 
sensor components are operating properly, but also in the presence of some component 
failures. 
In [A112] a neural network state observer is trained by the actual nonlinear control 
system. From the residual difference between outputs of actual system and neural network 
observer, the fault of control system is detected and determined. Fault tolerant control is 
realized by using a compensation controller to maintain the stability and performance of 
the system. As an example of the application, a tracking control problem for the speed and 
azimuth of a mobile robot driven by two independent wheels is addressed by using the 
controller. 
The authors of [A113] use an RBF neural network to compensate for the system 
faults and disturbances using model reference adaptive control technology. The Lypanov 
stability theory is used to tune the weights of the neural network. 
 
 In [A114] the authors use an iterative learning algorithm combined with an 
unknown input observer. The controller is applied to a satellite attitude control system.  
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 The work in [A115] uses a RBF neural net along with reference models for adaptive 
control applied to wind turbines. 
 The work in [A116] introduces a fault tolerant controller design for nonlinear 
unknown systems with multiple actuators and bounded disturbance. The controller consists 
of an adaptive learning-based control law and a switching function mechanism. The 
adaptive control law is implemented by a two-layer neural network and the switching 
function is designed to automatically search for the correct switching vector to turn off the 
unknown faulty actuator if there is one. The stability of the system output under the 
occurrence of actuator failure is proved through standard Lyapunov approach, while the 
other signals are guaranteed to be bounded. The proposed controller design is implemented 
on a simulation example using a continuous stirred tank reactor. 
 Finally, the authors of [A117] propose an adaptive, active fault tolerant control for 
a class of nonlinear systems with unknown actuator faults. The actuator fault is assumed to 
have no traditional affine appearance of the system state variables and control input. A 
radial basis function neural network (NN) is be used in the design of the fault tolerant 
controller. The authors claim their fault-tolerant control scheme can minimize the time 
delay between fault occurrence and accommodation and reduce the adverse effect on 
system performance. 
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1       0 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
2 1 206.17     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
3 2 0.71     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
4 3 0.24     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
5 4 0.50     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
6 5 340.08     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
7 6 *     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
8 7 0.28     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
9 8 0.50     1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
10   1 2.68   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
11   2 0.74   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
12   3 0.45   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
13   4 0.40   1 0 0 1 * 0 99.33% 
14   5 1.88   1 0 0 1 * 105 77.00% 
15   6 *   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
16   7 0.74   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
17   8 0.10   1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
18     1 2.81 1 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
19     2 0.49 1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
20     3 0.09 1 0 0 1 * 9 98.33% 
21     4 0.54  1 0 0 0 250 9 92.67% 
22     5 3.36  1 0 0 1 * 9 49.00% 
23     6 * 1 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
24     7 0.02  1 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
25     8 0.72  1 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
26 1 447.99  1 1.49    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
27 1 297.91  2 0.61    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
28 1 344.57  3 0.50    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
29 1 485.93  4 0.26    2 0 0 0 250 151 92.00% 
30 1 718.16  5 3.66    2 0 0 0 4 99 52.33% 
31 1 140.89  6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
32 1 617.00  7 0.97    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
33 1 376.34  8 0.50    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
34 1 667.00    1 1.59  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
35 1 670.79    2 0.69  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
36 1 429.47    3 0.14  2 0 0 1 * 9 98.00% 
37 1 672.76    4 0.34  2 0 0 0 250 9 93.33% 
38 1 166.15    5 1.63  2 0 0 1 * 9 75.00% 
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39 1 668.67    6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
40 1 758.26    7 1.00  2 0 0 1 * 153 95.67% 
41 1 281.74    8 0.26  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
42 2 0.34  1 2.35    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
43 2 0.47  2 0.66    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
44 2 0.21  3 0.26    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
45 2 0.68  4 0.47    2 0 0 0 250 187 92.33% 
46 2 0.48  5 3.70    2 0 0 0 2 103 51.67% 
47 2 0.17  6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
48 2 0.24  7 0.12    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
49 2 0.36  8 0.32    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
50 2 0.76    1 1.86  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
51 2 0.14    2 0.42  2 0 1 1 * 9 99.33% 
52 2 0.38    3 0.45  2 0 0 1 * 10 96.67% 
53 2 0.77    4 0.11  2 0 0 1 * 10 91.00% 
54 2 0.14    5 1.63  2 0 1 1 * 9 74.67% 
55 2 0.49    6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
56 2 0.59    7 0.65  2 0 0 1 * 10 97.33% 
57 2 0.73    8 0.47  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
58 3 0.55  1 1.47    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
59 3 0.36  2 0.37    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
60 3 0.25  3 0.50    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
61 3 0.18  4 0.30    2 0 0 1 * 0 99.33% 
62 3 0.28  5 1.24    2 0 0 1 * 140 84.33% 
63 3 0.13  6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
64 3 0.10  7 0.40    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
65 3 0.41  8 0.01    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
66 3 0.10    1 3.04  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
67 3 0.38    2 0.37  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
68 3 0.20    3 0.19  2 0 0 1 * 9 97.67% 
69 3 0.25    4 0.48  2 0 0 0 71 10 77.00% 
70 3 0.21    5 1.71  2 0 0 1 * 9 74.33% 
71 3 0.23    6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
72 3 0.15    7 0.38  2 0 0 1 * 10 98.33% 
73 3 0.30    8 0.44  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
74 4 0.38  1 2.08    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
75 4 0.22  2 0.35    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
76 4 0.06  3 0.11    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
77 4 0.09  4 0.29    2 0 0 1 * 0 99.67% 
78 4 0.26  5 3.26    2 0 0 0 2 93 54.33% 
79 4 0.21  6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
80 4 0.31  7 0.30    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
81 4 0.34  8 0.17    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
82 4 0.26    1 2.85  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
83 4 0.08    2 0.66  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.33% 
84 4 0.34    3 0.37  2 0 0 1 * 9 96.33% 
85 4 0.51    4 0.50  2 0 0 0 45 9 71.67% 
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86 4 0.14    5 1.26  2 0 0 1 * 9 80.33% 
87 4 0.32    6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
88 4 0.21    7 0.50  2 0 0 1 * 10 98.33% 
89 4 0.52    8 0.21  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
90 5 617.82  1 2.83    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
91 5 806.00  2 0.13    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
92 5 843.89  3 0.36    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
93 5 113.62  4 0.38    2 0 0 1 * 0 99.67% 
94 5 528.18  5 1.54    2 0 0 1 * 119 83.33% 
95 5 225.07  6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
96 5 722.37  7 0.71    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
97 5 130.29  8 0.07    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
98 5 570.14    1 2.73  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
99 5 606.40    2 0.59  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
100 5 852.30    3 0.09  2 0 0 1 * 245 99.33% 
101 5 298.13    4 0.43  2 0 0 0 250 10 96.33% 
102 5 433.60    5 2.35  2 0 0 1 * 9 64.00% 
103 5 801.63    6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
104 5 563.82    7 0.95  2 0 0 1 * 146 96.00% 
105 5 790.12    8 0.36  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
106 6 * 1 2.16    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
107 6 * 2 0.79    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
108 6 * 3 0.12    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
109 6 * 4 0.35    2 0 0 0 6 163 80.00% 
110 6 * 5 3.24    2 0 0 1 * 95 55.00% 
111 6 * 6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
112 6 * 7 0.22    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
113 6 * 8 0.89    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
114 6 *   1 1.37  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
115 6 *   2 0.40  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
116 6 *   3 0.08  2 0 0 1 * 10 98.33% 
117 6 *   4 0.08  2 0 0 0 132 10 82.67% 
118 6 *   5 3.18  2 0 0 1 * 9 51.00% 
119 6 *   6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
120 6 *   7 0.11  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.00% 
121 6 *   8 0.61  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.00% 
122 7 0.80  1 2.15    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
123 7 0.02  2 0.10    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
124 7 0.88  3 0.22    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
125 7 0.11  4 0.36    2 0 0 1 * 0 99.33% 
126 7 0.08  5 3.64    2 0 0 0 1 99 52.00% 
127 7 0.54  6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
128 7 0.04  7 0.29    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
129 7 0.12  8 0.81    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
130 7 0.82    1 1.41  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.33% 
131 7 0.99    2 0.19  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
132 7 0.29    3 0.11  2 0 0 1 * 9 98.67% 
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133 7 0.41    4 0.51  2 0 0 0 250 9 92.00% 
134 7 0.54    5 1.25  2 0 0 1 * 9 80.33% 
135 7 0.59    6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
136 7 0.77    7 0.35  2 0 0 1 * 10 98.67% 
137 7 0.55    8 0.77  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
138 8 0.72  1 1.31    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
139 8 0.11  2 0.33    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
140 8 0.14  3 0.14    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
141 8 0.16  4 0.10    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
142 8 0.18  5 1.65    2 0 0 1 * 115 82.67% 
143 8 0.52  6 *   2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
144 8 0.41  7 0.30    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
145 8 0.50  8 0.90    2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
146 8 0.80    1 2.93  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.00% 
147 8 0.90    2 0.19  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
148 8 0.31    3 0.28  2 0 0 1 * 13 96.67% 
149 8 0.23    4 0.37  2 0 0 0 250 9 93.33% 
150 8 0.09    5 3.14  2 0 0 1 * 9 52.33% 
151 8 0.25    6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
152 8 0.23    7 0.30  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
153 8 0.10    8 0.18  2 0 0 1 * 10 99.33% 
154   1 2.91  1 2.50  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
155   1 2.94  2 0.49  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
156   1 1.54  3 0.40  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
157   1 2.15  4 0.26  2 0 0 0 250 143 91.33% 
158   1 2.05  5 3.09  2 0 0 1 * 103 57.33% 
159   1 1.56  6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
160   1 2.59  7 0.57  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
161   1 1.69  8 1.00  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
162   2 0.14  1 1.38  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
163   2 0.24  2 0.34  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
164   2 0.28  3 0.18  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
165   2 0.52  4 0.33  2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
166   2 0.57  5 1.17  2 0 0 1 * 170 91.67% 
167   2 0.32  6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
168   2 0.37  7 0.83  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
169   2 0.21  8 0.78  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
170   3 0.16  1 1.35  2 0 0 1 * 9 99.33% 
171   3 0.33  2 0.26  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
172   3 0.14  3 0.13  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
173   3 0.16  4 0.22  2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
174   3 0.46  5 1.60  2 0 0 1 * 122 80.33% 
175   3 0.48  6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
176   3 0.32  7 0.31  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
177   3 0.33  8 0.02  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
178   4 0.41  1 2.04  2 0 0 0 86 135 88.00% 
179   4 0.38  2 0.44  2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
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180   4 0.08  3 0.14  2 0 0 1 * 176 92.33% 
181   4 0.17  4 0.45  2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
182   4 0.10  5 2.43  2 0 0 1 * 105 66.67% 
183   4 0.49  6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
184   4 0.10  7 0.32  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
185   4 0.22  8 0.97  2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
186   5 3.40  1 1.57  2 0 0 0 1 105 55.33% 
187   5 2.12  2 0.32  2 0 0 1 * 112 73.33% 
188   5 2.00  3 0.20  2 0 0 1 * 109 70.67% 
189   5 1.73  4 0.20  2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
190   5 2.39  5 2.12  2 0 0 0 7 215 48.33% 
191   5 3.20  6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
192   5 2.52  7 0.36  2 0 0 1 * 105 64.00% 
193   5 2.12  8 0.73  2 0 0 1 * 110 73.00% 
194   6 * 1 2.82  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
195   6 * 2 0.80  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
196   6 * 3 0.41  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
197   6 * 4 0.23  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
198   6 * 5 1.25  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
199   6 * 6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
200   6 * 7 0.21  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
201   6 * 8 0.12  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
202   7 0.46  1 1.93  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
203   7 0.22  2 0.51  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
204   7 0.36  3 0.35  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
205   7 0.39  4 0.26  2 0 0 1 * 0 92.67% 
206   7 0.88  5 1.03  2 0 0 1 * 168 85.67% 
207   7 0.64  6 * 2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
208   7 0.08  7 0.30  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
209   7 0.86  8 0.66  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
210   8 0.78  1 2.95  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
211   8 0.72  2 0.16  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
212   8 0.74  3 0.27  2 0 0 1 * 0 100.00% 
213   8 0.93  4 0.24  2 0 0 1 * 0 99.00% 
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